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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Gan Hun Ahn An Analysis of Semi-Compatibilism
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Semi-compatibilists intend to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. For them, moral responsibility does not require free will, which is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. They agree with the view that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism as well as moral responsibility. Both compatibilists and semi-compatibilists argue for the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. However, the latter fails to prove sufficiently the reason why determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Erik Anderson Scientific Essentialism, Could’ve Done Otherwise, and the Possibility of Freedom
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Philosophers concerned with the problem of freedom and determinism differ strikingly over the analysis of the concept of human freedom of the will. Compatibilists and incompatibilists, determinists and indeterminists populate the conceptual landscape with a dizzying array of theories differing in complex and subtle ways. Each of these analyses faces an under-appreciated potential challenge: the challenge from scientific essentialism. Might all traditional analyses of freedom of the will be radically ill-conceived because the concept—the nature of freedom itself—is something discoverable only by empirical science? I explore this vexing question.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Popkov Valerian, Baturin Andrey Philosophic Rethinking of Poincaré Topological Complex
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The key philosophic concepts - wholeness and duality - are analyzed on the basis of general scientific and vision ideas of H. Poincaré. His cellular structure with full set of topological invariants (cycles) can be considered as a model of dual arrangement of the World. The World is seen as a multidimensional process, consisting not of parts, but of local processes, adjoining each other. It is demonstrated, that a set of cycles at each structural level not only resolve paradoxes of wholeness and development, but represents a recommencing process, which reproduces its own environment. The wholeness – world is considered as a duality of flows and potentials, which arrange and produce absolutely different structures, being closely conjugated, as cycles and co-cycles within the whole. Thestreams are structured and coordinated towards decrease of structural level dimensions: from the general to the particular, from the concrete to the abstract, from the depth to the surface. This is the direction of differentiation of the whole. Potentials are coordinated in the opposite direction, with increase of dimension, through structural elements of higher dimensions. The world is gathered, integrated, joined, specified through stresses; differentiated parts tend to scatter, connections between them strain and turn them back to their whole. A penetration of the scientist into more complicated processes turns out to be a movement within a closed multidimensional surface (closed manifold), enriched with new dimensions with inclusion of new processes. Those concrete examples illustrate importance of Poincaré duality theorem for closed manifolds.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Lee-Sun Choi Essence and Identity
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In this paper, I am going to ask what the general criteria for identity are and exactly how essence is related to that. Two notions are related to this question: Essential properties (necessary properties) and individual essences. Only the notion of individual essence has been involved in the criteria of transworld identity. The disputes of transworld have centered on the intrinsic properties necessarily connected to thisness. Through introducing a notion of part-rigidity, however, we can see that there can be an entity that does not have an individual essence as an intrinsic property necessarily connected to thisness, the non-part-rigid structure. Being this structure is an intrinsic property that is relational and compositional. An entity that has a relational and compositional intrinsic property as its necessary property seems to have no individual essence. For this kind of entities, just an essential property (or a necessary property) is involved in the criteria of transworldidentity.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Sergey Demensky Time of Mentality: Reconsideration of Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time"
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From descriptive interpretation of "understanding" to abstract-gnosiological understanding of mentality. The historical deconstruction of the existential understanding introduced as ontologic property of constantly becoming stable "Being-in-the-World" allows us to interpret this concept as mentality. Through theprism of existential philosophy in general and its interpreters such as Jacque Le Goff it allows us to make a conclusion that mentality is one of complete formations of public consciousness. But in the course of such interpretation of mentality it is important to avoid the methodological situation in which Plato deadlocked, when he had decided to find out, what was beautiful itself. For the way out from this situation he had to introduce independently existing ideas and special space of ideas which define all the things and even gods. We, unfortunately, do not have such an opportunity which the history gave to Plato. Somehow to define structural and historical conditions for breaking out of mentality we shall be limited to the instruction that it is more complex, compound, but in the same time integrally complete formation historically actualized, unlike traditionally allocated kinds and forms of consciousness. Another important question is whether the concept "mentality" is acceptable for analysis of the current modern processes or it can only be used for the reconstruction of the completed formations. The mentality cannot be analyzed from inside. And we are inclined to consider that to operate the concept "mentality" in relation to a modern representative of civilization is inappropriate.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Guo Yi The Philosophy of Yi: Reconstructing the Chinese Metaphysics
