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presenting our authors
1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Presenting Our Authors
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articles
2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Jorge J. E. Gracia, Jonathan Vajda Individuation and the Realism/Nominalism Dilemma: The Case of the Middle Ages
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After reviewing various formulations of the problems of universals and individuation, this essay considers the dialectic that informs the relationship between the two. This dialectic involves a distinction between a realist theory of universals that satisfies the requirements of science but fails to account for the non-instantiability of individuals and a nominalist theory of universals that fails to satisfy the requirements of science but accounts for the non-instantiability of individuals. Inadequacies found in one view tend to motivate movement to the other view. But, like a pendulum swing, this movement inevitably involves facing what motivated the original view. This dialectic is illustrated by a consideration of the views of five medieval authors: Boethius, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Grzegorz Hołub Karol Wojtyła’s Thinking on Truth
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In his book The Acting Person Karol Wojtyła makes frequent references to the concept of truth. He analyzes truth expressions in various realms, including the epistemological, the metaphysical, the moral, and the axiological. He does not, however, say exactly what he means by truth. This essay analyzes select passages from this book and tries to formulate a coherent understanding of truth as Wojtyła conceived it. This essay puts special emphasis on the question of axiological truth, for this concept is novel within the Thomistic framework of philosophizing and seems to be a consequence of the philosopher’s encounter with phenomenology. In the centre of attention is the first edition of this book published in 1969 in Poland. The main intention of the article is to grasp the very first Wojtylian approach to the problem of truth.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Adrian Bardon Rehabilitating Kant’s Third Analogy of Experience
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In this essay I revisit Kant’s largely-ignored Third Analogy of Experience with an eye to what it may yet contribute to our understanding of time perception. The essay begins with an elucidation of the purpose of the Third Analogy, followed by an account of how the core argument is intended to work. It then summarizes the problem that has left the Third Analogy out of much of the scholarly literature on Kant. I respond by introducing two ways of scaling back on Kant’s claims. First, I offer a revisionary interpretation of the Third Analogy as a “modest” transcendental argument; second, I propose a re-imagining of the Analogy such that it yields an empirical hypothesis that might be of use in developmental psychology.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Richard A. Cohen Social Theory in Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
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The present article argues: that to support the primary aim of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which is to establish the primacy of practical reason for religion (and thereby to criticize the subversion of religion qua supra-moral “ecclesiastical faith”), Kant elaborates and assigns to it a social ethics. Contrary to the tired adage that without religious foundation ethics must collapse, the reverse is actually the case: without ethical foundation religion must collapse, degenerating into dogmatism, superstition and fanaticism. To ground and concretize the link between ethics and religion Kant elaborates a three layered “anthropology” of human sociality upon which religion builds its communities (“church”) wherein holiness consists above all in the solidarity of ethical striving to achieve virtue for each and justice for all. Despite his good intentions, however, and independent of the question of the legitimacy of ethical religion, Kant fails in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone owing to the imposition of a debilitating formalism owing to an undiminished allegiance to the epistemological strictures and structures—the Transcendental Idealism—of the Critique of Pure Reason.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Stathis Livadas Is Existence an Ontologically Sound Term?
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This article deals with the question of existence by considering the way in which phenomenology has faced this issue. To provide an argument against the ontological certainties typical of idealism and realism, I try to show the possibility of a subjective reduction of the question of existence and to highlight the way in which the concept of existence may be “undermined” by this reduction. A prominent place is given to the concept of infinity for radically reassessing the content and scope of the concept of existence. I try to integrate some of the main themes of Husserlian phenomenology without being restrictively committed to it. I include some discussion of foundational mathematics and of quantum physics.
contemporary currents
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Philip Shields How Identity Politics Objectifies People and Undermines Rational Agency
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In our contemporary society it is widely recognized that public discourse has become increasingly polemical and polarized, as claims to truth and justice are cynically dismissed as manipulative power plays. We argue first that this growth of power politics reflects the triumph of the objectifying stance of the social sciences, and the consequent loss of any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power, and second that it is ad hominem to dismiss or accept people’s arguments simply because of their identity interests, their positionality, instead of considering the explicit meaning and validity of what they say. By adopting the objectifying perspective of the social sciences, identity theorists on the left and the right reduce “power” to coercion and fail to appreciate the power of persuasion, and the normative conditions that make rational agency possible. This tendency is ultimately contemptuous of human dignity because it undermines the rational agency and moral responsibility of everyone concerned, from the objectified human subjects to the objectifying theorists.
