articles in english 
1.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
Volume >
13
Valentin A. Bazhanov
Heuristic Ground of Paraconsistent Logic:
The Imaginary Logic of N.A. Vasiliev
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The paper deals with the heuristic prerequisites of paraconsistent logic in the case of imaginary logic of N.A. Vasiliev proposed in 1910.



2.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
JeanYves Béziau
What is “Formal Logic”?
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“Formal logic”, an expression created by Kant to characterize Aristotelian logic, has also been used as a name for modern logic, originated by Boole and Frege, which in many aspects differs radically from traditional logic. We shed light on this paradox by distinguishing in this paper five different meanings of the expression “formal logic”: (1) Formal reasoning according to the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and content, (2) Formal logic as a formal science by opposition to an empirical science, (3) Formal systems in the sense of Hilbert, Curry and the formalist school, (4) Symbolic logic, a science using symbols, such as Venn diagrams, (5) Mathematical logic, a mathematical approach to reasoning. We argue that these five meanings are independent and that the meaning (5) is the one which better characterized modern logic, which should therefore not be called “formal logic”.



3.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Chang Kyun Park
A Philosophical Interpretation of Rough Set Theory
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The rough set theory has interesting properties such as that a rough set is considered as distinct sets in distinct knowledge bases, and that distinct rough sets are considered as one same set in a certain knowledge base. This leads to a significant philosophical interpretation: a concept (or phenomenon) may be understood as different ones in different philosophical perspectives, while different concepts (or phenomena) may be understood as a same one in a certain philosophical perspective. Such properties of rough set theory produce a mathematical model to support critical realism and the theory ladenness of observation in the philosophy of science.



4.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Don Faust
Explorationism, Evidence Logic and the Question of the Nonnecessity of All Belief Systems
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Explorationism (see www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Logi/LogiFaus.htm, WCP XX, “Conflict without Contradiction”) is a perspective concerning human knowledge: as yet, our ignorance of the Real World remains great. With this perspective, all our knowledge is so far only partial and tentative. Evidence Logic (EL) (see “The Concept of Evidence”, INTER. JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 15 (2000), 477‐493) provides an example of a reasonable Base Logic for Explorationism:EL provides machinery for the representation and processing of gradational evidential predications. Syntactically, for any evidence level e, for a proposition symbol P, Pc:e asserts that there is level e confirmatory evidence regarding P, while Pr:e asserts level e refutatory evidence (n‐ary predications, for n>0, are handled similarly). Semantically, EL has similarly enriched model spaces. The Boolean sentence algebras of the variety of EL languages, varying across stipulated families of predicate and functions symbols, have been analyzed, and EL is sound and complete. Belief Systems, we will argue, are all unnecessary: in science, as well as in all broader domains of human relations and activity, it is always sufficient to have simply commitments, which entail no assertion of Truth but rather simply entail agreed‐upon consequent actions. (Agent A believes a sentence S if A asserts S is True although A does not know (have absolute evidence) that S is True.) We will further seek to explore ways in which such a perspective may help in engendering more enhanced discourse, less absolutist and shrill advocacy and violence, and more rationality, in the Global Village of the new century.



5.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
TzuKeng Fu
Translation Paradox and Logical Translation:
A Study in Universal Logic
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Why do logicians develop so many different philosophical logics? All their aims focus on the same question”What is logic?” Whether they have said it is the aim question which they want answer or not when they are doing logics, this is the presumed motivation for all studies of logics. In other words, the reason for logicians to do logics is try to answer what logic is. This kind of conceptual analysis on logic is the main problem style to be asked in Universal Logic, such as “What is classical propositional logic?”, “What is many‐valued logic?”, “What is paraconsistent logic?”, etc. In this paper, we discuss one of Béziau’s paradoxes, Translation Paradox in Logical Translation, due to this kind of conceptual analysis on logic. Universal Logic is not a new logic, according to Béziau, it is a general theory of logical structures analogy to Universal Algebra, even if we could see it as a new logical activity. It is not to find out a ‘universal’ logic to cover all aims of logical researches. And it is definitely not in the spirit of logical monism, that is there is only one true logic. Develop Universal Logic about 15 years, besides its own motivation and purposes, it increasingly induces to two main stream problems, one is Logical Translation and the other is Combination of Logics which are two new realms in logic research. We find it is an easier way to start with Béziau’s Translation Paradox to get involved into Translation of Logics.



6.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Mario GomezTorrente
Tarski on Variable Domains
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In earlier work I claimed that when Tarski wrote his seminal 1936 paper on logical consequence, he had in mind a now nonstandard convention, that he also used in his 1937 logic manual, requiring the domain of quantification of the different interpretations of a firstorder mathematical language to covary with changes in the interpretation of a nonlogical “domain predicate”. Recently Paolo Mancosu has rejected this claim, holding that it can be established on the basis of a passage from Tarski’s manual that he did not employ that convention. I show that Mancosu misinterprets the passage in question and that detailed examination of the surrounding text actually confirms my earlier claim.



