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articles in english
1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Marius Dumitru The Extended Mind Hypothesis and Phenomenal Consciousness
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The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) needs a defence of phenomenal externalism in order to be consistent with an indispensable condition for attributing extended beliefs, concerning the conscious past endorsement of information. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage such a defence. Proponents ofthe EMH are thus confronted with a difficult dilemma: they either accept absurd attributions of belief, and thus deflate EMH, or incorporate, for compatibility reasons, the conscious past endorsement condition for extended belief attribution, implying a seemingly unavailable defence of phenomenal externalism, and thus risk inconsistency within EMH. Either way, EMH is threatened.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Manuel Liz Selective Attention: Reasons without Inferences, References without Concepts
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The aim of this paper is to focus on the phenomenon of selective attention as pointing out important psychological cases where it is arguable that we can have practical reasons without the capacity to carry out any relevant inference. Selective attention also would serve to show the possibility to have very basic demonstrative references to particular perceptual items without the possession of any concept. I will argue that if we assume 1) that believing can be taken as a kind of action and 2) that demonstrative references to particular empirical items in that so basic sense have an important epistemological role in all of our knowledge, then our conclusions would have a very large application. There would be reasons without inferences not only for acting but also for believing, anddemonstrative reference without concepts would be an uneliminable component of our knowledge.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Lorenzo Magnani Multimodal Abduction: External Semiotic Anchors and Hybrid Representations
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In this paper I contend that abduction is essentially multimodal, in that both data and hypotheses can have a full range of verbal and sensory representations, involving words, sights, images, smells, etc. but also kinesthetic experiences and other feelings such as pain, and thus all sensory modalities. The kinesthetic aspects simply explain abductive reasoning is basically manipulative, both linguistic and non linguistic signs have an internal semiotic life, as particular configurations of neural networks and chemical distributions (and in terms of their transformations) at the level of human brains, and as somatic expressions, but can also be delegated to many external objects and devices, for example written texts, diagrams, artifacts, etc. Still in this case unconscious aspects takepart of the abductive procedure, which acquires the features of a kind of "thinking through doing".
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Gonzalo Munevar A Distributive Explanation of “Grandmother” Cells
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The existence of “grandmother” cells clashes with the model of the brain as a distributive system and is implausible because such neurons would have powers of representation across visuals angles and contexts. Nevertheless, Kreiman, Koch and others have offered experimental evidence that such neurons do exist. I agree that neurons may indeed fire when the subject looks at a variety of pictures, drawings, etc. of one particular person. I argue, however, that such a “grandmother” cell is nothing but the single-neuron output stage of a neural network trained to recognize that person. The so-called “grandmother cell” does not have any extraordinary binding properties: They are properties of the neural network instead. I will thus offer a distributive explanation of grandmother cells.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Elena A. Nikitina Cognition in Conditions of Technological Environment
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At the beginning of the third millenium the aspect of truth comes out to be especially topical. The greatest interest is risen by existentialistic and social aspects of the truth issue. Their correlation studying is the most productive way to research the aspect of truth. An individual life passes under certain circumstances, one of them being social reality. Presence of other people, necessity of communication and correlation of individual and social substances allows emphasizing a social side of the truth aspect. The notion of truth is shaped under condition of intersubjectivity or within the process of social subjects interaction. On the one hand it provides a possibility to take the truth as an objectively existing phenomenon, on the other hand it transfers individual valuables and strivings into generally significant field. So Truth is destined to stay one of the most important and notional for a person concepts (despite of post-modernism attempts not to use it basically), as it legitimates a universal principle of common valuables availability for all people on the earth.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Vladimir Przhilenskiy Disciplinary and Cognitive Status of Philosophy of Science
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Философия науки возникла в итоге неспособности теории познания ответить на важные вопросы, вставшие перед научным сообществом в конце XIX века. И в дальнейшем философия науки и теория познания шли каждая свом путем, оказывая друг на друга немалое влияние, но ставя и решаявесьма разные задачи. Главным различием между ними является то, что эпистемология является теоретическим видом знания, тогда как философия науки – посттеоретическая дисциплина. Эпистемология – это теория, включающая в себя объяснительную схему, это философский проект познания, это дисциплина, содержащая набор запретов и предписаний. Философия науки представляет собой изучение научногопоиска как состоявшегося реального события, а также экспертную оценку результатов. Философия науки предполагает критическое и рефлексивное сравнение проекта и результата, тогда как теория познания совершенствует нормативы и регулятивы познавательной активности. Там, где теория познания создает метод и сама опирается на метод, философия науки обходится историко‐критической рефлексией, логико-грамматическим анализом, поиском культурных или социальных детерминант.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Abby Thomas Mind, Brain and Intellectual Machine in the Digital Age
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In this presentation we shall discuss the nature of mind vis-a-vis the brain and computers. Such a comparison presumes a general equivalence of brains and computers and models the brain as a huge biological computer, with consciousness added. The uniqueness of Mind in the lines of ancient Indian thought has been accpted as the basic concept in the analysis. Regarding the chief difference between mind and brain, material of the mind is taken to be subtle matter.The brain is made of gross matter and is a part of the physical body. Considering the brain and the computer, the brain is a biological structure made of organic molecules, whereas computer chips are inorganic objects manufactured by etching circuits on the surface of silica chips. Thus the human brain, occupying volume, is a volumetric entity whereas a computer, as electronic circuitry on a silica chip, is an areal entity. This explains the vast processing power andexceptional capabilities of the human brain.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Kevin Nicholas Thomson Universal Game Theory
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Universal Game Theory - The theory that all of life is a game played by consciousness’es, (Living Beings). The board is a dream like structure of the universe. The progression is through an active process of intent witnessing, and passive meditation. Which releases the tension in the nerves of the body and leads to selfless actions, moral goodness, and eventually the finish, Enlightenment. Just like a wounded creature only cares about it’s own self. Man in tensionthrough self-centered thought only thinks about his own predicaments. Even if he is thinking about others it is only through his own objectionable view from his false-created center. The enemy or deterrents in the game is the conditioning created by society for ambition, greed, control and general brain washing to give theindividual a false sense of identity, the ego. This is achieved by Religion; tradition, culture, education, reasoning, linear thought, and the creation of time. Leaving him/her in constant anxiety about millions of future contingencies. Through witnessing one realizes the whole futility of one dimensional thought which only leads to more and more thought. Simple or constructed elaborately, thought being time, a human construction. The final step of the Universal Game Theory is understanding the whole process of thought and the eventual revelation of Enlightenment, Bliss, ecstasy. Which the person then understands that he/she is the creator of the life/dream with which they are in. That point being a sexual ecstasy similar to what happens in death to men. i.e. Human males release semenwhen they die, having a sexual ecstasy at their last breath.
