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Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy

Volume 2, Issue 2, 2018
Ancient Greek Philosophy: Classical Greek Philosophy

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Displaying: 1-10 of 68 documents


articles in english
1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Christiana Andreou Reflection and the Aristotelian Theory of Vision
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Reflection was the only optical phenomenon known in ancient Greek science and its quantitative law was soon discovered. The phenomenon, as we understand it today, is related to some sort of motion. In the present paper, we discuss the compatibility of the explanations of the phenomenon of reflection with the Aristotelian theory of visual perception in which no movement is involved. First, we describe Aristotle’s theory of vision, then we will examine the role, if any, of reflection in the Aristotelian theory of vision, and, finally, we propose a way to explain how the phenomenon of reflection can be accommodated into the Aristotelian theory of visual perception.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Carolina Araujo Adeimantus’ Challenge
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A large amount of contemporary literature on Plato’s Republic deals with Glaucon’s speech as the major challenge Socrates is to face in his defense of justice, seeing in Adeimantus’ speech nothing but a restating of the matter. However, Plato is very clear in stating both that Glaucon’s argument was not enough and that he did not make the most relevant point to the matter (362d3-5). The aim of this paper is to present Adeimantus’ contribution to the problem in two general theses: first the objection to piety as a virtue, submitting it to justice; second the argument about the power of collective concealment as a device for breaking the cause/effect pattern that sustains the logic of retribution. The conclusion is that, while Glaucon presents an account that would grant justice to members of a community that obey its laws, Adeimantus considers this only an appearance of justice that would still produce collective unjust actions. By means of Glaucon’s challenge, Socrates is expected to prove that justice has a power in the soul besides its communitarian function, but by Adeimantus’ challenge, he is to demonstrate that it has a power in the soul despite the injustice that constitutes a community.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Hugo Filgueiras de Araújo A Perception Philosophy in Plato
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The aim of this paper is to defend that Plato’s philosophy, embodied in the hypothesis of forms that has in its scope an account of sense data and sensitivity. They do not have to be left out, as the secondary literature usually holds. In Theaetetus, Socrates analyses exhaustively the possibility of sensitivity be held as knowledge; In Phaedo, using the reminiscence argument, Plato admits that in order to have learning process and memory, it is necessary that we have two correlative and mutually necessary cognitive experiences, namely: a sensitive perception (aísthesis), which gives rise to anamneses, and the soul’s contact to the forms, which is prior to birth. This is so, because the individual can only have memory of what he knew beforehand. This paper holds therefore that there is a perception philosophy in Plato.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Chloe Balla Philosophy as a Way of Dying?: On Socrates’ Last Words in the Phaedo
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The idea of philosophy as a way of living is explicitly introduced by Plato, who illustrates it through the story of his teacher’s life and death. A most striking aspect of Plato’s account of philosophy as a way of living is that it also appears to involve the idea of philosophy as a preparation for, or even a pursuit of, dying: they that strive unceasingly for this release [sc. the release of soul from body] are, so we maintain, none other than those that pursue philosophy aright; indeed this and nothing else is the philosopher’s concern, the release and separation of soul from body (Phaedo 67d; trans. Hackforth, with modifications) The soul of the philosopher trains itself to die readily, by achieving, already during life, a state of purity: which is precisely what true philosophy consists in 80-81a.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Richard A. Berg The Role of Irony in Xenophon’s Dialogue of Socrates with Theodote
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In his Memoirs of Socrates at 3.11 Xenophon reports a dialogue of Socrates with Theodote, a high-ranking prostitute, which looks to be unique in the ancient Greek canon in representing a philosophical exchange of ideas between a man and woman. But what are we to make of the dialogue between them? The mere occurrence of the dialogue alone is surely not enough to make Xenophon’s Socrates out to be a feminist. In the attempt to understand the exchange between them I argue it is important to note that Theodote’s offer for Socrates to cross the line from the mind to the body makes literal and commercial sense, while Socrates’ description of his male followers as “girlfriends” does neither. Moreover, the biting irony of the dialogue’s conclusion suggests that he would not have wanted her to join his male followers, thus breaking with their established women-stay-at- home social conventions. Xenophon’s Theodote dialogue, I conclude, emphatically does not make Socrates out to be a feminist, at least not in the sense of being willing to accept female followers.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Hugo Bezerra Tiburtino Organon and its Meaning
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What does it mean when it is said that Aristotelian logic is an organon, an instrument? Does it mean that Aristotle’s logic is a method? I shall argue that the first meaning of organon is not that it is a method; at least that was not the intention of the ancient commentators, who began the tradition of an instrumental logic. Indeed, for them organon means what it is supposed to mean, i.e., means that lead to an end, even if we talk about logic or any other discipline; that do not imply that it should be a method, although does not rule this out also.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Laura Bitiniece Justice as a Method of Politics in Plato’s Republic
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This paper looks at a hypothesis that for Plato politics is a field of ethical acts. The reason behind every truly political action is justice, in a way making justice a method of politics. According to Resp. 433a-c, it’s possible to interpret two meanings of justice: (a) the principle of differentiation by division of functions, and (b) something that provides δύναμις for virtues. Seeing justice as a creative energy, justice can be understood as a motivational force to counterbalance the force of desires. Republic is clear about “who has to do x?” (one who is fit for it, e.g. Resp. 370a-c, 433a) and “how to do x?” (with the ἀρετή of this τέχνη, e.g. Resp. 352e-353c). The question “why to do x” (because it is just) in all the cases concerning life in polis is the one, that could possibly link the motivational gap in politics and ethics of Plato’s Republic.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lisa Bressan A Comparison between Book E and Book K of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: The Being Outside and Separate
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In Aristotle’s Metaphysics K 8, in the part which is the parallel discussion of being as truth done in book Epsilon (chapter 4), the author, in defining being per se, uses the phrase τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. This is not what Aristotle states in book E, namely that being as truth, along with being per accidens, is founded on the remaining kind of being and does not manifest - any nature outside of being (οὐκ ἔξω οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος). Through the analysis and comparison of the two expositions, I will try to highlight how this difference depends on the different conception in the author of book Kappa about the object of the philosophy. In fact, while in book E the object of philosophy is being qua being and in particular being per se, and the separate substance turns out to be the object of first philosophy as the cause and the principle (that is as the explanation of being qua being) in book K, on the con-trary, the separate substance, since it is identified tout court with being qua being (cf. K 7, 1064a29 - there is a science of being qua being and qua separate, τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν), is itself the true object of study of philosophy.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
George Bruseker The Metaphor of Hunting and the Method of Division in the Sophist
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This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato’s dialogue, the Sophist. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the ‘angler’ given at the start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of division introduced for coming to definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student’s understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a non-linear, iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or seperative arts (as they are classified within the dialogue).
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Aylin Cankaya Philosophia as Energeia in Aristotle
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This paper discusses Aristotle’s description of philosophia in a way of how it should be understood? It seems like philosophy begins with wonder. In this sense, it consists of an inquiry. Hereby, inquiring about the “things” and “beings” and constantly pursuing knowledge indicates an endless process. And this process may not be sufficient for philosophical activity itself. Besides the inquiry process, philosophical activity consists of active thinking and the ability to practice active thinking in our daily lives. In this context, philosophy is not a debate of abstract concepts, or describing the concepts. For Aristotle, philosophia was a way of active living throughout our entire lives. That means that not only pursing knowledge is necessary to achieve that state, but also thinking about, and transforming that knowledge in our lives. This paper focuses on the active part of philosophy; which can be seen as an important part towards the understanding of philosophia.