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The New Chinese philosophy should face the main issues in traditional philosophy and modern philosophy. The biggest issue in traditional Chinese philosophy during the last 800 years is Xing (Nature) is Li 性即理 or Xin (Mind) is Li 心即理. The biggest issue in modern Western philosophy is how to fortify value in thisera of knowledge explosion. This paper tries to do some exploration on these issues through reconstruction the Chinese metaphysics. It puts forward a theory of Four Substances 四體說. The so called Four Substances include Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi, Xing Ti 性體 or the substance of Nature, Xin Ti 心體 or the substance of Mind, and Dao Ti 道體 or the substance of the Way. The sphere of Yi 易 is the origin of the universe and the root of the world. The substance of Yiis formed by three fundamental cosmic ideas or energies, namely Zhi 恉 or meaning, Li 理 or reason or principle, and Qi 氣 or matter. Zhi 恉 is the being of Value and meaning. Li 理is the being of knowledge. Zhi 恉 and Li 理 are forms, and Qi 氣 is matter. Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi is an inexhaustible value source. Just like Confucianism has developed its Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy, other value systems in the world have also developed their own Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Masaki Ichinose Vagueness of Free Will
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I aim to bring the idea of “degree of free will or freedom” into philosophical debates on free will by rejecting the formulation, ‘we are either free or not’. This idea is based upon my viewpoint of regarding freedom as a realistic phenomena actually occurring. First of all, I focus on the fact that it is vague whether an agent is free or not. This vagueness is interpreted as ontic vagueness, corresponding with the status of freedom as real. However, Evans’s argument regarding ontic vagueness must be considered as, according to his argument, ontic vagueness about identity and objects are impossible. I indicate that this argument assumes the truth-value gap position in borderline cases, hence we can avoid Evans’s argument by adopting truth-value glut position. Of course, the truth-value glut approach has serious difficulties, but I conclude with sketching out a possibility to develop this approach in the free will debate via the introduction of probabilistic valuation.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Yi Jiang Philosophical Topology: A Method or a New Branch in Philosophy?
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In this paper I will try to argue for a new version in philosophy entitled as Philosophical Topology. It is inspired by the thought of Peter Strawson as well as ones of some of so-called Continental philosophers like Heidgger. Unlike any of metaphilosophy in general, the philosophical topology focuses rather on analyses of processes of make-up in philosophers’ thinking, especially by revealing the internal logic of philosophical ideas in making and processing in order to explain the intrinsic continuation of philosophical ideas in particular philosophers’ thinking. In this sense the philosophical topology is not one of philosophical methodsbut a new branch in philosophy that is characterized as being concerned with continuation of ideas as its basic task. So, in this way, it is available to analyses of various doctrines in philosophy. Main issues in the philosophical topology are as follows: 1) to analyze the internal law-likes in the development of philosophy with the perspective of topology; 2) to interpret the general routes of Western philosophy in terms of the philosophical topology; 3) to view the philosophical topology as a way to inquire into metaphysics; 4) to deal properly with the relation of the philosophical topology to other branches in contemporary philosophy such as the philosophy of language, of logic, of science and ethics.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Jerry Kapus Realism, Deflationism, and Success
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Realism is often characterized by the claim that sentences are true or false in virtue of their ‘fit’ with reality. However, philosophers motivated by the deflationary view of truth argue that the formulation and defense of realism does not require a substantial conception of truth. The role of truth in stating and defendingrealism can be accounted for in terms of its being a device for expressing generalizations. I sketch the outline of an argument against this position. I begin with the deflationary view of truth and its relevance for realism. I argue that the deflationary view of truth does not show that truth is only being used as a device for expressing generalizations. I then argue that a robust conception of truth is needed to make sense of the objectivity dimension of realism and for the realist explanation of how language contributes to our success in achieving our goals.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Konstantin S. Khroutski Introducing RealCosmism and BioCosmology: In the Search for a True Universalizing Metaphysics
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Author brings forward a BioCosmological (metaphysical) conception that primarily explores the reasons of present ongoing and increasing global crises. In the issue, author substantively arrives at the conclusion (‘diagnosis’) of the current ‘cosmological insufficiency’ of modern philosophical and cultural community,wherein the leading ‘clinical form’ turns out to be the modern mainstream ‘presentism’, while the ‘patient's treatment’ (perceiving that ‘the patient’ signifies the whole process of life on Earth) – proves to be the urgent rehabilitation of Aristotelism and Russian philosophy and science (neo-Aristotelism). Precisely in this course, author’s BioCosmological conception carries out a realistic and rational proposal that strives to construct a substantive comprehensive theoretical framework – for the tackling of these actual issues.
