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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Anna Baka The Core of Legal Rights as a Logical Necessity: From Wittgenstein’s Logic of Language to Phenomenology and Aristotle’s Induction
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Analytical jurisprudence and the legal mainstream perceive legal rights in an interactionist fashion, pursuant to a right-obligation duality. The Paper suggests that this is principally because legal positivism and the analytical Anglo-Saxon legal tradition ground their theories on logical positivism and the Wittgensteinian premise that meaning is produced and asserted in social use, i.e. both consensually and contextually. The paper suggests that there is a surplus of meaning which exists beyond social use and which cannot be conceptualized within the sociolinguistic confines of Wittgenstein’s logic of language. This surplus of meaning corresponds to the essential core of legal rights, which, following Aristotle’s induction and philosophy of the essences, constitutes a necessary property and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of legal rights, namely a state of affairs or a state of being that cannot be altered without their necessary breach or, indeed, the negation of their very meaning. The Paper discusses the shortcomings of the Wittgensteinian approach and revisits the philosophical foundations of legal rights by employing Aristotle’s induction and theory of the essences, which the Paper connects to the phenomenological method and particularly Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and Husserl’s transcedental phenomenology. This is a process of abstraction and insight, which aspires to induce a rational revisiting of the general theory of legal rights and address the surplus of meaning that Wittgensteinian logic leaves semantically uncovered.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Dawid Bunikowski How to Enhance Responsibility? What about the Effects of Cognitive Enhancement on Moral and Legal Responsibility?
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The paper concerns a legal-philosophical and legal-theoretical (but in fact more interdisciplinary) problem of so called cognitive enhancement and of what to do with influence of neuroscience on legal and moral responsibility. A problem of responsibility in the law is treated as one of the most important themes in jurisprudence. We say that some people are responsible for behavior (e.g. the competent, adults). But we must seek the limits of the idea that responsibility “tracks” mental capacity. According to the paper assumptions, we should consider two fundamental questions. The first, have some professionals such as surgeons, soldiers, pilots a responsibility (duty) to cognitively enhance themselves (by e.g. drugs)? The second, if so, after the enhancement should they be acquired by greater responsibilities (greater standard of care)? I see some dangers for morality, freedom, human rights in the case of two positive answers for these questions. I analyze some projects of recommendation of the law change. I strictly highlight really potential axiological problems, too.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Thomas Bustamante Legal Philosophy in the Courtroom: Can Positivism Explain Theoretical Disagreements?
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The paper examines the challenge that Ronald Dworkin poses to positivism when he asserts that legal discourse often comprises theoretical disagreements about the foundations of law, as well as Scott Shapiro’s answer that these disagreements, although legitimate, can be reconstructed as meta-interpretive disagreements about the proper interpretation of the legal system. Though Shapiro’s answer is partly correct, if we distinguish between ‘conceptual’ and ‘meta-interpretive’ theoretical disagreements it becomes clear that this answer fails to save positivism from Dworkin’s objection because it is unaware of the existence of theoretical disagreements of the ‘conceptual’ kind. Positivism is wrong, therefore, because it misses this important connection between legal philosophy and legal practice.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Yezid Carrillo De La Rosa Law and Morality in Legal Theory and Contemporary Constitutionalism
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As is well known, the two great traditions of legal thought, the positivist and anti-positivist, baked beans around the discussion of the theory of bonding and the theory of separation. The central thesis of current positivism, which is emblematic Hart, is summarized in the thesis of the conceptual separation between law and morality and their acceptance or otherwise mark the dividing line between positivists and non-positivists. But usually the term moral can be used in a multitude of ways without being aware of it, which sometimes leads to different things being discussed on the belief that talking about the same, as a result, the first thematic area of This essay is devoted to clarify the sense that it used the term “moral” in the context of legal theory. Next, study the most important manifestations of the central thesis of positivism (decoupling) and anti-positivism (tie), then try to carry out an approach to the problem that arises as a result of the inclusion of moral standards in the current constitutionalism.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Serkan Golbasi Ernst Bloch on Natural Law and Human Nature
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Natural law is generally regarded as a part of bourgeoisie ideology in both Marx and Engels’ thought and accordingly by other Marxist thinkers. Ernest Bloch’s somewhat sympathetic approach to natural law is an exception that deserves to argue about and evaluate. According to Bloch, natural law has an unrealized ideal for human dignity. A radical natural law can be founded upon the not yet determined nature of human beings. For Bloch, human nature is not universal and a-historical but it is changing and future-oriented.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Eleftherios Karampilas Natural Law: From the Ancient Greek City-state to the First Constitutional Attempts of the Greek Revolution
