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articles in english
1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Olga Fernández-Prat The Contribution of Philosophy of Mind to Empirical Theories in Cognitive Science
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It has been argued that philosophical theories in the philosophy of mind necessarily require empirical theories in cognitive science or cognitive neuroscience to be validated (cf. Davies 2000). This is indeed an unexpected relation between philosophy and science, since it is widely assumed nowadays – quite apart from Quinean qualms – that philosophical claims are largely a priori just in that their justification proceeds along paths which are independent of empirical investigations. I will defend that the case of attention provides further confirmation of a position which is similar to Davies’s, but it shows at the same time that we should subscribe to a weaker version that has to do with the possibility of an eliminativist attitude towards the philosophical theory and the entities postulated in it. However, I will try to show that the case studies concerning attention show that this possibility, though it should not be excluded, is rather remote due to the fact that philosophical theories of mental phenomena are typically related to one in a set of different possible empirical theories. I will also try to show that this relation arises in at least one rather interestingly different way, in addition to the one involved in the case studies discussed by Davies.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Alkis Gounaris, Georgina Abou Elkheir Why Embodied Artificial Intelligence is not so Embodied?
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In recent years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has concentrated its research interest in the philosophical theories of embodied cognition (EC). Seeking a way out of the GOFAI’s dead-end attempt to develop intelligent robots with the ability to perform complex tasks in unknown and changing environments, AI adopted basic principles of the EC, like the body’s direct interactions with the world. This view inspired AI researchers to abort traditional “sense-plan-act” architectures in favor of bottom-up approaches that focused on the integration of action and perception. However, the embodied AI community, tried to integrate these concepts by encapsulating them into frameworks that relied heavily in fundamental assumptions and mechanisms, that violated core principles of EC, both ontologically and practically, as in the utilization of sensorimotor knowledge in the sense of information extraction -instead of using sensorimotor knowledge in the sense of a meaningful “know-how”, the utilization of internal states and representations coupled with computational information processing based architectures, and the conceptualization of affordances grounded in categorization and internal representations. In this paper our objective is to identify and classify the fundamental principles and properties, by which embodied AI and EC differ, in a philosophical as well as in a technical context. In our view, grasping this fundamental ontological bounds, apart from being philosophically interesting, will contribute to the understanding of the limits of the capabilities of embodied AI, compared to the concept of embodied cognition.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Inna Kostrikina Philosophical Basis of Implicit Cognitions Researching
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Implicit cognition empirical and practical issues show the needing in philosophical reflection for accumulated facts and development of practical technologies. The role of implicit cognition is evident in the practices and technologies of artificial intelligence while maintaining the obscurity of the issues in psychology sciences about the natural functioning of implicit cognitions. Implicit cognitions –memory, attention functions, processing, learning, perception and apperception are included consciousness, automatically and constant unconscious, instinctive, unintentional processes. The researching implicit cognitions open new perspective on the relationships between conscious and unconscious processing and on the function of consciousness in cognitive systems. Cognitive science may be able to solve the puzzle of human evolution and consciousness and unconsciousness co-evolution, provided philosophical understanding of research methodology and the integration of various forms of philosophical knowledge in cognitive studies. Modern philosophers emphasize the presence of motion from greater-than-human artificial intelligence to superintelligence. The implicit learning is critical significant for intellectual effectiveness and successful. Philosophical understanding of the cognitive research on implicit processes can address fundamental questions about the nature of human cognition, to promote adequate development of technologies to improve the natural and artificial intelligence.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Katsunori Miyahara Social Perception and the Problem of Other Minds
