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presentacion
1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Javier Echeverria, Andoni Ibarra Presentación
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2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Javier Echeverria, Andoni Ibarra Presentation
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seccion monografica
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Carlos Pereda ¿Qué es un buen argumento? (What Is a Good Argument?)
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Las preguntas importantes, o que parecen importantes, no tienen por qué tener respuestas importantes, incluso no tienen por qué tener respuestas. Me propongo explorar qué respuestas, importantes o no importantes, puede recibir, si es que puede recibir alguna respuesta, la importante pregunta “¿qué es un buen argumento?”.Important questions, or questions that seem important, need not have important answers, moreover, they need not have answers at all. I propose to explore what answers, whether important or not, we could obtain, if some answer can be obtained at all, to the important question “what is a good argument?”.
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Eduardo De Bustos Metáforas polémicas: el caso de la argumentación (Polemic Metaphors: The Case of Argumentation)
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La argumentación es un aspecto publico y comunicativo, quizás no el único, de los procesos cognitivos inferenciales en la especie humana. Aunque los propios procesos cognitivos inferenciales no son exclusivos de los seres humanos, su expresión a través de la comunicación lingüística, su utilización en los procesos sociales para la conformación y cambio de las creencias y la conducta es propiamente humana. Una explicación correcta del concepto de argumentación es por tanto importante para captar nuestro concepto de racionalidad, de uso de la razón. EI trabajo explora la forma que tiene el concepto de argumentación en la cultura occidental utilizando las herramientas de teorías cognitivas recientes sobre la naturaleza de los conceptos, sugiriendo sus consecuencias para el concepto de razón.The argumentation is a public and communicative aspect, maybe not the only one, of inferential cognitive processes in the human species. While the very inferential, cognitive processes are not exclusive of the human beings, their expression through the linguistic communication, their use in social processes to shape and change beliefs and behaviour is properly human. An accurate description of the concept of argumentation is important then to grasp our concept of rationality, of the use of the reason. This paper explores the form of the concept of argumentation in western culture using the tools of recent cognitive theories on the nature of concepts, suggesting its consequences for the concept of reason.
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Rom Harré Rhetoric and Realism
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Does the deconstruction of scientific discourse and experimental procedures undercut realism? In this paper I want to argue that the revelation of the rhetorical character of science serves rather to support realism, since it is in the interests of the presentation of scientific writing as factual and of scientific experiments as disclosing or revealing reality that the various rhetorical devices are employed.
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Eleonora Montuschi Metaphor in Social Science
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It is widely acknowledged that scientific discourse is full of metaphors. Does this undermine the commitment of such a discourse to truth and objective knowledge? Does this mean that the scientist (any scientist) is, after all, only a ‘rhetorician in disguise’?In what follows I will try to argue for quite the opposite view. I will show that metaphor is not simply a rhetorical device -at least, in the derogatory sense of rhetoric. There are metaphors which can be used to increment our knowledge, and to explore new conceptual domains. This appears to be the case not only for natural science, but also for the so-called ‘sciences of the social’.
articulos
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Alistair C. Crombie Commitments and Styles of European Scientific Thinking
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8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Víctor Sanchez de Zavala Towards a less simple but sounder (psychological) Pragmatics, & IV
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This final part of the essay begins by exploring some linguistic resources that organize the overall structure of utterances and longer stretches of discourse. Then specific study of emission is broached: after touching upon some further constraints and patterns of interpersonal behavior, the previously developed general sketch of (actionlike) activities’ inception is applied to several types of speech (soliloquy, full other-addressed speech and an intermediate type); the section ends with an assessment of results. Study of linguistic reception is prefaced by a general sketch of processes occurring in perception-like activities, which is then specified for Iinguistic reception; on this basis alternative preferential interpretations of an example are delved into. After an appraisal of results and perspectives and a section on general (mainly methodological) conclusions, the essay comes to a close with several Appendixes.