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In a period of the European history when property, trade, economic development and capitalism (were in the forefront of the intellectual progress, Greeks, despite their past ideas on natural law, could not have desired anything but the same philosophical foundations that supported the political, economic and social demands of the uprising new classes. These philosophical foundations transformed the notion of natural law into the notion of natural rights, influencing the constitutional texts of the newly established Greek state. Thus, the ancient idea of natural law in close correlation with the pursuit of virtue, faded away allowing the, relatively, new concept of natural rights to find its way to the texts of the new constitutions, assuming the role of a protective wall against the demands of the state.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Yigong Liu Traditional Chinese Legal Philosophy and its Modernization
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China has a long history of legal tradition. Traditional Chinese legal philosophy played an important role in ancient Chinese society and even today it still has a strong influence. Actually, China is experiencing legal modernization, and we should pay attention to our local legal resources and take into account our legal heritage. Though China should learn from the experience of the West, it is also necessary to consider her conditions and reality, rather than following the West blindly. At first, the paper makes a general survey on legal thoughts of Confucianism, Legalism, and Taoism. After these preliminary remarks, the paper discusses the traditional Chinese legal philosophy and the process of China’s legal modernization.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Stefan Munteanu Aspects Concerning the Philosophy of the European Community Law
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An approach of the European Community Law from a philosophical point of view had a great following in the last half of the 20th century, with good results in the creation of some real strategies about the integration. That is why some general, traditional wise values were assumed as basic for the European Community Law. An important aspect in the foundation of a new practice of the science of law, based on the values of philosophy, emerges from the fact that the community law is different both from the science of general law and international law. The new directions of the community law were adopted by the sovereign states, which signed institutive Community treaties. The philosophical approach is that by signing the community treaties, those sovereign states accept to transfer a certain part of their national sovereignty to the newly created Community institutions. On the other hand the transfer of sovereignty must not be understood as a threat to the national integrity, but as a chance of integrating into larger and more efficient structures. From this point of view, the present work initiates a debate upon the main characteristics of the community law, the way in which the concepts of political and juridical philosophy contribute to the creation of the new mechanisms and procedures of the European community law. Having a clear image of these aspects means a great importance for the success of Romania’s accession.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Nadire Ozdemir Ethics and the Confidentiality Rule for Lawyers: Can Ethical Norms be an Excuse for Breaching the Rule?
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The confidentiality rule ensures lawyers not to reveal their client’s confidence that has been learnt through their professions. However sometimes confidentiality can involve to hide serious dangers. This is a small field work that searches theoretical basement of morality-centered or law-centered lawyers. The research question of this study is “the role of ethics/ethical norms in the breach of the confidentiality rule between the lawyer and her client”. In order to understand this, I have specified three sub-topics: Ethics, dilemma and the perception of profession. What does it mean ethics for lawyers, how do they act in ethical dilemmas and on what grounds they are breaching or they would breach the confidentiality rule were the relevant questions for my research question.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 54
Iraklis Pantelidakis Ronald Dworkin’s Ethical Individualism: Metaphysical and Metaethical Commitments
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We focus on Dworkin’s ethical individualism because it is the basic substrate of his moral and political philosophy. Ethical individualism consists of two main principles; that of equal concern and respect, and the special responsibility thesis. We consider that both principles hold certain metaphysical origins. The principle of equal concern retains a connection with the notion of natural equality. This point is elegantly expressed in an earlier paper of Dworkin, who comments on Rawls’ original position. In that paper, Rawls’ veil of ignorance is substituted by Dworkin’s deep theory. Ronald Dworkin unsuccessfully tries to persuade that this deep theory is metaphysically neutral. Moreover, the principles of ethical individualism are not neutral in a metaethical sense. Dworkin calls upon a general agreement on his principles. According to “Objectivity and Truth” the two principles are I-moral propositions. Their weight rests on their form as “rational intuitions”. Dworkin’s metaethics stem from Moore’s intuitionism and this is clear in “Objectivity and Truth” where he defends an “extended” non-naturalistic moral realism. The problem is that this extended realism includes a priori truths which belong to some form of idealism. Dworkin replaces the Archimedean platform with an Euclidean one, but he does not explicitly state it because of his fear of Platonism.