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Displaying: 1-10 of 23 documents


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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Meriç Bilgiç New Transcendental Dialectics between Kant and Hegel
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This paper offers a new transcendental dialectical logic within the mathematical set theory between Kant and Hegel, it is both free of culture and culturally meaningful. It has neither been derived from Kant nor Hegel, has been hypothesized from our teaching experiences. It gives a new general systematization of philosophy, and a meaningful total picture of philosophy. It is also a transition formula between natural and artificial intelligence so as to be an answer from a transcendental Cartesian point to our postmodern era that could be characterized with a double alienation.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Georg Brutian Metaphilosophy from the Perspectives of Platonic and Rhodian Models 13 of Metatheories
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This report deals with one of the most popular trends in modern scientific theoretical thinking, that of building meta-conceptions of existing theories. All these meta-conceptions follow the method of building meta-mathematics for formalized mathematical calculi. The essence and forms of various types of metatheories are discussed. The author of this report has suggested the idea of metatheoretical models – Platonic and Rhodesian models of metatheories – a completely new approach in philosophical publications on the subject. These models allow separating two different sets of metatheoretical constructions taking into account the level of formalization of object-theories. The Rhodesian model allows finding out those methods that are helpful in building certain type theories as well as suggesting and examining theories that have special metatheoretical features and revealing their common features and differences in regard of other theories. The paper discusses the complicated problem of metaphilosophy in the light of the Platonic and Rhodian models. The general conclusion is that philosophy is its own metaphilosophy.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Luis Daniel Cárdenas-Macher Possible Phenomenological Foundations of Negative Dialectics as a way of Understanding of Metaphilosophy
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This paper proposes to establish synthetically how the Merleau-Ponty’s proposal in Phenomenology of Perception and the Adorno’s proposal in Negative Dialectics are closely related and even complementary, specifically regarding to what would be the phenomenological foundations that stand in the Adornian negative dialectic that questions the main way of philosophy to proceed. This questioning will help us to understand a metaphilosophy with practical scopes. Themes such as corporality and the critic to the modern rationality stuck in the preeminence of subjective transcendental conscience are common and complementary aspects which will help us to understand the limits of a discursive and unilateral way of thinking. Finally, but not less important, this paper will help to set the basis on how the dialectical movement and the phenomenological approaches, considering Adorno’s and Merleau-Ponty’s proposals, could influence on the contemporary notion of moral reflection and action.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Shai Frogel Descartes: Searching for Truth by Self-deception
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The paper examines the role of self-deception in Descartes’ Meditations. It claims that although Descartes sees self-deception as the origin of our false judgments, he consciously uses it for his searching for truth. Descartes finds that self-deception is a very productive tool in our searching for truth, since it expands our ability to free ourselves from our actual certainties; logical thinking enables us to doubt our certainties but only self-deception enables us to really suspend them. Although it might sound wrong or even absurd to employ self-deception for the purpose of searching for truth, one should examine Descartes’ strategy carefully. After all, this strategy leads him to great philosophical insights.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Theodoros Georgiou Ancient Ontology and Contemporary Philosophy
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The term “paradigm” (Kuhn) has been used for years with pretensions to scientific validity also in metaphilosophical researches, namely in theoretical and philosophical studies, the subject of which is the historical evolution and development of the philosophical thought. Ancient ontology and contemporary philosophy are formed as two different “paradigms” of the philosophical thinking both at the contents’ level (of the problematic, the ideas and the arguments) and at the scientific level of the exposition of ideas. Ancient ontology as metaphysical research, which is called to answer the question what does the world consist of (the reality) and which the first principles of its structure are, pivots on the principle of identity and is self-determined as “phonocentric”. Contemporary philosophy as metaphilosophical research, which seeks the establishment of the philosophical rationality in the open relationship between the thing and the language, is self-determined as grammatological thought, which means that “writing” (Derrida) becomes the first principle of the philosophical thinking itself. According to Hegel, “philosophy is its own time apprehended in thoughts”. In a contemporary interpretive wording, the Hegelian definition of philosophy means that the “notion” as self-consciousness of the thing itself and reality are identical. Having as metaphilosophical criterion the Hegelian definition of philosophy both ancient ontology as metaphilosophical research and contemporary philosophy as grammatological thought constitute two different types of philosophical rationality (“paradigms” of philosophical thinking). Between these two “paradigms” of philosophical thinking a dialectical relationship is developed, which entails two things; First: that the historic research of the philosophical tradition is replaced by the metaphilosophical reflection, according to which the integration as to the content of ancient ontology in the problematic of the contemporary philosophy is the new condition of philosophical thinking. Second: the grammatological reconstruction of the philosophical thinking re-determines the relationship between the thing and the language based on the philosophical rationality, which functions as pragmatological condition for the appearance of new philosophical things, as for example is the communication and the language.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Deborah K. Heikes Philosophy’s Ambivalent Future