articles in russian
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
Vladimir Przhilenskiy Дисциплина и когнитивный статус философии науки Пржиленский В.И.
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The philosophy of a science has arisen as a result of inability of the theory of knowledge to reply to important questions which were rised before scientific community on a boundary of the XIX and XX centuries. Further the philosophy of a science and the theory of knowledge developed separately from each other. They had a big influence on each other, but their tasks were always different. The main distinction between them epistemology is a theoretical and projective kind of knowledge while philosophy of a science – post theoretical discipline. Epistemology is the theory including an explanatory scheme, it is a philosophical project of knowledge, and it is the discipline containing a set of interdictions and instructions. The philosophy of a science is interested in studying of scientific knowledge as a real event, which went through, making an expert estimation of results. The philosophy of a science assumes critical and reflective comparison of the project and result whereas the theory of knowledge improves specifications and discipline of cognitive activity. While the theory of knowledge creates a methodand is guided by a method the philosophy of a science prefers a historical and critical reflection, the logical-grammatical analysis, searches of cultural or social determination.
articles in chinese
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 34
DongKai Li 黑格尔认识论和本体论的根本错 误以及我的新的本体论和认识论
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Almost all think Hegel’s Ontology and Cognition is wrong. Yeah, his is wrong. But, what mistake? What mistake is the essential one? How to demonstrate Hegel’s this essential mistake in his great Ontology and Cognition system? This section is Ontology. But, Ontology can not be there without the Cognition. Hegel’s great achievement in philosophy history is his Cognition. While, His main mistake is also in his Cognition, and, his that mistake in Cognition is at the basis of hisOntology, his wrong Ontology. So, before point out Hegel’s mistake in Ontology, we must take out his Cognition, point out his that essential mistake in his Cognition. By law of contradiction, Hegel ever study the Cognition, demonstrated that the Cognition course moves by the force of contradiction from the contrast between the object and knowledge. This was really a great achievement and big progress on the development of Cognition, clear up Kant’s confusion in Kant’sstudy of Cognition. But, now, I ask, is that contradiction from the contrast between the object and knowledge the force to move the Cognition course? Pls be kindly noted, this is the place where Hegel’s essential mistake in Cognition rooted. Pls your attention, how does the contrast between the object and knowledge produce a kind of contradiction force, while the object is external exist, the knowledge is another exist? By law of contradiction, only when a pair of contrast exist in a samebody, that contrast could produce the force. the object and the knowledge, obviously are not in a same being body, so, even though there is the contrast between the object and knowledge, that contrast can not produce the force to more the Cognition. For example, the tree is there as a kind of exist being, the knowledge about the tree is there also as a kind of exist being, or, this knowledge about the tree could be regarded as that in people’s mind, in book. Of course, betweenthe tree and the knowledge about that tree there is the contrast, pls be kindly asked, does this contrast produce the force to move your Cognition about the tree? Can you get? Can you feel that force? of course, the answer is NO. So, the force to move the Cognition course is not from the contrast between the object and knowledge! This is Hegel’s essential mistake in Cognition. So, the force moves the Cognition course must come from one same exist being body, in which a pair of contrast exist. In my this Paper, besides point out above mentioned Hegel’s mistake in Cognition, I already present the pair of contrast, existing in one same exist being body, to produce the force to move the Cognition. The contrast to produce the force is demonstrated out by following steps: Firstly, find out Hegel’s mistake in Ontology, because, his wrong Cognition is on basis of his Ontology. Secondly, demonstrate what is the Ontology. I demonstrated successfully that theuniform contradiction body is just the noumenon, the ONTO, which is the root for everything. Then, people, as a kind of external exist, exist also as per the law of uniform contradiction, is a kind of specific uniform contradiction body, in which, a pair of contrast exist, produce the force to control people’s exist, move. Then, I study this uniform contrast in people’s body, finally, I found out this uniform contrast body within people’s body, it is ego and nonego. Ego, refers to the people’s live body, include the body and the instinct, the desire in mind, etc. Nonego, refers to the Idea in people’s mind, the idea reflects the external exist being. For one person, one live body, the Ego and Nonego is a kind of contrast, producing the force to make this live body move. Cognition is a kind of movement of human, so, Cognition course moves by the force from the contrast between the Ego and Nonego within an exist being live body. Following is the Cognition move course way: “EGO”+“Nonego” →→ Force to move (N times) → → Feeling (N times) → → Idea (N numbers)+ thinking (N times) →→ Knowledge (N numbers) ≈ Object →→=Object