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Displaying: 1-16 of 16 documents


in memoriam
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Javier Echeverria, Andoni Ibarra Sánchez de Zavala In Memoriam
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seccion monografica
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Luis Vega Reñon Presentación: una historia en construcción
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3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Ivor Grattan-Guinness Vida en común, vidas separadas. Sobre las interacciones entre matematicas y lógicas desde la Revolución Francesa hasta la Primera Guerra Mundial (Living together and living apart. On the interactions between mathematics and logics from the French Revolution to the First World War)
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Este artículo presenta un alnplio panorama histórico de las conexiones existentes entre ramas de las matematícas y tipos de lógica durante el periodo 1800-1914. Se observan dos corrientes principales,bastante diferentes entre sí: la lógica algebraica, que hunde sus raíces en la logique yen las algebras de la época revolucionaria francesa y culmina, a través de Boole y De Morgan, en los sistemas de Peirce y de Schröder; y la lógica matematíca, que tiene una fuente de inspiraeión en el analisis matemático de Cauchy y de Weierstrass y culmina, a través de las inieiativas de Peano y de la teoria de conjuntos deCantor, en la obra de Russell. Se extraen algunas conclusiones generales, con referencias relativas a la situaeión posterior a 1914.This article contains a broad historical survey of the connections made between branches of mathematics and types of logic during the period 1800-1914. Two principal streams are noted, rather different from each other: algebraic logic, rooted in French Revolutionary logique and algebras and culminating, via Boole and De Morgan, in the systems of Peirce and Schröder; and mathematical logic, inspired by the mathematical analysis of Cauchy and Weierstrass and culminating, via the initiatives of Peano and the set theory of Cantor, in the work of Russell. Some general conclusions are drawn, with examples given of the state of affairs after 1914.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Volker Peckhaus The way of logic into mathematics
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Using a contextual method the specific development of logic between c. 1830 and 1930 is explained. A characteristic mark of this period is the decomposition of the complex traditional philosophical omnibus discipline logic into new philosophical subdisciplines and separate disciplines such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and formal (symbolic, mathematical) logic. In the 19th century a growing foundational need in mathematics provoked the emergence of a structural view on mathematics and the reformulation of logic for mathematical means. As a result formallogic was taken over by mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century as is shown by sketching the German example.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gregory H. Moore Hilbert and the emergence of modern mathematical logic
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Hilbert’s unpublished 1917 lectures on logic, analyzed here, are the beginning of modern metalogic. In them he proved the consistency and Post-completeness (maximal consistency) of propositional logic -results traditionally credited to Bernays (1918) and Post (1921). These lectures contain the first formal treatment of first-order logic and form the core of Hilbert’s famous 1928 book with Ackermann. What Bernays, influenced by those lectures, did in 1918 was to change the emphasis from the consistency and Post-completeness of a logic to its soundness and completeness: a sentence is provable if and only if valid. By 1917, strongly influenced by PM, Hilbert accepted the theory of types and logicism -a surprising shift. But by 1922 he abandoned the axiom of reducibility and then drew back from logicism, returning to his 1905 approach of trying to prove the consistency of number theory syntactically.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
José Ferreiros Notes on types, sets, and logicism, 1930-1950
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The present paper is a contribution to the history of logic and its philosophy toward the mid-20th century. It examines the interplay between logic, type theory and set theory during the 1930s and 40s, before the reign of first-order logic, and the closely connected issue of the fate of logicism. After a brief presentation of the emergence of logicism, set theory, and type theory (with particular attention to Carnap and Tarski), Quine’s work is our central concern, since he was seemingly the most outstanding logicist around 1940, though he would shortly abandon that viewpoint and promote first-order logic as all of logic. Quine’s class-theoretic systems NF and ML, and his farewell to logicism, are examined. The last section attempts to summarize the motives why set theory was preferred to other systems, and first orderlogic won its position as the paradigm logic system after the great War.
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Francisco Rodriguez Consuegra Nominal definitions and logical consequence in the Peano School
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This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of definition, as they saw them, are briefly explained, mainly in a philosophical context. Finally, already in the kernel of the paper, some of the details of the model-theoretic view itself are shown, first in Peano, then in Pieri and Padoa, including in both cases some study of their semantic definitions of logicalconsequence.
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Ignacio Jane Theoremhood and logical consequence
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In this paper, Tarskis notion of Logical Consequence is viewed as a special case of the more general notion of being a theorem of an axiomatic theory. As was recognized by Tarski, the material adequacy of his definition depends on having the distinction between logical and non logical constants right, but we find Tarskis analysis persuasive even if we dont agree on what constants are logical. This accords with the view put forward in this paper that Tarski indeed captures the more inclusive notion of theoremhood in an axiomatic theory. The approach to logical consequence via axiomatic theories leads us to grant centrality to inference schemas rather than to full-fledged arguments and to view the logically valid schemas as a subclass of generally valid schemas.
articulos
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stuart Silvers Nonreductive Naturalism
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Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism.
in memoriam
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Mario A. Presas In memoriam Ezequiel de Olaso
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recensiones
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Carlos Mínguez Pérez El animal cultural: Biología y cultura en la realidad humana
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12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
José Miguel Rodríguez Santos La nueva filosofía de la mente
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13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Xabier Eizagirre Positivismusstreit: Die Auseinandersetzungen der Frankfurter Schule mit dem logischen Positivismus, dem amerikanischen Pragmatismus und dem kritischen RationalisInus
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libros recibidos
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECEIVED
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Víctor Gómez Pin New Developments on Fundamental Problems in Quantum Physics, Oviedo, julio de 1996.
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16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
AGENDA / NOTEBOOK
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