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articulos
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero Putnam’s Dewey Lectures
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This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls “Cartesianism cum Materialism”, CM. He puts forward what he takes to be an alternative, apparently based on the traditional Chisholmian “Theory of Appearing”. The paper suggest firstly that, in view of the facts to be accounted for, a theory along those lines cannot count as a real alternative to CM. In the second part, the paper develops an analogous tension between the views on truth Putnam seems to be willing to defend in the Dewey Lectures, and previous criticisms of the semantic conception of truth by hirn that heclaims still to be willing to subscribe.
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jean-Pascal Alcantara La théorie leibnizienne du changement en 1676: une interpretation du dialogue Pacidius Philalethi a la lumière de la Caractéristique géométrique (Leibniz's Theory of Variation in 1676: an Interpretation of the Dialogue Pacidius Philalethi through the Characteristica geometrica)
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Cherchant à refonder l’édifice euclidien, Leibniz a formulé une Caractéristique géométrique qui annonce les concepts géneraux de la théorie des ensembles. Dans ce cadre, il a pu en particulier formaliser sa conception du continu. L’intérêt du Pacidius Philalethi (1676) est de montrer qu’en choisissant la conception intensionnelle du continu -position qu’il ne dementira jamais- il sélectionne parmi les images duales celle dont se déduit le changement qualitatif, base d’une philosophie naturelle qui soutiendra encore la dynamique ultérieure. Une tâche se dessine maintenant, soit déduire la nécessité d’un mouvement universei et infiniment varié à partir de ses conditions topologiques.We know that Leibniz intended to bring new foundations to the euclidean geometry and he has according to this view formulate a Characteristica geometrica which announces few general concepts of set theory. Parlicularly he tried to formalise his conception of continuity. Before the main interest of the Pacidius Philalethi (1676) is here: showing us that Leibniz when he chooses an intensional conception of continuity he chooses in the same time the dual image from which be can deduce the qualitative variation. We reckon again these conception at the grounds of his later philosophy of nature. But now we have to follow Leibniz demostrating how universal and infinite variations flow from its topological conditions.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Femando Joven Los infinitesimales como ficciones útiles para Leibniz: la polémica en la Academia de París (The Infinitesimals as Useful Fictions for Leibniz: The Controversy in the Paris Academy of Sciences)
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A comienzos deI siglo XVIII se origina una polémica en la Academia de Ciencias de París a propósito de la fundamentación deI calculo infinitesimal. Con motivo de la misma Leibniz presentará los infinitesimales corno ficciones útiles, noción que agrega polémica a la polémica y que habrá que precisar. Leibniz se desmarcará claramente de la idea de infinitesimal mantenida por sus seguidores franceses. Resultado de todo ello es un triunfo en la práctica deI cálculo infinitesimal y un alto en cuanto a su fundamentación.In the beginning of the XVIII century arises a discussion in the Paris Academy of Sciences about the justification of infinitesimal Calculus. In this line, Leibniz will present infinitesimals as useful fictions, a problematic notion that requires an accurate meaning. Leibniz does not accept the infinitesimal concept of his french followers. The result of the controversy was a triumph for Calculus, but a pause in its justification.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Eduardo Almeida Un analisis de la “res cogitans” (An analysis of “res cogitans”)
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EI tratamiento que hace Descartes deI ‘yo pienso-existo’, lejos de todo proceder inferencial, nos muestra la condición propia de un pensamiento que es “res cogitans”: mi ‘asistir a’ como condición originaria de la fuerza de realidad que soy. Así, el conocimiento que tengo de mí como pensamiento es prejudicativo: no necesita afirmación alguna, sino que expresa prevolitivamente el ser-siendo, o acto, que soy como pensamiento, y que no se extiende a mi cuerpo. The treatment Deseartes does of ‘I think - I exist’ far from any inference, shows the conditioning which is proper of a “res cogitans” thought: my ‘attendance to’ as the originary conditioning of the strength of reality which I am. Thus, the Knowledge I have of myself as thought is prejudicative: it needs no affirmation but it expresses prevolitionally the ‘to be-being’, or act, that I am as thought and which does not extend to my body.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pedro Ramos El argumento de la identidad y la nominación de funciones en Frege (The Argument on Identity Statements and the Problem of Referring to Functions in Frege’s Philosophy)
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En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, su seolantica resulta ser inexpresable. Finalmente considero una solucion posible a este probierna.In this paper, I relate two items not commonly related in the literature on Frege: Frege’s argument on the interpretation of identity statements and his problem of referring to functions. First, I expound the argument and conclude that it is sound. Second, I characterize the semantical relations which the argument allows him to introduce. In what follows, I deal with the above mentioned problem and show how it affects Frege’s semantics: those semantical relations become unnameable and, therefore, his semantics turns out to be unexpressible. I consider a possible solution of this problem.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Daniel Attala Pochon Dos escepticismos y desafío escéptico en The Advancement of Science, de Philip Kitcher (Two Skepticism and Skeptic Challenge in Philip Kitcher’s The Advancement of Science)
