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Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents


seccion monografica: mental causation and the exclusion problem
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Josep E. Corbí Presentation
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Marcelo H. Sabatés Varieties of Exclusion
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The problem of exclusion threatens non-reductive physicalist theories of the mind by implying that they cannot account for mental causation. This paper attempts to clarify what exactly the exclusion problem is, and, given the problem, to survey the theoretical options open. First I reconstruct the problem from its most influential sources (Malcolm and Kim), showing that it should be understood as an ontological rather than an explanatory problem. I then distinguish the problem from some consequences that seem to follow from it. Finally I sketch a map of possible answers to exclusion.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
David Pineda Functionalism and Nonreductive Physicalism
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Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of serious difficulties. In this paper, I propose a metaphysical account of functional properties and show how this proposal is able to overcome some of these difficulties, in particular, some recent arguments against the causal efficacy of multiply realized properties. However, in the second part of the paper an objection against this proposal is raised and, after a detailed discussion of it, the conclusion reached is that the prospects for a functionalist nonreductive metaphysics of the mind which affords causal powers to the mental seem certainly dim.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Stephen Yablo Superproportionality and Mind-Body Relations
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Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say that the second threat relies on a perversion of proportionality that would lay waste to all causal relations.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Agustín Vicente Realization, Determination and Mental Causation
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The by now famous exclusion problem for mental causation admits only one possible solution, as far as I can see, namely: that mental and physical properties are linked by a vertical relation. In this paper, starting from what I take to be sensible premises about properties, I will be visiting some general relations between them, in order to see whether, first, it is true that some vertical relationship, other than identity, makes different sorts of causation compatible and second, whether physical and mental properties can be pairs of such relationship.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Terry Horgan Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem
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Causal compatibilism claims that even though physics is causally closed, and even though mental properties are multiply realizable and are not identical to physical causal properties, mental properties are causal properties nonetheless. This position asserts that there is genuine causation at multiple descriptive/ontological levels; physics-level causal claims are not really incompatible with mentalistic causal claims. I articulate and defend a version of causal compatibilism that incorporates three key contentions. First, causation crucially involves robust patterns of counterfactual dependence among properties.Second, often several distinct such patterns, all subsuming a single phenomenon, exist at different descriptive/ontological levels (e.g., microphysical, neurobiological, macrobiological, and psychological). Third, the concept of causation is governed by an implicit contextual parameter that normally determines a specific descriptive/ontological level as the contextually relevant level, for the context-sensitive semantic evaluation of causal statements.
articulos / articles
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Newton C.A. Da Costa Paraconsistency: Towards a Tentative Interpretation
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In this expository paper, we examine some philosophical and technical issues brought by paraconsistency (such as, motivations for developing a paraconsistent logic, the nature of this logic, and its application to set theory). We also suggest a way of accommodating these issues by considering some problems in the philosophy of logic from a new perspective.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Cristina Corredor A Comment on Threats and Communicative Rationality
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The article studies two especific forms of social interaction, linguistically mediated: promises and threats. Two pregnant theoretical accounts are to be considered here. Firstly, the analysis propounded within the framework of Game Theory, assuming an intentionalist account of human agency and an instrumentalist concept of rationality; and secondly, the attempt carried out by Speech Acts theorists. In the first case, it can be shown that the theoretical premisses are insufficient to offer a proper account of such basic forms of social interchange. This result gives indirect support, so it is argued, to the second theoretical framework considered. Yet some of the solutions offered seem to be also unsatisfactory. Reasons are given of why it is so, and an attempt of solution, within the same theoretical framework, is suggested.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Jesús Vega ¿Por Que es Necesario Distinguir entre "Ciencia" y "Tecnica"? (Why do we need to distinguish between "Science " and "Technology "?)
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RESUMEN: Este artículo argumenta a favor de la necesidad de mantener una distinción nítida entre ciencia y técnica en contra de ciertas tendencias interpretativas y socio-institucionales dominantes en algunos círculos de filósofos y sociólogos. Se presentan dos argumentos: el primero insiste en la conveniencia analitíca de describir direrencìadamente las actividades científicas y tecnológicas a partir de las nociones de "acto epistémico" y "acto material"; el segundo descubre en las reglas constitutivas de la aceptabilidad de resultados científicos y técnicos respectivamente un modo de distinguir socio-institucionalmente ambas esferas de producción de conocimiento.ABSTRACT: This paper argues for the need to maintain a clear distinction between science and technology against some well-known interpretative tendencies within some dominant circles of philosophers and sociologists. Two arguments are presented: the first one insists on the analytical convenience to describe differently the scientific and the technological activities by introducing the notions of "epistemic act" and "material act"; the second one discovers in the constitutiverules for the acceptability of scientific and technological results a way to distinguish socioinstitutionally both spheres of knowledge production.
recensiones / book reviews
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
José L. Falguera Kuhn y el cambio científico
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Luis Fernandez Moreno Filosofía del lenguaje
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Libros recibidos / Books Received
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cronicas y proximas reuniones / notices and announcements
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Agenda / Notebook
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sumario analitico / summary
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Seccion Monografica
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15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Articulos / Articles
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16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Recensiones / Book Reviews
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17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 16 > Issue: 1
Boletin de suscripción / Order Form
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