Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents


seccion monografica
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Manuel García-Carpintero Presentación
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Christopher Belshaw Gold
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Kripke’s opponents claim that gold, in all possible worlds, is a yellow metal. They believe that the atomic number can vary from world to world. Kripke inverts this, holding that while gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79, its surface properties may vary widely from world to world. Both views are flawed, but of the two, the rival is to be preferred. There is a better view. Gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79. And (given certain specifiable conditions) it is, in all possible worlds, a yellow meta!. Only insofar as they give rise to familiar and important surface properties is there reason to maintain that structural properties are at the essence or nature of things.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
María Cerezo Nombrar kripkeano versus Nombrar tractariano: un intento de demarcación (Tractarian Naming versus Kripkean Naming: Similarities and Differences)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Raymond Bradley ha ofrecido una interpretacion esencialista de la ontologia deI Tractatus Logico Philosophicus de Wittgenstein (R. Bradley, The Nature of All Being, 1992), en la que pretende desarrollar las dimensiones modales que en su opinión estan implícitas en el Tractatus. EI proposito de este trabajo es revisar la interpretación bradleyana de los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, examinando la noción tractariana de nombre y la kripkeana de designador rigido en Naming and Necessity, con un doble objetivo: contestar a la cuestión de si es posible interpretar los nombres tractarianos corno designadores rígidos, y alumbrar algunas semejanzas y diferencias entre ambas teorias deI significado.Raymond Bradley, in his book The Nature of All Being, has put forward an essentialist interpretation of the ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logicophilosophicus and aims to develop the modal dimensions that, in his opinion, are implicit in that work. The aim of this paper is to reassess Bradley’s interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators, by examining the tractarian notion of name and the kripkeanconcept of rigid designator in Naming and Necessity, with a view to answering the question as to whether an interpretation of tractarian names as rigid designators is possible, and to bringing to light some similarities and diffirences between the two theories of meaning.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Josep Macià Does Naming and Necessity Refute Descriptivism?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a number of arguments in order to show that no descriptivist theory of proper names is correct. We present here a certain version of descriptivist theory -we will characterize it as an individual-use reference-fixing descriptivist theory that appeals to descriptions regarding how a name is used by other speakers. This kind of theory can successfully answer all the objections Kripke puts forward in Naming and Necessity. Such sort of descriptivist theory is furthermore compatible with the picture about reference that Kripke presents. It also seems to be able to account for some phenomena that are difficult to explain on Kripke’s view (the existence of informative identity statements and true negative singular existential statements).
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Genoveva Martí Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I discuss two approaches to rigidity. I argue that they differ in the general conception of semantics that each embraces. Moreover, I argue that they differ in how each explains the rigidity of general terms, and in what each presupposes in that explanation.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sattig Proper Name Change
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Gareth Evans (1973) adduces a case in which a proper name apparently undergoes a change in referent. ‘Madagascar’ was originally the name of a part of Africa. Marco Polo, erroneously thinking he was following native usage, applied the name to an island off the African coast. Today ‘Madagascar’ is the name of that island. Evans argues that this kind of case threatens Kripke’s picture of naming as developed in Naming and Necessity. According to this picture, the name, as used by Marco Polo, referred to a part of the African mainland, since he was connected to the latter by a historical chain of communication. Since we are historically connected to Marco Polo, the name, as it is used today, still refers to the African mainland. But it doesn’t. The aim of the present paper is to give a conclusive account of the phenomenon adduced by Evans, which is compatible with Kripke’s picture.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Niko Strobach Time and Development in Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I want to focus on time and development in Kripke’s “Naming and Necessity” by considering two topics: (1) the evolution of scientific knowledge; (2) the evolution of biographies. In connection with (1) I suggest the introduction of a sentence operator for epistemic possibility and argue that some of Kripke’s strong metaphysical statements are finely counterbalanced by rather “Popperian” epistemological considerations. In connection with (2) I consider the idea of exploiting necessity of origin for a crossworld identity criterion.