11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Peter Loptson Naturalism and Truth
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In this paper I want to address themes in what has arguably become, through one or other of its facets, the single largest philosophical topic of our day, one which, possibly because of the ocean of ink which it has generated, has discouraged technically unengaged, or less engaged, arm’s length not-obviously committed expressions of assessment, possibilities of some sort of ecumenical conjunction, and, not least, of surprise, about the debate itself, and atthe impasse the literature referred to may be argued to have in fact reached.
12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Natalia Martishina Metaphisics as a Study of True Reality
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Classic of Russian philosophy Alexandr I. Vvedensky proposed a definition of metaphysics as a study of true reality contrary to apparent one. This definition seems to be useful in contemporary issues. It's an apt definition because it describes an ancient metaphysics as good as classical tradition and concerns all branches of the philosophical knowledge. A number of philosophical subjects are connected with the difference of true and apparent reality as their foundation. For instance, Philosophical Anthropology differentiates between real and formal personal existence. Epistemology discusses a problem of a criterion of real existence and notes that any language does not contain such internal criterion. The Philosophy of science analyses a conventional reality created by people, and so does the Philosophy of art. Social and Political Philosophy due to understand a nature of special phenomena which have no substance but are real and objective. Finally, contemporary Philosophy of technology concentrates on the virtual reality as a special kind of existence. So, the problem of the distinction between true and apparent reality manifests itself in all philosophical disciplines, and this fact determines a major meaning of the metaphysics in the philosophy.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Cei Maslen A Higher-Order Problem of Causal Relevance?
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Robb & Heil describe a higher-order version of the popular Causal Exclusion Problem. In particular, they ask whether the argument that led to a change in focus from event causation to causal relevance of properties can be iterated, leading us to focus on the causal relevance of properties of those properties, or properties of properties of those properties, and so on. In this paper, I investigate this curious higher-order problem and argue that the appeal of both the original argument and its iterations reflects a lack of understanding of causal relata and a problem with the notion of causal relevance.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Andrew Moon Against Rea on Presentism and Fatalism
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T In [Rea 2006], Michael Rea presents an argument that presentism is incompatible with a libertarian view of human freedom and the unrestricted principle of bivalence. I aim to show that Rea’s argument fails. The outline of my paper is as follows. In Part I, I briefly explain the above three views and I present Rea’sargument. In Part II, I argue that one of the premises of the argument is unjustified.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Matteo Morganti Identity, Individuality and Indiscernibility
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This paper deals with the identity and individuality of material objects. In particular, the view that identity is derivative on the qualities of things, based on the endorsement of the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles, is studied in detail. This provides what seems to be a much-needed unitary look at, and up-to-date critical analysis of, the vast literature on the Identity of the Indiscernibles. It is concluded that the ‘reductionist’ view, dating back to Quine and, earlier, to Leibniz, possesses no compelling justification, neither from the conceptual, a priori point of view, nor from the methodological perspective, nor as far as empiricalevidence (as the latter is described by our best current science) is concerned. That is to say, the Principle has not been (perhaps, cannot be) shown to be either a necessary or a contingent truth. Therefore, it can be argued that the whole reductionist view of the individuality of material entities can be dispensed with in favour of an interpretation of reality in terms of objects provided with primitive identity. A suggestion in this latter sense that preserves the appeal of a property-based ontology is very briefly made.
16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Faiza Muhammad The Chaotic Paradigm of Complexity: A Metaphysical Approach
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Contemporary research, across various disciplines, alludes to notion of complexity. Indeed, the phenomenon has even been accredited for comprising a new “world-view” that not only heralds theory construction but also instigates miscellaneous nifty yet practical avenues. On the other hand, however, the complexityparadigm has frequently been criticized of obscurity, contestation and scope imprecision. In addition, its various mutually incommensurable philosophical implications have lead to much heated debates regarding methodological pluralism and metaphorical applications, within literature. To elaborately discussand resolve these concerns, this paper will be organized in three sections: The first section will build on the idiosyncratic characteristics of complexity that differentiate it from related notions of chaos and complicatedness. The second section will shed light on the philosophical deliberations of individual complexityattributes, toward metaphysics of complexity, through elaborately drawn diagrams. Also, this section will draw attention to several conflicting perspectives encompassing the theological, epistemological and ontological domain of complexity. The third section will trace the origins of such paradoxical debates, in the complexity literature, through a ‘Super-System-Outlook’ (SSO) framework. The framework is likely to be of particular significance as it aims to not only divulge an eradicable joint cause of the disparity governing complexity studies but also to propose a possible assimilation of such deliberations.