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Philosophy today is undergoing a transformation away from modernism. The problem is that it is far from clear what this transformation is moving toward. I examine the transition from the premodern to the modern philosophical world and contrast it with our current situation. While the moderns were clear in their rejection of Aristotelian scholasticism and sure of their methods, in our own time we are neither clear about the extent to which we reject modernism nor our methodology moving forward. I argue that the uncertainty of the postmodern philosophical world is, in an important sense, a necessary consequence of the rejection of modernism itself.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Ángeles J. Perona Jimeneth Philosophy, Criticism and Moderate Scepticism
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The aim of this paper is to think about the relationship between criticism, philosophy and normativeness. I will outline a conception of philosophy which is not completely sceptical with regard to itself. So I will begin by considering that the notion of criticism is central to a philosophical activity which is not reduced to a merely descriptive analysis. Therefore, I will outline some features and the conditions of possibility of a notion of philosophical criticism which can fulfil a new normative role: it allows us to see the normative level of contexts (world images, forms of life, traditions, cultures, etc.). But, at the same time and most importantly, I will argue that philosophy allows us to undertake a metanormative and trans-contextual criticism. Such an understanding also brings philosophy closer to the activities which somehow contribute to produce change, whether change refers to one’s own context (one’s own image of the world, one’s own form of life, tradition or culture) or to a different context. From philosophical positions closely intertwined with political practice and with specific vital needs, it has become evident that a kind of trans-contextual connection within normativeness has again become indispensable for human beings.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Heikki J. Koskinen Quine and Ontological Pragmatism
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In the late 1940s, Quine influentially talked about “the ontological problem”, claiming that it concerns the issue of what there is. I shall adopt this Quinean notion as a basis for an initial characterization of ontological discourse as language use or thought involving existential assumptions or commitments. I will also assume that we engage in ontological discourse in at least three discernible types of contexts, namely those of (i) everyday experience, (ii) the special sciences, and (iii) categorial frameworks of being. In this paper, my main argument is that Quine’s way of situating ontological discourse out of the first context of everyday experience and into the second context of the special sciences is somewhat problematic because he mostly doesn’t seem to exhibit a developed enough a conception of the third context of categorial frameworks of being. I suggest that this problem is connected with Quine’s narrow ontological pragmatism which has its eye too restrictively fixed on the context of the special sciences. In place of the narrow Quinean conception, I suggest a broader kind of ontological pragmatism which gives proper acknowledgement to the very general and fundamental nature of the categories of being. The suggestion makes it possible to see that due to its generality, the third context of categorial frameworks of being both transcends and unites the other two. This structural recognition is important in itself, but it also provides an effective metaphilosophical ground for answering many of the much debated issues raised by the naturalistic, reductionist and scientific tendencies often seen in Quine’s thought and influence.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Frank Martela Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative
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Ever since Kant, mainstream moral philosophy has been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law-like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, more and more authors have started to question a) whether this is possible, and b) what could this project, after all, achieve? An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatic idea that philosophizing begins and ends in the actual human experience. It leads into a view where morality is seen as a ‘social technology’ that aims to make living together possible, and strengthen people’s capability to live a good life within a society. Moral rules, then, are tools that we use to influence our behavior for the better. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop further our moral tools, to propose solutions that enhance people’s capabilities to live good lives. In other words, moral philosophers become ethical engineers that use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing ‘moral technology’ and construct new concepts and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 22
Karel Mom Another Scandal of Philosophy
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Kant’s work, taken as a whole manifests a diversity of styles of writing, of which the disparity between his critical and popular style is salient. In this paper, this diversity is connected with, what Lyotard calls ‘the absence of a homogeneous language’ in Kant’s system. Taking this connection as a point of departure it is argued that the stylistic diversity in Kant reflects the burden of coordinating the realist and idealist aspects of his philosophical outlook. That Kant labels the skepticism about the deductibility of practical validity from theoretical rightness as a scandal of philosophy is taken as an indication that he is concerned about this problem. In view of this it is asked, with reference to the occurrence of moral and juridical terms (δίκη [justice], τίσις [reparation], αδικία [injustice], διδόναι δίκην [do justice]) in de text in which Anaximander’s key metaphysical ideas about nature and world order are cast what lessons can be learned from the origins of the European philosophical tradition to come to terms with Kant’s problem, which is considered as a problem for metaphysics in general, given its cosmopolitical tendency.