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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Jean W. Rioux What Counts as a Number?
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Georg Cantor argued that pure mathematics would be better-designated “free mathematics” since mathematical inquiry need not justify its discoveries through some extra-mental standard. Even so, he spent much of his later life addressing ancient and scholastic objections to his own transfinite number theory. Some philosophers have argued that Cantor need not have bothered. Thomas Aquinas at least, and perhaps Aristotle, would have consistently embraced developments in number theory, including the transfinite numbers. The author of this paper asks whether the restriction of arithmetic to the natural numbers that is apparently assumed by Aristotle and Aquinas is necessary in the light of their stated principles. The author concludes that, while some texts from Aristotle and Thomas suggest that such discoveries as zero, rational, and real numbers, and even Cantor’s own transfinite numbers, are legitimate objects of scientific knowledge, a careful analysis shows that they are incompatible with the ultimate arithmetical principle, the unit.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Vincent Shen From Gift to Law: Thomas’s Natural Law and Laozi’s Heavenly Dao
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For Thomas Aquinas, the creator of natural law is a personal, substantial, and relational God. For Laozi, it is an impersonal, non-substantial, self-manifesting dao. There are similarities, and this article will consider several of them. For Thomas, the act of creation comes from God, and for Laozi the giving birth of the universe is from the dao’s unconditional generosity. Thus it is possible to compare the way in which the world-originating generosity of God generates the moral law and the way in which the self-manifesting dao generates the moral law. In Thomas’s view the natural law is the rational participation of the human being in God’s eternal law. Laozi’s heavenly dao governs all things in the universe, and for this reason human beings and their techniques should comply with dao. Thomas emphasizes human freedom of will and the responsibility to pursue what is good and to avoid what is evil. Laozi emphasizes the objectivity of heavenly dao without any reference to human freedom of will or individual responsibility. With religious Daoism there develops the idea of collective responsibility and the divinization of dao, a point that invites further comparative study of Thomism and Daoism.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Michael Davis Locke (and Hobbes) on “Property” in the State of Nature
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Anyone reading the second of Two Treatises of Government after Leviathan must notice how much more civil Locke’s state of nature is in comparison to Hobbes’s. Many readers may also notice how much space the Second Treatise gives the subject of property. While Hobbes has only a few scattered sentences on property, Locke has the famous chapter five, which constitutes about a tenth of the whole Second Treatise (§§25–51). Private property in the state of nature seems to be what protects Locke’s Second Treatise from the absolutist conclusion of Hobbes’s Leviathan. The Second Treatise’s account of private property achieves that without even a minimal theory of property. What Locke offers instead in chapter five is a proof that property of a quite limited sort is possible in the state of nature. He does not—and need not—claim that this possibility was ever realized (as one must do in order to have even a minimal theory of property). Insofar as Locke offers a theory of property, it is the same as what Hobbes offers.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Peter Tumulty Recovering a More Robust Understanding of Naturalism and Human Rights: Remarks Inspired by McDowell and Wittgenstein
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To those working for human rights because of belief in their substantive value, Richard Rorty’s non-cognitivist advocacy of the Western culture of human rights is an example of a confused vision that is tragically self-defeating. Rorty undermines the grounds for a commitment that can transcend feelings and endure threats. In addition, the natural consequence of developing the reflective intelligence of the young would lead in time to seeing their “teachers” of human rights as cultural colonizers attempting to rob them of their identity. The argument here is that there is a more compelling vision of nature and human nature available that is (1) not a version of materialism, (2) eliminates having to confront materialism’s inherent difficulty with norms, and (3) can make intelligible and support a more self-aware, inspiring human rights culture. The argument draws upon, qualifies, and extends reinforcing insights to be found in the works of McDowell and Wittgenstein.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Eric v. d. Luft From Self-Consciousness to Reason in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: Aporia Overcome, Aporia Sidestepped, or Organic Transition?
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The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates (1) whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or (2) whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end and either manages to create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or (3) whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Charles A. Hobbs Reconsidering John Dewey’s Relationship with Ancient Philosophy
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There has been little scholarly attention to the tension within Dewey’s comments on the ancients. On the one hand, Dewey’s polemics condemn the lasting influence of Greek philosophers as deleterious. He charges the Greeks with originating a quest (“the quest for certainty”) that has led Western philosophy into such dualisms as reason and emotion, mind and nature, individual and community, and theory and practice. On the other hand, Dewey often has many sympathetic things to say about the Greeks. Taking account of the limited scholarship done on this topic, this essay articulates the dimensions of the tension and tries to put it into a Deweyan perspective.
book reviews
8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Raymond Dennehy Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates in France. Edited and translated by Gregory B. Sadler
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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Brian Gregor Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life: Between Romanticism and Modernism: Selected Essays. By George Pattison
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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 3
Brendan Palla Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value. By John Martin Fischer
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