articulos
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Sebastián Alvarez La causalidad probabilista y las dificultades del enfoque humeano (Probabilistic Causality and the Difficulties of the Humean Approach)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Comienzo este artículo mostrando que las teorías neohumeanas de la causalidad probabilista basadas en la noción de relevancia estadlstica (como la teoria de Suppes, 1970) se encuentran con múltiples e insuperables dificultades. Luego analizo brevemente algunas versiones de la causalidad probabilista que relativizan o prescinden de dicha noción: la de Cartwright, que postula la existencia de capacidades causales, y las de Salmon y Dowe, quienes, aunque se proponen no abandonar el suelo humeano, creen necesario introducir una ontología de propensiones. Y concluyo que el análisis de estas versiones demuestra que la causalidad probabilista constituye un nuevo y serio obstáculo para el enfoque humeano o neohumeano de la causalidad.In this paper I first show that the neohumean theories of probabilistic causality based on the notion of statistical relevance (as that of Suppes, 1970) run into many and unsolvable difficulties. Then I briefty analyze some accounts of probabilistic causality which relativize or avoid this notion: the Cartwright’s account, claiming the existence of causal capacities, and those of Salmon and Dowe, though trying to remain on a Humean ground, believe that the introduction of an ontology of propensities is required. I finally conclude that the analysis of these accounts shows that probabilistic causality constitutes a new and serious obstacle to the Humean or neohumean view of causality.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Manuel Montalvo, Miguel Angel Durán EI mercado como orden espontáneo y el principio de ignorancia (Market as a Spontaneous Order and the PrincipIe of Ignorance)
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
La perspectiva historiográfica ofrecida por la teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias puede ser reconceptualizada en una concepción del mercado que explique su funcionamiento como una continua interrelación entre individuos que desconocen las consecuencias colectivas de los cursos de acción que emprenden.Asimismo, podrían distinguirse dos versiones de dicha teoria; de un lado, Ia versión débil, que se correspondería con el concepto de mercado de Hayek, y, deI otro, Ia versión fuerte. EI objetivo de este artículo es proponer el concepto al que hemos denominado el principio de ignorancia, que seria una concepción acerca deI desenvolvimiento deI mercado acorde con los rasgos propios de Ia versión fuerte de Ia teoría de las consecuencias involuntarias.The historiographical perspective of the theory of unintended consequences can be reconceptualized into a conception of the market which explains its operation as a continuous interaction among individuals that do not know the collective consequences of their behaviours.Also, two versions of this theory might be distinguished, the weak version, which corresponds to Hayek’s concept of market, and the strong version. The aim of this paper is to propose the concept that we have termed as ignorance principIe, which is a conception of the operation of the market that fits to the characteristics of the strong version of the theory of unintended consequences.
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
J. Javier Goldáraz EI temperamento igual. Una indagación histórica (Equal Temperament: A Historical Research).
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Nuestro sistema musical de referencia está basado en la division de la octava en doce partes, doce semitonos, iguales. Aunque adecuada tal configuración a la práctica musical, conlleva en el plano teórico una serie de problemas, como que, a excepción de la propia octava, no haya ni una sola consonancia natural (justa) o que la razon deI semitono sea 12√2. Tal temperamento igual no se impone definitivamente hasta mediados deI s. XVIII, pero ya a finales deI s. XVI se llega a su formulación y determinación exactas, bien que no de forma matemática. En este esfuerzo merece especial atenciónla figura deI teórico musical español Francisco Salinas.Our tonal system of reference is based· on division of the octave into twelve equal parts, twelve semitones. Although this configuration is suitable for practical musical purposes, it poses some problems for music theory. For example, apart from the octave itself, there is not one natural (just) consonance. Also, the semitone ratio results to be 12√2. This equal temperament was not definitively imposed until the middle of the 18th Century, but by the end of the 16th Century its precise formulation and calculation, although not in its mathematical form, had been completed. The spanish humanist and music theorist Francisco Salinas was one of the key figures responsible for this task.
recensiones
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Miguel Espinoza “¿Puede la física explicar la conciencia?”
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Juan Bautista Bengoetxea Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Luis Garagalza Razones prácticas: Sobre la teoría de la acción
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
libros recibidos
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Libros recibidos / Books Received
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
cronicas y proximas reuniones
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Agenda / Notebook
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
sumario
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
contents
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
view |  rights & permissions | cited by