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articulos
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Antonio Blanco Relacionalidad y atomicidad (Relationality and Atomicity)
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Se presenta un esquema ontológico en el que el par relacional/atómico desempeña un papel central. La noción basica, la que se define en terminos positivos, es la de “relacionalidad”. La atomicidad es definida negativamente, como no-relacionalidad. En realidad, se distinguen diversas nociones positivas, emparentadas entre sí, que pueden verse como diferentes formas de relacionalidad a las que corresponden diferentes formas de atomicidad (o no-relacionalidad). A continuación, ese instrumental ontológico se aplica al planteamiento de dos cuestiones semánticas: se trata brevemente la cuestión deI individualismo y, más en detalle, la cuestión deI holismo semántico.An ontological framework is presented in which the relational/atomic pair plays a central role. The basic notion, which is defined in positive terms, is that of “relationality”. “Atomicity” is negatively defined as non-relationality. More exactly, we distinguish between several related positive notions that can be seen as different kinds of relationality. Correspondingly, we distinguish between several kinds of atomicity (or nonrelationality). Then, the ontological tools are applied to two semantic issues: we briefly deal with the individualism issue and in more detail with the issue of semantic holism.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Louise Cummings Self-Refutations and Much More: The Dialectical Thinking of Hilary Putnam
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In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s (1981) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Alejandro Sobrino Conocimiento absoluto y conocimiento cientifico. Una visión computacional (Absolute Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge: A Computational View)
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EI análisis de algunos programas lógicos y de algunos problemas ya tradicionales de la teoría de la computabilidad -como el problema de la correspondencia de Post-, permiten mostrar algunas claves para argumentar acerca de la posibilidad o imposibilidad de un ordenador omnisciente. Los programas logicos inductivos y alguno de sus resultados más prometedores, como Golem, sirven para valorar la posibilidad de un ordenador corno ayudante cualificado en la tarea de hacer ciencia. Ambas discusiones dan paso a una reflexión final sobre el mecanicismo.The analysis ofsome logical programs and some traditional topics from the computability theory -as the Post Correspondence Problem-, enables us to illustrate some key points for discussing the possibility ofa computer as an omniscient entity. Inductive logical programs and some oftheir most promising representatives, such as Golem, are showed useful for evaluating the possibility ofa computer as a qualified support ofscientific activity. Both topics give rise to a concluding discussion around mechanism.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Charbel Niño EI-Hani, Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Causação descendente, emergência de propriedades e modos causais aristotélicos (Downward Causation, Property Emergence, and Aristotelian Causal Modes)
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O problema da causação descendente é um ponto central na formulação do fisicalismo não-redutivo e na compreensão da emergência de propriedades. Duas interpretações possíveis da causação descendente, nas quais a contribuição do pensamento aristotélico é importante, são examinadas. Os requisitos do programa de matematização da natureza na mecanica clássica, que levaram ao abandono de três dos modos causais aristotélicos, nao parecem igualmente importantes nas ciencias especiais. Isto sugere que a contribuição de Aristóteles pode ser, de certa maneira, retomada. Uma definição de propriedade emergente é apresentada, sendo a causação descendente interprerada de acordo com os modos causais formal e funcional.The problem of downward causation is a key subject in the formulation of nonreductive physicalism as well as in the understanding of property emergence. Two possible interpretations of downward causation, to which Aristotelian thought is relevant, are examined. In the mathematical understanding of nature in classical mechanics, the principle of causality should meet requirements that entailed the rejection of three among the four Aristotelian causal modes. Those requirements do not seem equally important in the special sciences and one may suggest, then, that Aristotle’s contribution may be taken into account. A definition of an emergent property is proposed, in which downward causation is interpreted according to the formal and functional causal modes.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Eleonora Orlando Abduction, Realism and Ethics
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In this paper, I am concerned with the possibility of applying an abductive strategy in founding ethical realism. First, I criticize Harman’s position, according to which abduction, though useful for founding scientific realism, does not serve to found ethical realism. Secondly, I examine Sturgeon’s critique, according to which distinctively moral facts do constitute the best explanations of the moral evidence. Finally,I conclude that Sturgeon is right in as far as the ontological status of moral properties is concerned but his answer to Harman’s point is not properly developed.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Carlos Solís Los cometas contra Copérnico: Brahe, Galileo y los jesuitas (Comets Against Copernicus: Brahe, Galileo, and the Jesuits)
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Brahe creía que su teoría sobre los cometas refutaba el copernicanismo. Analizamos el argumento y mostramos que ningún sistema existente podía acomodarlos. Tras el decreto anticopernicano de 1616, muchos jesuitas que rechazaban a Ptolomeo e incluso coqueteaban con Copérnico se vieron obligados a abrazar el sistema de Brahe. La discusión de los cometas de 1618 permitía a los jesuitas reforzar a Brahe en un momento en que Galileo no podía defender el copernicanismo. La disputa de los cometas se examina bajo esta luz y se conjetura la orientación pro-Brahe de las censuras del Diálogo de Galileo.It was Brahe’s belief that the motion of comets refuted Copernicus’ system and complied with his own. His argument is analyzed to show that neither could explain their motion. After the anti-copernican decree of1616 quite a few Jesuits that rejected Ptolemy and even courted Copernicus were bound to accept Brahe’s system. The appearance of comets in 1618 allowed the Jesuits to describe them and support Brahe, while Galileo could not treat them in copernican terms. So he crossed them off. The comets war is seen under this light and the pro-Brahe bias in the censorship of the Dialogo is strongly conjectured.
recensiones
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Hannot Rodríguez World Risk Society
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Libros recibidos / Books Received
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Agenda / Notebook
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sumario
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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contents
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 2
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
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