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Caleb Bernacchio MacIntyre on Practical Reasoning: A Reply to Patrick Byrne
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Patrick Byrne argues that MacIntyre’s account of practical reasoning is inadequate because it is based upon a notion of flourishing that places too much emphasis on impersonal facts, likewise because it is excessively focused on means without considering the role of desire for ends, and because it is does not account for the role of feelings in explaining how knowledge of ends is attained. In this essay, I argue that MacIntyre’s account provides adequate responses to each of these concerns. But more broadly, I argue that Byrne is right to suggest that a Lonerganian perspective offers important insights that can extend MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Specifically, Lonergan’s account of the generalized empirical method may inform MacIntyre’s theory of rival, and potentially incommensurable traditions, explaining how standards of argument are both transcultural and historically articulated.
book reviews
9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 4
Francis Feingold Graven Images: Substitutes for True Morality
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presenting our authors
10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Presenting Our Authors
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articles
11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Alan Daboin The Ethical Concept of Responsibility in Levinas and Wojtyła
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In this article I examine the ethical concept of responsibility as presented by Emmanuel Levinas and Karol Wojtyła. I focus throughout on questions pertaining to the relations between identity and alterity and between heteronomy and autonomy. To do so involves looking at the contrary roles that these two authors give to selfhood and freedom when accounting for our sense of obligation and responsibility toward others and toward ourselves. I then put Levinas’s phenomenological account of responsibility into dialogue with Wojtyła’s personalist account in an examination of the question of animal ethics. Specifically, I discuss the extent to which their ideas on our responsibilities toward others can be extended to the domain of non-human animals.
12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Ning Fan Transparent Self-Knowledge of Attitudes and Emotions: A Davidsonian Attempt
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In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran provides a fascinating account of how we know what we believe that he calls the “transparency account.” This account relies on the transparency relation between the question of whether we believe that p and the question of whether p is true. That is, we can consider the former by considering the grounds for the latter. But Moran’s account has been criticized by David Finkelstein, who argues that it fails to explain how we know our attitudes and emotions more generally. The aim of this paper is to show how Moran’s transparency account can be extended to meet this criticism by modifying it, using insights from Davidson’s view on attitudes and emotions.
13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
S. K. Wertz Collingwood and the Nature of Consciousness
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This essay touches on the following topics: imagination, caprice, relative and absolute presuppositions, language, knowledge, moral and aesthetic values, art, evolution, and dreams. Collingwood distinguished between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness and identified four features of consciousness: forms (simple or primitive, practical, and theoretical or specialized), objects, feelings, and selective attention or focus. He also spoke of the corruption of consciousness that psychologists of his day called repression. This is a way in which we can falsify consciousness that can lead to inauthentic thinking and to error. The phenomenological description of these processes that he gave us is a promising over-all account. This essay also utilizes some of the contemporary literature on consciousness to draw comparisons and contrasts with Collingwood’s account. As a historical note, it offers some parallels between Leibniz and Collingwood on attention, awareness, and consciousness.
14. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Carl Humphries Ontological Realism and the Later Wittgenstein
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If Wittgenstein’s later writings have implications for ontological investigations, they would appear to center on the thought that metaphysical claims, along with ontological commitments more broadly conceived, are problematically distanced from our everyday activities of language use and the contexts these involve. If they are taken in this way, it can seem natural to view them as furnishing a basis for thinking that ontological realism, at least when construed as metaphysically motivated, can be ruled out on linguistic-conceptual and/or ethical grounds as incompatible with how language figures in our lives. This paper argues against such a conclusion by claiming that on each of the currently prevalent approaches to interpreting Wittgenstein’s later thought, if we construe him as essentially an anti-dogmatic thinker, then we cannot draw such implications from his work without uncharitably attributing to him an internally inconsistent stance—one involving some sort of dogmatic commitment itself.
15. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Timothy Furlan Principles and Judgments in Rawls’s Theory of Justice
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In this paper I argue that the right to equal respect and consideration that Rawls incorporates into the original position by means of the veil of ignorance cannot provide support for his two principles of justice independently of an appeal to considered judgments. The trouble is that this right is intolerably vague. The crucial terms are neither transparent in meaning nor clearly definable, and so they can only be understood against a background of considered judgments. To the extent that the principle is kept vague, it places no constraints on the conditions of the original position. To the extent that its meaning is specified, its interpretation presupposes the very principles and considered judgments that are supposed to be independently justified by the device of the original position. Finally, I respond to Norm Daniels’s claim that “wide reflective equilibrium” provides a way to test moral principles independently of their respective considered judgments.
16. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Timothy Kearns, Oswald Schmitz Flourishing: Outlines of an Aristotelian Natural Philosophy of Living Things
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Accounts of flourishing have been employed in many disciplines. Aristotelian moral philosophers have developed accounts of flourishing based on the characteristic forms of life of living things. In this paper we develop an Aristotelian account of flourishing for living things in general as part of a larger Aristotelian natural philosophy. We relate accounts of flourishing to evolutionary theory, behavioral studies, and ecology as well as to what flourishing is for individual organisms in their parts and activities. We distinguish between contingent and determinate activities by arguing that the behavior of living things are their contingent activities. We consider the structure of cognitive capacities in living things and their relation to flourishing, and we follow out the implications of the distinctively human capacities of cognition. Our consideration of humankind alloww us to show that the study and practice of human flourishing entail stewardship of nature.
book reviews
17. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Wargin The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility
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18. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Glenn Statile The Transmission of Knowledge
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19. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
Curtis Hancock A Political Philosophy of Conservatism: Prudence, Moderation and Tradition
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20. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 61 > Issue: 3
John D. Gilroy American Pragmatism: An Introduction
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