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En este artículo me propongo analizar el punto de partida epistemológico de un reciente libro de Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) a través de su discusión con las concepciónes ‘escépticas’. Podemos distinguir entre dos tipos de escepticismo en Ia trama deI libro de Kitcher: uno débil y otro radical. Intentamos difinir el tipo de realismo que Kitcher defiende, para finalmente mostrar que tal tipo de realismo es posible para Kitcher en Ia medida que no toma en cuenta el escepticismo en su versión radical. En efecto, Kitcher sólo se enfrenta al escepticismo débil. Y es precisamente debido a esta restricción que es capaz de mantenerse al margen de una alternativa que sigue siendo crucial: realismo fuerte o realismo “de espíritu kantiano”.The purpose of this article is to carry out an analysis of the epistemologic standpoint on a recent book by Philip Kitcher (The Advancement of Science) by discussing the sceptic ideas which are dealt with there. We can discriminate between two kinds of scepticism appearing on Kitcher’s book: a weak and a radical one. Then we work towards a definition of the kind of realism held by this author and, finally, we try to show that such a viewpoint as Kitcher’s is possible to hold provided that we do not take the radical scepticism into account for that question. Kitcher only objects by means of the weak scepticism. And it is precisely because of that restriction that he is capable of not giving a definition of a crucial alternative: strong realism or realism in “Kantian spirit”.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Joan Pages Armstrong on the Role of Laws in Counterfactual Supporting
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Armstrong (1983) poses two requirements that law-statements must satisfy in order to support the corresponding counterfactuals. He also argues that law-statements can not satisfy one of these requirements if they merely express regularities, although both requirements are satisfied if law-statements are interpreted as expressing relations between universals. I try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be raised against Armstrong’s own solution by adding three premisses to it: the inference thesis, the contingency thesis and a principle whose rationality I also argue for. Finally, I offer a more reasonable alternative condition for nomic counterfactual supporting which is satisfied by law-statements if they are interpreted as expressing relations between universals, but not so if we interpret them as mere regularities.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Montserrat Bordes Consideraciones procesualistas: en defensa de las partes temporales
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En este artículo pretendo analizar ciertos elementos de la tematica correspondiente a la noción de parte temporal. En la primera parte estudio dicha noción y describo las tesis principales con las que los partidarios de la teoría de partes temporales se comprometen al respecto, En la segunda parte expongo algunas críticas contra la existencia de partes temporales presentadas por los partidarios de continuantes e intento mostrar que o bien estas críticas parten de ciertas confusiones que las hacen insatisfactorias o bien son perfectamente salvables desde el marco tetradimensionalista. Me centro especialmente en las criticas de J.J. Thomson, P. Geach, D. Mellor y S. Haslanger, que hacen referencia a las cuestiones acerca deI supuesto carácter instantaneo de las partes temporales, su existencia ex nihilo, la analogía espacio-temporal y la causalidad humeana.In this paper some answers to certain arguments against temporal parts are presented. The first part explores the very notion of temporal part and tries to describe the main tenets that friends of temporal parts hold. The second one develops sonze criticisms that friends of continuants have expoused against those entities and argues that most of these criticisms mischaracterize the problems at issue. The discussion focuses on J.J. Thomson’s, P. Geach’s, D. Mellor’s and S. Haslanger’s arguments about the impossibility of procesualism to escape from some problematic commitents like instantaneous parts, ex nihilo existences, time-space analogies and humean causes. Nevertheless I will try to show that some of this consequences do not folIow and that some other are seen not to be as threatening as they might first have appeared.
recensiones
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
David Pineda Filosofía de la mente y Ciencia Cognitiva
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10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Alberto Gutiérrez El error de Descartes
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11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Andoni Ibarra Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Javier Echeverría Ciencia, tecnología y sociedad: Una introducción
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14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Andoni Alonso Technology’s School: The Challenge to Philosophy
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15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
lgnacio Ayestarán Uriz Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change
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libros recibidos
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECEIVED
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
AGENDA / NOTEBOOK
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noticias
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Convenio de Asociación entre la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica, de una parte, y la Revista THEORIA, de otra
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