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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Nijolė Aukštuolytė Ludwig Wittgenstein as the Most Important Philosophical Figure at the Juncture of Logicism and Functionalism
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The paper analyses the two paradigms of epistemological research in language of science which were dominating in the 20th century. Different explanations of this relationship allow the analyses of the cognitive value of logical modeling of the language of science and the studies of its functioning variety. The aim of this work is to discuss the relationship of these paradigms to L. Wittgenstein’s ideas. The essential idea of the work is that L. Wittgenstein’s ideas and their development characterize different paradigms of epistemological research of the language as well as their transformations. While in Tractatus the philosopher seeks to substantiate the structural unity of different scientific theories and the logical uniformity of different areas of science, in Philosophical Investigations; however, he expands the content of the notion ‘language of science’ and rehabilitates the cognitive value of different linguistic worldwide reconstructions. The conception of relativity of boundar-ies and principles of science and the emphasis on theoretical conventionality of the language, too, rejects the possibility of the autonomous language of science and presents the problem of ‘understanding one another’ among in-comparable theories. The paper is focused on these questions.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Janina Buczkowska Informational Function of the Meaning and the Cognitive Role of Language
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The assumption that language is an element of the cognitive system, fulfilling specified information collection and processing functions, bears consequences for the understanding of meaning. The paper demonstrates that we should rather speak of a beam of informational functions fulfilled by meaning, rather than of a single meaning, the same one in all situations of ex-pression use. Each of the functions identified in the paper provides a different input into the final meaning assigned to each individual expression use. The proposed solution helps understand that meaning has both conventional and contextual meaning, is both universal and individual, is both structural infor-mation and information acquired via current processes, without falling into the trap of traditional contradictions.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Juliano Gustavo dos Santos Ozga On Austin and Searle’s Speech Acts Theory
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In the first part, will be presented the Austin’s distinction between constative/descriptive and performative statements. In the second part, will be presented the definition of felicity conditions of speech acts, being this is a condition of performative statement, that must be made so as the action of the speech act will be performed, being labeled the statement as successful and happy or unsuccessful and unhappy. In the third part will be discussed the Austin’s speech acts theory, divided into locutionary act (act of pronouncing the statement); illocutionary act (act performed when pronouncing the state-ment), and perlocutionary act (act referring to the realized action and the re-sulting consequence when pronouncing the statement). In the fourth part will be presented the contribution of Searle for the speech acts, classifying them in five (5) categories: 1. Representative Act, 2. Direct Act, 3. Commissive Act, 4. Expressive Act and 5. Declarative Act, closing this restricted approach about the contribution of Austin and Searle to pragmatics and language, exposing not only the language as a description of the world, but as an active-performative entity before the physical world, in other words, a performative entity.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Eli Dresner Baking Measures and Propositions
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In the first section of this paper I consider the practice of volume-measurement in baking, and I distinguish between two measurement schemes that can be extracted from this practice. In the second section I argue that (i) the ascription of propositional content to utterances (and mental states) bears intuitive affinity to one of these schemes, that (ii) extant accounts of propositions are in the mold of the other scheme, and that therefore (iii) an alternative conception of propositions is called for.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Guangwu Feng Speaker’s Intention, Signification and Cancellability
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This paper is intended to reveal the deeper aspects of the unity’ between Grice’s fundamental notion of intention and his other notions of signification, cancellability. We emphasize that the total signification of an ut-terance is ultimately determined by the speaker’s intention and therefore both what is said and what is implicated are hard to cancel without rendering the whole utterance self-contradictory. We suggest that any intention-based account of meaning be ontologically clear about whose intention we are really invoking, and consequently capture the metaphysics of meaning in order to remove the fallacy “that all the information in an utterance must come from its interpretation” (Barwise and Perry 1983: 34).
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Luis Fernández Moreno The Reference of Natural Kind Terms: A Descriptivist Proposal
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This paper aims to propose a version of the description theory of reference –for short, descriptivism– on natural kind terms. This version is grounded on some proposals of descriptivists, such as Searle and Strawson, about proper names, which will be extended to natural kind terms. According to Searle and Strawson the reference of a proper name is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that speakers associate with the name, but among the sorts of descriptions admitted by these authors are those in which the average speaker defers the reference of a term to other speakers. In this regard, descriptivism can accept Putnam’s thesis of the division of linguistic labour and claim that some of the descriptions associated by non-experts have the function of deferring the reference of natural kind terms to their reference in the use by experts. Thus, descriptivism can maintain that the reference of a natural kind term is determined by a sufficient number of the descriptions that (present) experts concerning a natural kind associate with the term. I will argue that this version of descriptivism, which grants more weight to social links than to historical links, can explain better than Kripke’s theory the reference of the use of natural kind terms by the average speaker.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Claudio Ferreira-Costa Neo-descriptivism on Proper Names
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My aim in this paper is to briefly present the essentials of my reformulation of the old cluster theory of proper names. Essential to this reformulation is the introduction of a meta-descriptivist rule which establishes a cluster’s main descriptions and the manner in which they must be satisfied in order to allow the application of a proper name. Using this rule, we can explain the informative content of proper names, understand why they are rigid, in contrast to descriptions, and give more detailed answers to the counterexamples to descriptivism.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Rodolfo Gaeta, Nélida Gentile Kitcher’s Theory of Reference Revisited
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To explain how theoretical terms can acquire and maintain ref-erence, Kitcher introduces the concepts of “mode of reference” and “reference potential”. The reference potential of an expression-type would be a function of the two basic modes of reference, the descriptive and the baptismal. Kitcher puts forward an argument: modes of reference correspond individually to each token and not to the expression-type, whereas the reference potential of a type is a compendium of modes of reference of its tokens. Different tokens of the same expression-type may be associated with different modes of reference and, therefore, some tokens of the same type could refer whereas others do not. We argue that a series of marks or of sounds became tokens of an expression-type precisely because they are instantiations of a type, and not the other way around, as Kitcher suggests. We argue that Kitcher’s main resource, to primarily link the reference to tokens rather than to expression-types, is based on a conflation that seems to have been passed over by his critics. So, both the descriptive and the baptismal basic ways of providing reference to general terms are useless to Kitcher’s theory on referring and we conclude that it is far from solving the problems it intended to overcome.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Heimir Geirsson Moral Twin Earth, Reference and Disagreements
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Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Manjulika Ghosh Austin and Linguistic Phenomenology
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This paper wishes to look into the relationship between J. L.Austin’s methodological notion of linguistic phenomenology and continental phenomenology. Austin himself did not offer an explicit elaboration or examination of linguistic phenomenology; nor did he follow its implication and significance for phenomenology practiced in the continent. However, a number of philosophers have argued that Austin’s methodology has important bearing for continental phenomenology, specifically, Husserl’s version of it. Austin was not simply calling attention to the utility of drawing fine distinctions in ordinary language, he was also recommending an examination of what we should say when; what words should we use in what situations. For him, the distinctions discernible in language mark distinctions in the world. Austin’s proposal to prise off words from the world and to look at them without linguistic blinkers has been compared to Husserl’s epoché. His repeated reference to ‘context’ and ‘situation’ is understood as concerned not only with words but also with the phenomena of everyday life – the concrete life-world in Husserl’s terminology. This paper does not intend to overlook the distinctions between the two ways of doing philosophy. Rather it considers it rewarding to interpret Austin’s suggestions as affording a bridge between Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and continental phenomenology.