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How do we understand other people’s minds? This is a descriptive problem of other minds, a question concerning the descriptive nature of social cognition or interpersonal understanding. There are currently three prominent approaches to this problem, namely, the theory theory approach (TT), the simulation theory approach (ST) and the direct perception approach (DP). Instead of trying to resolve the conflict between them, I will conduct a preliminary exploration concerning the nature of social perception or the experience of seeing other people. TT, ST and DP are all implicitly or explicitly committed to a particular conception of social perception. Thus, it is necessary to look into the nature of social perception in developing a theory of social cognition. I claim that social perception involves the following three characteristics: In social perception, (i) other people are given to us; (ii) other people are given as transcendent; (iii) other people are given as transcendent but potentially accessible. They respectively constitute the Immediacy constraint, the Transcendence constraint, and the Accessibility constraint on theories of social cognition. I suggest that TT and ST fail to do justice to the Immediacy constraint and the Accessibility constraint, while DP does not pay due attention to the Accessibility constraint.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Abraham Sapien Cordoba Valuable Pain: Masochism and Rituals
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Recent research has focused on the affective dimension of pain and has tried to explain situations that, at first glance, appear counterintuitive: sometimes people search for pain. Although pain is usually considered as something unpleasant and, therefore, undesirable, there are situations that bring this idea into question such as masochism and ritual pain. In this essay I will discuss and make sense of these two cases. For this, I will proceed in three parts. Firstly, I will expose the contradiction between pain and masochism and I will offer three possible solutions to it. Secondly, based on anthropological research, I will describe situations where pain can be valued in ritual initiations. Finally, based on the former theoretical clarifications, I will propose a suitable way to interpret such rituals.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
V.B. Zlokazov The Impact of Cybernetic Mentality on Interpretation of Fundamental Categories of Philosophy
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Philosophical-theoretical conceptualization of the experience of Cybernetics in the creation of artificial intelligence (AI) leads us to the following conclusions: 1. The AI is not intelligence and never will be. 2. In principle the AI is capable to achieve any degree of the proximity of the formalized ‘senses’ (semantics), intentions (will) and intuition (talent) to their informal prototype. 3. In a distributed mode of the existence the pair (intelligence, AI) is as global and universal constituent of the AI as the pair (energy, intentionality) and as the pair (matter, forms of virtual reality). This makes us take a new look at the problem of creationism -the World can be basically established (more correctly, being established) both with the participation of a subject-like Creator, and without it, according to a plan, a project, by way and methods, characteristic for the human creativity, but a formal creativity, though outwardly similar to the former.4. The world is not atoms and the void, the world is a metasystem of microsystems, macrosystems and megasystems, their hierarchy and heterarchy. This applies both to real objects, and virtual images. 5. Management is an inexpensive energetically and simple algorithmically impact on the object, which may cause an extensive energetically and complicated algorithmically post-effect; figuratively speaking, pressing a button we cause an explosion of the A-bomb. Management is the only means to achieve a positive balance in the dynamics of the Universe entropy. Our ‘conquest’ of the Nature has been carried out just in this way. 6. Information – a process and result of transforming the vivid semantics of thoughts and senses into the compact formal meanings –the codes and, vice versa, is the implementation of the knowledge portability.
articles in spanish
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
David Arturo Hernández Vega ¿Pueden los robots tener conceptos propios del mundo?
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By a very long time, humankind has imagined about machines with autonomous consciousness, this ideas has become reality step by step in the last decades. But the question is still remaining, can computers think by themselves? This paper shows the principal differences between human and -a pretended- consciousness in the machines, also explains why I think that machines hasn’t get self-consciousness yet. It is worked on the idea that machines cannot have own ideas, beginning on the thought that it is necessary have a consciousness to be rational, and just then a system could create its own ideas about the world. This paper it is also based in two principal authors: John Searle and Mario Bunge, the first one to refer about the difference between syntax and semantics, and the second one to apply few of his ideas about knowing if a machine can be conscious or not.
articles in russian
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 45
Ziyoda Kodyrova Роль интуиции в познавательном процессе
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In reception of new knowledge the big role plays the logical thinking, as well as in ways and methods of formation of new concepts. But experience of cognitive activity testifies that the usual logic, in many cases, appears insufficient for the decision of scientific problems; process of gaining of the new information cannot be either inductive, or deductive. The important place in this process is occupied by the intuition, giving to knowledge a new impulse and a direction. The intuition, as the specific cognitive process, direct-ly produces new knowledge, generally speaking.