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1. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
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2. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Ian George Robertson In Defence of Radically Enactive Imagination
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Hutto and Myin defend, on the basis of their “radically enactive” approach to cognition, the contention that there are certain forms of imaginative activity that are entirely devoid of representational content. In a recent Thought article, Roelofs argues that Hutto and Myin’s arguments fail to recognise the role of representation in maintaining the structural isomorphisms between mental models and things in the world required for imagination be action-guiding. This reply to Roelofs argues that his objection fails because it fails to fully appreciate the resources radical enactivists have at their disposal in characterising basic imaginings.
3. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Eric Johannesson Completeness also Solves Carnap’s Problem
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In what sense, and to what extent, do rules of inference determine the meaning of logical constants? Motivated by the principle of charity, a natural constraint on the interpretation of logical constants is to make the rules of inference come out sound. But, as Carnap observed, although this constraint does rule out some non-standard interpretations, it does not rule them all out. This is known as Carnap’s problem. I suggest that a charitable interpretation of the logical constants should, as far as possible, make the rules of inference both sound and complete, and I show how this idea can be brought to bear on a successful solution to Carnap’s problem in the case of classical propositional logic, as well as classical first-order logic. In fact, the solution generalizes to any logic whose rules of inference are sound and complete with respect to a bivalent semantics that is classical with respect to negation.
4. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Danny Weltman The Paper Chase Case and Epistemic Accounts of Request Normativity
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According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests.
5. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Owain Griffin The Problem of Isomorphic Structures
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Structuralism is one of the most popular contemporary accounts of mathematics. Despite its popularity, it has been challenged on the grounds of consistency. In this paper, I show that existing arguments purporting to establish an inconsistency miss the mark. I then proceed to develop a new argument against realist structuralism, to show that the commitment to mathematical pluralism and the structural identity criterion embraced by the realist structuralist jointly entail a contradiction.
6. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Giorgio Sbardolini Shadows of Sentences
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Propositions are defined by abstraction from an equivalence relation on sentences. The equivalence is synonymy. The resulting view, Propositional Abstractionism, has roots in Frege’s work, and considerable advantages over competitors. The key to the advantages is that Propositional Abstractionism puts language first. Consequently, in metaphysics, granularity debates benefit from linguistic evidence; in logic, abstraction is a safeguard against higher-order paradoxes; in epistemology, questions of knowledge of propositions can be approached as questions about semantic competence. These benefits form a package that make Propositional Abstractionism a compelling hypothesis.
7. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Alex Oliver, Timothy Smiley Snyder and Shapiro’s Critique of Pseudo-Singularity
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Call a term ‘pseudo-singular’ if it is syntactically singular but semantically plural. ‘The pair who wrote Principia’ is a good example, standing as it does for the two individuals, Whitehead and Russell. In this journal (2021), Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro launched an attack on the idea, calling it ‘linguistically and logically untenable.’ In this reply we rebut every one of their criticisms.
8. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Euan Allison Performative Shaming and the Critique of Shame
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Some philosophers argue that we should be suspicious about shame. For example, Nussbaum endorses the view that shame is a largely irrational or unreasonable emotion rooted in infantile narcissism. This claim has also been used to support the view that we should largely abandon shaming as a social activity. If we are worried about the emotion of shame, so the thought goes, we should also worry about acts which encourage shame. I argue that this line of reasoning does not license the leap from the critique of shame to the critique of shaming. This is because shaming does not always aim to inflict shame on its targets. Many acts of shaming (which I label ‘performative shaming’) should simply be understood as aiming to serve their characteristic function of shoring up social norms and standards.
9. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 4
Jaakko Reinikainen Kripke against Kripkenstein
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What was Saul Kripke’s personal stance on the sceptical challenge that he famously attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein? It will be argued that despite his statements to the contrary, we can, in fact, outline at least a rough sketch of Kripke’s own views on the challenge and its aftermath on the basis of the remarks he left in the text. In summary, Kripke (a) rejected the sceptical solution to the challenge and (b) leaned towards a non-sceptical primitivist solution. If this is correct, it follows that there is a way in which Kripke's view makes his causal-historical picture of reference potentially able to solve the sceptical challenge.
10. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
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11. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Patrick Denning Faultless Disagreement as Evidence for Moral Relativism
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Arguments from faultless disagreement appeal to the possibility of mistake-free disagreement as evidence for semantic relativism. Typically, these arguments focus on paradigmatically subjective topics such as taste, aesthetics, and comedy. Many philosophers hold that ethics is also a subjective topic. But so far, there has been little discussion of faultless disagreement in ethics. In this paper, I advance an argument from faultless moral disagreement, in favour of a relativist semantics for ethics.
12. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Keith Harris Epistemic Domination
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This paper identifies and elucidates the underappreciated phenomenon of epistemic domination. Epistemic domination is the nonmutual capacity of one party to control the evidence available to another. Where this capacity is exercised, especially by parties that are ill-intentioned or ill-informed, the dominated party may have difficulty attaining epistemically valuable states. I begin with a discussion of epistemic domination and how it is possible. I then highlight three negative consequences that may result from epistemic domination.
13. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer Two-Dimensional Theories of Art
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What determines whether an object is an artwork? In this paper I consider what I will call ‘social’ theories of art, according to which the arthood of objects depends in some way on the art-related social practices that we have. Though such a dependence claim is plausible in principle, social theories of art tend to unpack the determining link between artworks and social practices in terms of intentional relations between the objects in question and the people involved in the relevant practices. This intentionalism has unappealing upshots. Drawing on two-dimensional approaches in social ontology, I show how social theories of art can be done differently, improving their prospects.
14. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Thomas Kroedel Removing Realizers: Reply to Rellihan
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The paper replies to Matthew Rellihan’s recent criticism of Thomas Kroedel’s simple argument for downward causation. Rellihan argues that the simple argument equivocates between two notions of realizers of mental properties, namely total realizers and core realizers. According to Rellihan, one premise of the argument is false on each disambiguation. In response, this paper argues that the version of the argument in terms of total realizers is sound after all if we evaluate counterfactual conditionals about the non-occurrence of total realizers correctly.
15. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Daniel Molto, Spencer Johnston The Knowledge of Contradictions
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If there are true contradictions, where are they? In language or in the world? According to one important view, best represented by Jc Beall (2009), only the former. In this paper, we raise a problem for this view. In order to defend a “merely semantic” version of dialetheism (aka ‘glut theory’), Beall adopts transparent accounts of truth and falsity, which gives rise to “dialethic ascent” on which true contradictions are also, contradictorily, untrue contradictions. This is a consequence of trying to restrict contradictions to language and keep them out of the world. However, in this paper, we show that this ascent carries over intensional contexts, so that, on this version of dialetheism, even if there are true contradictions, no one knows a true contradiction. This shows that contradictions have not been kept out of the world. We end by connecting this issue with the infamous ‘just true’ problem.
16. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Jonas F. Christensen Subset Realization and the Entailment Problem: A Response
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According to the principle of conditional power aggregation (CPA), conditional powers conjoin when the properties that bestow them conjoin. Sophie Gibb has argued that CPA is false given Shoemaker’s account of conditional powers and that this leads to a problem for his account of subset realization. In short: If CPA is rejected, subset realization fails to be an entailment relation, in which case it cannot provide a basis for non-reductive physicalism. I defend the subset account against this argument by denying that CPA fails. I argue that (i) Shoemaker’s account of conditional powers does not warrant a rejection of CPA, (ii) his account is incomplete and should be supplemented with a further sufficient condition for when a property bestows a conditional power, and (iii) this further sufficient condition supports CPA.
17. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
J. J. Snodgrass The Co-Intension Problem: A Reply to Rodriguez-Pereyra
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Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra has presented an objection to the co-intension problem. According to this objection, the examples of properties often cited to motivate the co-intension problem are actually relational properties, and so turn out not to be co-intensional. In this essay, I want to revisit Rodriguez-Pereyra’s objection and explain why I find it defective.
18. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 3
Joseph Salerno Suppositional Attitudes and the Reliability of Heuristics for Assessing Conditionals
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Timothy Williamson contends that our primary cognitive heuristic for prospectively assessing conditionals, i.e., the suppositional procedure, is provably inconsistent. Our diagnosis is that stipulations about the nature of suppositional rejection are the likely source of these results. We show that on at least one alternative, and quite natural, understanding of the suppositional attitudes, the inconsistency results are blocked. The upshot is an increase in the reliability of our suppositional heuristics across a wider range of contexts. One interesting consequence of the increased reliability is a proportional decrease in the plausibility of an error-theory that Williamson employs against widespread intuitions about the truth values of counterpossible conditionals.
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19. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
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20. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Nils Kürbis On a Definition of Logical Consequence
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Bilateralists, who accept that there are two primitive speech acts, assertion and denial, can offer an attractive definition of consequence: Y follows from X if and only if it is incoherent to assert all formulas X and to deny all formulas Y. The present paper argues that this definition has consequences many will find problematic, amongst them that truth coincides with assertibility. Philosophers who reject these consequences should therefore reject this definition of consequence.