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seccion monografica
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Luis Fernandez Moreno Presentation
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Howard Sankey Incommensurability: The Current State of Play
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The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ. This paper presents an overview of the main issues which have arisen in the debate about incommensurability. It also briefly outlines a response to the thesis based on a modified causal theory of reference which allows change of reference subsequent to initial baptism, as well as a role to description in the determination of reference. On such a view. the content of theories may be compared on the basis of shared reference, despite failure of translation. Two recent developments involving the incomnensurability thesis are also examined: (i) the taxonomic version of the incomensurability thesis found in Kuhn’s later writings. (ii) Hoyningen-Huenc’s neo-Kantian interpretation of Kuhn’s metaphysics.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Eric Oberheim, Paul Hoyningen-Huene Incommensurability, Realism, and Meta-Incommensurability
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The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Brigitte Falkenburg Incommensurability and Measurement
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Does incommensurability threaten the realist’s claim that physical magnitudes express properties of natural kinds? Some clarification comes from measurement theory and scientific practice. The standard (empiricist) theory of measurement is metaphysically neutral. But its representational operational and axiomatic aspects give rise to several kinds of a one-sided metaphysics. In scientific practice. the scales of physical quantities (e.g. the mass or length scale) are indeed constructed from measuring methods which have incompatible axiomatic foundations. They cover concepts which belong to incomensurable theories. I argue, however, that the construction of such scales conmmits us to a modest version of scientific realism.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Luis Fernandez Moreno ¿Es la referencia deI término “agua” immutable?: (ls the reference of the term “water” immutable?)
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Algunas de las objeciones más importantes contra la tesis de la incommensurabilidad, especialmente en su versión referencial se basan en la teoría causal de la referencia y, en particular, en la teoría de la referencia de Putnam acerca de los términos de género natural: de estl teoría se sigue que la referencia de los términos de género natural no se ve modificada por cambios en nuestras teorías. En este articulo examino la teoria de la referencia de Putnam y arguyo que esta no permite rebatir la tesis de la incommensurabilidad referencial. Mi examen se centra en la referencia de un tipo de términos de genera natural los terminos de sustancia y, en concreto, en la referencia deI término “agua”.Some of the most imporant objections against the incommensurability thesis, especially in its referential version, are based on tbe causal theory of reference and, in particular, on Putnam’s reference theory about natural kind terms; from this theory it follows that the reference of natural kind terms is not modified by changes in our theories. In this paper I examine Putnam’s theory of reference and argue that it does not countenance a refutation of the thesis of referential incommensurability. My examination concentrates on the reference of one sort of natural kind terms, substance terms, and specifically on tbe reference of the term “water”.
articulos
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Andreas Beck Mentiras sobre el mentiroso: (Lies about the Liar)
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La construcción de un lenguaje formal en el que sea posible llevar a cabo fonnulaciones sobre la verdad de los enunciados deI propio lenguaje se ha revelado en extremo problemático, puesto que los llamados enunciados deI mentiroso conducen a paradojas. En su libro The Liar, Barwise y Etchemendy afirman haber solucionado el problema mediante su semántica russelliana y semantica austiniana. Sin embargo, en este articulo va a ser demostrado que la semántica russelliana fracasa en solucionar el problema por las mismas razones que planteamientos clásicos suelen fracasar, y que la semantica austiniana fracasa totalmente puesto que esta semantica no contiene ningún predicado