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Popkov Valerian, Baturin Andrey Philosophic Rethinking of Poincaré Topological Complex
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The key philosophic concepts - wholeness and duality - are analyzed on the basis of general scientific and vision ideas of H. Poincaré. His cellular structure with full set of topological invariants (cycles) can be considered as a model of dual arrangement of the World. The World is seen as a multidimensional process, consisting not of parts, but of local processes, adjoining each other. It is demonstrated, that a set of cycles at each structural level not only resolve paradoxes of wholeness and development, but represents a recommencing process, which reproduces its own environment. The wholeness – world is considered as a duality of flows and potentials, which arrange and produce absolutely different structures, being closely conjugated, as cycles and co-cycles within the whole. Thestreams are structured and coordinated towards decrease of structural level dimensions: from the general to the particular, from the concrete to the abstract, from the depth to the surface. This is the direction of differentiation of the whole. Potentials are coordinated in the opposite direction, with increase of dimension, through structural elements of higher dimensions. The world is gathered, integrated, joined, specified through stresses; differentiated parts tend to scatter, connections between them strain and turn them back to their whole. A penetration of the scientist into more complicated processes turns out to be a movement within a closed multidimensional surface (closed manifold), enriched with new dimensions with inclusion of new processes. Those concrete examples illustrate importance of Poincaré duality theorem for closed manifolds.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Anastasia Shulyndina Vladimir Soloviev and His School on System of Universal Sphere of Knowledge
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One of the most powerful tendencies of the World scientific thought development of XIX – the first half of XX century was analysing all sorts of knowledge, accumulated by mankind in the form of universal synthetic system combining science, religion and philosophy into the Universal Sphere of Knowledge that gives the humanity the possibility to achieve a new deeper level of understanding the reality. By the founder of the Classical Russian Systematic School of Philosophy (according to me – A.Sh.) V.S.Soloviev - for the first time in history - the Idea of the Universal Sphere of Knowledge which is depicted by the Greek term Θεω-Σοφιαwas descriptively defined. The followers of V.S. Soloviev’s school in the middle of XIX – the beginning of XX century worked out many aspects of the Concept of Ontological Synthesis of dispersed Spheres of knowledge, among which the Philosophy is an important and homogeneous part of synthesis of Science and Theology. This Spheres of Knowledge look different and it was aggravated in the course of historically developed separation of their methods, spheres ofexperience and types of thinking. Nevertheless to find the new ways to reach the new level of knowledge for the mankind they must be concentrated on the investigation of the Absolute Elements of the World : TrulyExisting [Λογος] (suprasystematic Element) in its real manifestation. The main (or the basic) method of knowledge is the inner experience of mystic origin. The findings of Russian Philosophers are confirmed by the studies of scientific methods which made it possible to achieve great staggering discoveries and inventions which will for a long time remain mysterious for the majority of human beings.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Dan Simbotin About the Needlessness of the Verb “To Be”
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Semi-compatibilists intend to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. For them, moral responsibility does not require free will, which is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. They agree with the view that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism as well as moral responsibility. Both compatibilists and semi-compatibilists argue for the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. However, the latter fails to prove sufficiently the reason why determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Ikuro Suzuki Coincidence and the Semantic Solution
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Many philosophers deny that two different material objects can “coincide”, i.e. share their spatial location and microscopic parts. But, there seems to be a difficulty in identifying these coinciding objects, since we have many kinds of predicates that appear to show differences between them. One prominent strategy to avoid such a difficulty is to argue that such “problematic” predicates merely indicate our ways of describing objects, and thus that any difference between coinciding objects is only apparent. I call this move "the semantic solution". The goal of this paper is to show that the semantic solution is unmotivated. The semantic solution, I argue, must distinguish problematic predicates from ones that indicate genuine properties. But the trouble is that in doing so it bringsmassive indeterminacy into our understanding of vast numbers predicates. Furthermore, indeterminacy would be hopelessly massive if every actual material object is made of “atomless gunk”, i.e. matter divisible into proper parts ad infinitum.