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Displaying: 1-15 of 15 documents


articulos
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Miguel Sánchez-Mazas EI poliedro imposible: ciencia y filosofia, tecnología y utopía (The Impossible Polyhedron: Science and Philosophy, Technology and Utopia)
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A través de los recursos esenciales de la semantica de los mundos posibles se comparan y relacionan, por un lado, la dimensión científica y filosófica, y por otro, la dimensión tecnica y la utópica, utilizándose para ello las relaciones entre composibilidad (o compatibilidad) y existencia, y entre el mundo actual, en el que opera la técnica, y mundos posibles, hacia los que se proyecta la utopía. En esta tarea resulta de interés prestar atención a la problematica clasica acerca de los poliedros posibles e imposibles, en relación con el problema de la afectación, exclusión o ajuste de los “monstruos” de la lógica o de la razón.Through the essential means of the semantics of possible worlds, some dimensions are compared and related: firstly, the scientific and philosophical dimension, and secondly the technical and utopian dimension. For that purpose the relationship between compossibility (or compatibility) and existence are used as well as that between the real world, in which technique works, and possible worlds, towards utopia is oriented. In this task it is interesting to pay attention to the classic issue of possible and impossible polyhedrons, concerning affectation, exclusion or fitting of “monsters” of logic or of reason.
seccion monografica
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Presentation
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3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Herbert Simon Economics as a Historical Science
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As science deals with invariants and history with dated events, the phrase “historical science” might be thought to be an oxymoron. However, the prevalence in the natural sciences and economics of differential equations filled with time derivatives should persuade us of the legitimacy of joining history with science. The combination can, in fact, take several forms. This paper examines some of the ways inwhich history and economics can be fashioned into economic history, and the reasons why they need to be so joined.A particularly important source of historicity in economics is that boundedly rational economic actors represent the economic scene in radically different ways from time to time, and these changes occur as a function of natural and social events, social influences on perception, and the molding of human motives by the social environment, which is itself time dependent. For these and other reasons, many of thembound closely to basic human characteristics, the dynamic movements of the economic system depend not only on invariant laws, but on continually changing boundary conditions as weIl.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Daniel Hausman Confirming Mainstream Economic Theory
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This essay is concerned with the special difficulties that arise in testing and appraising mainstream economic theory. I argue that, like other theories designed to apply to complex open systems, it is very hard to confirm mainsteam economics. Parts can be tested and appraised, but the theory is only very weakly supported by evidence.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Alexander Rosenberg La Teoría Económica como Filosofía Politica (Economic Theory as Political Philosophy)
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Defiendo la legitimidad de la pregunta acerca de cuál puede ser el estatuto cognitivo de la Teoría Económica, y sostengo que la Teoría se comprende mejor como una rama de la Filosofía Política formal, en concreto, como una especie de contractualismo. Esto parece particularmente adecuado corno explicación de la Teoría deI equilibrio general. Dado el carácter intencional de las variables explicativas de la Teoría Económica y el papel de la información al realizar una elección, se argumenta que es improbable que dicha Teoría pueda garantizar el poder predictivo, que le permitiría funcionar corno teoría factual en vez de corno teoría normativa.I defend the integrity of the question of what the cognitive status of economic theory could amount to, and I argue that the theory is best understood as a compartment of formal political philosophy, in particular a species of contractarianism. This seems particularly apt as an account of general equilibrium theory. Given the intentional character of the explanatory variables of economic theory and the role of information in effecting choice, it is argued that economic theory is unlikely to secure the predictive power that would enable it to function as a factual instead of a normative theory.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Uskali Mäki Aspects of Realism about Economics
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A few aspects of the issue of realism are addressed in the context of a social science. The paper looks for adjustments needed in our conceptions of scientiflc realism to accommodate some peculiarities of economics. Ontologically speaking, economics appears to be closely linked to commonsense conceptions of the world, thus the problem of theoretical concepts does not emerge in the same form it is often taken to exist in physics. Theory formation is largely a matter of idealization and isolation among observables rather than postulation of unobservables. Given that isolative theories violate the truth in many ways, truth is more of a problem than existence in a realism pertaining to economics. The idea of significant truth -which is able to tolerare varieties of untruths in theories- is suggested to be based on the notion of the way the world works; this is a matter of the causal structure and functioning of the world. None of this is undermined by the acknowledgement that economist’s attittudes and decisions are shapped by rhetorical persuasion.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Wenceslao J. Gonzalez Prediction and Prescription in Economics: A Philosophical and Methodological Approach
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“Prediction” and “prescription” are crucial notions for economics. This paper offers a philosophical and methodological approach and takes into account the connection with the problem of science and values. To do this, two steps are followed: firstly, prediction in economics -its characteristics and limits- will be examined and, secondly, the role of prescription in economics (and its relations with internal and external values) will be studied. Thus; the underlying aims of this paper are to make explicit the characters of economic prediction, to show its nexus with the economic prescription and to point out the links of both -especially, the latter- with the specific values of “economic activity” and the values of “economics as activity” (i. e., values of economic undertaking as an activity interconnected with others in the social context).
articulos
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Carlos J. Moya Justificación, causalidad y acción intencional (Justification, Causality and Intentional Action)
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Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para entender el concepto de acción intencional. Esta concepción causal de la justificación y de la acción intencional no se ve expuesta al problema de las cadenas causales desviadas que afecta a las teorías causales ortodoxas ni a la amenaza deI epifenomenismo de las propiedades mentales.Both causal and non-causal action theories take the justification relation to be a non-causal, purely conceptual or logical relation between reasons and action. According to causal theorists, intentional action has to satisfy, besides the justification condition, an additional and independent causal condition. In this paper it is held, however, that justification is already a causal concept, so that there is no need to resort to an independent causal requirement in order to understand the concept of intentional action. This causal view of justification and intentional action does not face either the problem of wayward causalchains which infects orthodox causal theories or the threat of epiphenomenalism of mental properties.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Newton C.A. Da Costa, Jean-Yves Béziau Définition, Théorie des Objets et Paraconsistance (Definition, Objects’ Theory and Paraconsistance)
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Trois sortes de définitions sont présentées et discutées: les définitions nominales, les définitions contextuelles et les définitions amplificatrices. On insiste sur le fait que I’elimination des definitions n’est pas forcement un procede automatique en particulier dans le cas de la logique paraconsistante. Finalement on s’int’resse à la théorie des objets de Meinong et l’on montre comment elle peut êrre considéréecomme une théorie des descripteurs.Three kinds of definitions are presented and discussed: nominal definitions, contextual definitions, amplifying definitions. It is emphasized that the elimination of definitions is not necessarily straightforward in particular in the case of paraconsistent logic. Finally we have a look at Meinong’s theory objects and we show how it can be considered as a theory of descriptors.
recensiones
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Francisco J. Ausín Calculemos... Matemáticas y libertad (Homenaje a Miguel Sánchez-Mazas)
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Carlos Pelta Introducción a la Teoría de los Sistemas Deductivos
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Carlos Pelta Teoría de la computación
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libros recibidos
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Libros recibidos / Books Received
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Agenda / Notebook
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sumario
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
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