veritativo.Formal languages with truth predicates are seriously affected by paradoxes in the form of Liar sentences. In their best-seller The Liar, Barwise and Etchemendy achieved to convince a respectable part of the philosophical world that they have solved this problem by means of their Russellian- and Austinian semantics. The aim of this paper is to stop the rumour that the Liar paradox is solved. lt will be shown that Russellian semantics fails because of the same reasons classical approaches use to fail, and that Austinian semantics fails totally since it contains no truth predicate, i.e. in Austinian semantics it is generally impossible to express the truth or falsehood of a proposition.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Néstor Carrillo Biosemiótica. Un paradigma emergente en Biología: (Biosemiotics. An Emerging Paradigm in Biology)
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Se propone el uso de la Semiótica como herramienta integradora para investigar los aspectos fundamentales de los seres vivos. Como tal, la Biosemiótica abre nuevas perspectivas metodológicas para integrar un gran numero de fenómenos aparentemente no vinculados o incompatibles entre sí. EI principio básico es que la Biología, desde el nivel molecular al sistemíco, puede ser estudiada como comunicación, y los procesos biológicos como interacciones mediadas por signos. La vida es definida como una propiedad sistemica de la materia. La Biología es, en si misma y en todos sus aspectos, Semiótica Natural próxima al caos determinista. EI paradigma biosemiótico es propuesto como un paso hacia la formulación de una teoría sintética de la vida, que incorpore los componentes mecanistico-moIeculares, interpretaciones semioticas, y Ia historia natural de los sistemas vivientes.Semiotics is introduced as an integrative approach to investigate the intimate features of living systems. As an overarching concept, Biosemiotics offers new methodological perspectives to integrate a vast number of apparently unrelated phenomena. The basic tenet is that Biology, from the molecular to the systemic level, can be investigated as communication, and biological processes as sign-mediated interactions. Life is defined as a systemic property of matter. Biology is then, in all its aspects, Natural Semiotics with a proximity to deterministic chaos. The biosemiotic paradigm is intended as a step toward the establishment of a synthetic theory of life, incorporating the molecular-mechanistic components, the semiotic interpretations, and the natural history of the living systems.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Enrique A. Sanchez Perez, José Sanchez Marin Sobre algunas propiedades formaIes de los sistemas de representación en química: (On Some Formal Properties of the Chemical Representation Systems)
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En este trabajo se define formamente el concepto de representacion en química utilizando homomorfismos desde estructuras algebraicas, que llamamos sistemas de tipo C, en otras estructuras especiales de símbolos muy relacionados con los que son habituales en la qímica experimental. Para la definicion de los sistemas de tipo C se ha seleccionado un conjunto minimo de relaciones y funciones, que son necesarias para expresar proposiciones significativas en química. Tambien se define un lenguaje formal de primer orden adecuado a los sistemas de tipo C, que llamamos L(C). EI resultado principal que se demuestra es que toda representación que verifica las mismas sentencias de L(C) que un sistema de tipo C, es necesariamente isomorfo a él. Se concluye por lo tanto que puede existir un problema linguístico subyacente en la aplicacion que de la mecaníca cuántica se hace en la química teórica.The concept of representation in chemistry bas been formallv defined by means of homomorphisms from algebraical structures, which we call type-C systems, to some special sets of symbols which can be related to the symbols ordinarily used in experimental chemistry. A minimum number of relations and functions, which would suffice to express significant propositions in chemistry, have been chosen to define type-C systems. A first order formal language L(C) adequate to type-C systems has been defined. It has been shown that each representation that verifies the same sentences of L(C) as a type-C system is necessarily isomorphic to it. It is concluded that a systematic study of the representation problem in chemistry is in order because a deep language problem underlies the application of quantum mechanies to chemical problems.