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Aurelio Perez Fustegueras Sobre semantica de los terminos de genero natural (On the Semantics of Natural-kind Words)
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EI artículo comienza con un análisis de la estructura de la teoría semántica de Kripke y Putnam para términos de génera natural. A continuación, se someten a crítica algunos principios de esta teoría. Tomando pie en lo anterior, la segunda mitad del artículo esta dedicada a una reflexión sobre la relación entre intension y extensión. Tras constatar que los conceptos asociados con términos de genera natural están sujetos a evolución, se concluye que la intensión determina o no determina la extensión dependiendo de la etapa en la que el térmono se encuentre. Esto vendría a significar que tanto ladoctrina tradicional del significado corno la de Kripke y Putnam se basan en intuiciones certeras pero sobre situaciones semánticas diferentes.The paper begins with an analysis of the structure of Kripke and Putnam’s semantic theory in relation to natural kind terms. It then goes on to criticise some of the principles on which their study is based. From the standpoint of this critique, the second part of the article is devoted to a reflection on the relationship between intension and extension. After stablishing that the meaning of natural kind terms is subject toevolution, the thesis, stipulating that the intension determines or does not determine the extension depending at the stage in whieh the term is, is then defended. This seems to indicate that both the traditional doctrine of meaning and that put forward by Kripke and Putnam are based on sound intuitions, but these last ones are targeted towards different semantic situations.
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Julián Marrades Sobre las condiciones de la comprension transcultural (On the Conditions of Transcultural Understanding)
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En la primera parte del artículo examino la interpretación que hace Karl O. Apel de varios textos de Peter Winch sobre el problema de la comprensión de culturas ajenas, distinguiendo aquellos aspectos de la crítica de Apel que me parecen plausibles de otros que considero infundados. En la segunda parte trato de demostrar que en la obra del ultimo Wittgenstein hay elementos para una teoría de la comprensión transcultural libre de las limitaciones que Apel atribuye a Winch, pero a la vez enfocada desde una perspectiva naturalista diametralmente opuesta a la aproximación trascendental de Apel a la hermenéutica.The first part of the article considers Karl O. Apel’s interpretation of various texts by Peter Winch dealing with the problem of understanding alien cultures. I distinguish those aspects of Apel’s critique that seem plausible from others that I consider to be ill-founded. The second part seeks to demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s works contains elements that allow for a theory of transcultural understanding wich is free from the limitations that Apel attributes to Winch. However, such a theory should be developed from a naturalistic perspective that is diametrally opposed to Apel’s transcendental approach to hermeneutics.
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Manuel Perez Otero Verdad necesaria versus teorema de lógica modal (Necessary Truth versus Theorem of Modal Logic)
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En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine (its more prominent critic) objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general.
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Ton Sales Logic of Assertions
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Logicians treat assertions as true, believed or merely hypothesized sentences. The reasoner who uses them, however, is the sole referee who can validate their truth, their aptness to describe an actual situation, their strength (as beliefs) or the relevance of their use in the current logical context. Moreover, the reasoner actively counts on these factors, as part of the reasoning process itself, and should normally be capable, when asked to do so, to assign consistently relative strengths to the assertions used. The paper assumes, first, that assertions have -each- an associated, measurable strength, and that, second, this strength has significant -and measurable- effects on the truth of the sentences, the validity of the conclusion and the soundness of the reasoning. The concepts and formulas required for this are explored, and a semantics and proof theory for a sentential calculus of assertions are proposed as a natural extension of ordinary two-valued reasoning. The resulting theory, though reminiscent of Probability,is autonomous, self-contained and of a purely logical nature.
libros y revistas
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
José Ramón Arana Metafísica
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14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Arantza Etxeberria Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection
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15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Agustín Vicente, Jesús Ezquerro Supervenience and Mind
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16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Fernando Migura Semantics and Pragmatics of Natural Language: Logical and Computational Aspects
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17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Alejandro Sobrino Introducción a la lógica borrosa
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libros recibidos
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
LIBROS RECIBIDOS / BOOKS RECEIVED
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cronicas y proximas reuniones
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Eduardo Alonso, Jesús M. Marroquín Fourth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science: ICCS-95, Donostia-San Sebastián, mayo de 1995
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20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 11 > Issue: 1
Ignacio Ayestarán Uriz VIII Biennial Meeting of The Society for Philosophy and Technology: Technology: The City andthe Suburb, New York, junio de 1995
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