recensiones
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Ignacio Ayestarán Uriz Historias de la ciencia y deI olvido
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
lgnacio Vicario Arjona Pensamiento y lenguaje: Problemas en la atribución de actitudes proposicionales
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David Casacuberta La diversidad de las emociones
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libros recibidos
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECEIVED
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
AGENDA / NOTEBOOK
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noticias
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Il Congreso de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica
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sumario
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
SUMARIO DEL VOL. XII / CONTENTS OF VOL. XII
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articulos
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero Putnam’s Dewey Lectures
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This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls “Cartesianism cum Materialism”, CM. He puts forward what he takes to be an alternative, apparently based on the traditional Chisholmian “Theory of Appearing”. The paper suggest firstly that, in view of the facts to be accounted for, a theory along those lines cannot count as a real alternative to CM. In the second part, the paper develops an analogous tension between the views on truth Putnam seems to be willing to defend in the Dewey Lectures, and previous criticisms of the semantic conception of truth by hirn that heclaims still to be willing to subscribe.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jean-Pascal Alcantara La théorie leibnizienne du changement en 1676: une interpretation du dialogue Pacidius Philalethi a la lumière de la Caractéristique géométrique (Leibniz's Theory of Variation in 1676: an Interpretation of the Dialogue Pacidius Philalethi through the Characteristica geometrica)
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Cherchant à refonder l’édifice euclidien, Leibniz a formulé une Caractéristique géométrique qui annonce les concepts géneraux de la théorie des ensembles. Dans ce cadre, il a pu en particulier formaliser sa conception du continu. L’intérêt du Pacidius Philalethi (1676) est de montrer qu’en choisissant la conception intensionnelle du continu -position qu’il ne dementira jamais- il sélectionne parmi les images duales celle dont se déduit le changement qualitatif, base d’une philosophie naturelle qui soutiendra encore la dynamique ultérieure. Une tâche se dessine maintenant, soit déduire la nécessité d’un mouvement universei et infiniment varié à partir de ses conditions topologiques.We know that Leibniz intended to bring new foundations to the euclidean geometry and he has according to this view formulate a Characteristica geometrica which announces few general concepts of set theory. Parlicularly he tried to formalise his conception of continuity. Before the main interest of the Pacidius Philalethi (1676) is here: showing us that Leibniz when he chooses an intensional conception of continuity he chooses in the same time the dual image from which be can deduce the qualitative variation. We reckon again these conception at the grounds of his later philosophy of nature. But now we have to follow Leibniz demostrating how universal and infinite variations flow from its topological conditions.
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Femando Joven Los infinitesimales como ficciones útiles para Leibniz: la polémica en la Academia de París (The Infinitesimals as Useful Fictions for Leibniz: The Controversy in the Paris Academy of Sciences)
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A comienzos deI siglo XVIII se origina una polémica en la Academia de Ciencias de París a propósito de la fundamentación deI calculo infinitesimal. Con motivo de la misma Leibniz presentará los infinitesimales corno ficciones útiles, noción que agrega polémica a la polémica y que habrá que precisar. Leibniz se desmarcará claramente de la idea de infinitesimal mantenida por sus seguidores franceses. Resultado de todo ello es un triunfo en la práctica deI cálculo infinitesimal y un alto en cuanto a su fundamentación.In the beginning of the XVIII century arises a discussion in the Paris Academy of Sciences about the justification of infinitesimal Calculus. In this line, Leibniz will present infinitesimals as useful fictions, a problematic notion that requires an accurate meaning. Leibniz does not accept the infinitesimal concept of his french followers. The result of the controversy was a triumph for Calculus, but a pause in its justification.
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Eduardo Almeida Un analisis de la “res cogitans” (An analysis of “res cogitans”)
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EI tratamiento que hace Descartes deI ‘yo pienso-existo’, lejos de todo proceder inferencial, nos muestra la condición propia de un pensamiento que es “res cogitans”: mi ‘asistir a’ como condición originaria de la fuerza de realidad que soy. Así, el conocimiento que tengo de mí como pensamiento es prejudicativo: no necesita afirmación alguna, sino que expresa prevolitivamente el ser-siendo, o acto, que soy como pensamiento, y que no se extiende a mi cuerpo. The treatment Deseartes does of ‘I think - I exist’ far from any inference, shows the conditioning which is proper of a “res cogitans” thought: my ‘attendance to’ as the originary conditioning of the strength of reality which I am. Thus, the Knowledge I have of myself as thought is prejudicative: it needs no affirmation but it expresses prevolitionally the ‘to be-being’, or act, that I am as thought and which does not extend to my body.
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pedro Ramos El argumento de la identidad y la nominación de funciones en Frege (The Argument on Identity Statements and the Problem of Referring to Functions in Frege’s Philosophy)
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En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, su seolantica resulta ser inexpresable. Finalmente considero una solucion posible a este probierna.In this paper, I relate two items not commonly related in the literature on Frege: Frege’s argument on the interpretation of identity statements and his problem of referring to functions. First, I expound the argument and conclude that it is sound. Second, I characterize the semantical relations which the argument allows him to introduce. In what follows, I deal with the above mentioned problem and show how it affects Frege’s semantics: those semantical relations become unnameable and, therefore, his semantics turns out to be unexpressible. I consider a possible solution of this problem.