7.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Rolando M. Gripaldo
The Rejection of the Proposition
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Part of rethinking philosophy today, the author believes, is to rethink our logical concepts. The author questions the ontological existence of the proposition as the content of sentential utterances—written or spoken—as it was originally proposed by John Searle. While a performative is an utterance where the speaker not only utters a sentential or illocutionary content such as a statement, but also performs the illocutionary force such as the act of stating, the author reasserts John Austin’s constative as the general label (genus) of specific utterances (species) that can be rendered true or false such as a statement, assertion, description, and prediction. In the remainder of the paper, the author tries to show that it is a category mistake for someone to assert a statement or to state an assertion.



8.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Beomin Kim
The Translation of First Order Logic into Modal Predicate Logic
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This paper deals with the translation of first order formulas to predicate S5 formulas. This translation does not bring the first order formula itself to a modal system, but modal interpretation of the first order formula can be given by the translation. Every formula can be translated, and the additional condition such as formula's having only one variable, or having both world domain and individual domain is not required. I introduce an indexical predicate 'E' for the translation. The meaning that 'E(a)' is true is 'this world is 'a' '. Because of this meaning, I call 'E' an indexical predicate. 'E' plays an important role for the translation. In addition that the modal formulas can be translated into first order formulas, we can conclude that the first order logic and modal predicate logic isintertranslatable.



9.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Robert K. Meyer
Fallacies of Division
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What do wellknown theories look like if formulated with a relevant rather than a standard classical or intuitionist logic? Do familiar reconstructions of these theories go through, or do we change the reconstruction when we change the logic? I show in this paper that a new class of fallacies arises when we take the familiar Peano postulates as the foundation for a relevant theory of the natural numbers N. For these postulates fail in the relevant context to establish the relevant cancellation theorem. Put otherwise, there are fallacies of division in arithmetic formulated relevantly!



10.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Sergey Pavlov
Semantics with Only One Bedeutung:
Rethinking Frege's Semantics
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The modification of Frege's semantics that consists in using only one reference (Bedeutung, denotate) truth instead of two references truth and falsity is proposed. According to Frege 1) every true sentence stands for truth, 2) every false sentence stands for falsity. We modify the second statement: 2*) every false sentence doesn't stand for truth. The modification of sentential logic interpretation will consist in change of semantic rules: a) every formula A stands either for truth or falsity, b.1) the formula A has value T iff the formula A stands for truth, b.2) the formula A has value F iff the formula A stands for falsity. Let’s change rules a) and b.2) on: a*) every formula A either stands or doesn't stand for truth, b.2*) the formula A has value F iff the formula A doesn't stand for truth. So, we have only one reference but still two values. The proposed approach can be extended to nonclassical cases, for which the bivalence principle doesn't take place. An ordered pair of the sentences A, ~A is put in correspondence to the sentence A. Each sentence of ordered pair can either stands or doesn't stand for truthindependently from the other. Thus for each pair of sentences we have four possible variants of reference which are generate four functional values.



11.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
Volume >
13
Hartley Slater
Paradoxes and Pragmatics
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Tarski’s assessment that natural language is inconsistent on account of the Liar Paradox is shown to be incorrect: what Tarski’s theorem in fact shows is that Truth is not a property of sentences but of propositions. By using propositions rather than sentences as the bearers of Truth, semantic closure within the same language is easily obtained. Tarski’s contrary assessment was partly based on confusions about propositions and their grammatical expression. But more centrally it arose through blindness to pragmatic factors in language — a blindness that was common in his time, and it has continued to the present day, in discussions of ‘Open Pairs’, and Yablotype paradoxes, for instance. For completeness, it is also shown that the Fixed Point Theorem does not apply to propositions, because of categorical differences between sentences and propositions — also predicates and properties.



12.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
HungYul So
Goedel, Nietzsche and Buddha:
Logical Aspects of the Hawking Problem
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Hawking, in his book, A Brief History of Time, concludes with a conditional remark: If we find a complete theory to explain the physical world, then we will come to understand God’s mind. With Goedel in mind, we can raise questions about the completeness of our scientific understanding and the nature of our understanding with regard to God’s mind. We need to ask about the higher order of our understanding when we move to knowing God’s mind. We go onto develop these problems with Nietzsche’s thoughts on the death of God, and the emergence of super human intelligences. Then, we come to Buddha, a logical genius, to see how the Buddhistic enlightenment exemplifies the super human intelligence, as well as the higher order understanding in our knowledge of God’s mind.



13.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Kordula Świętorzecka
The Formalised Conception of Substantial Change in Terms of Some Modal Sentential Calculus (logic LCG)
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The intention of the presented paper is to establish within a certain modal semantic based on the situational ontology a description of the phenomenon of substantial change, which originally had been formulated within Aristotelian metaphysics – a theory based in reistic ontology. We understand substantial changesto be such changes whose subjects are primary substances (πρωται ουσι αι ) conceived as actually existing individual essences. The analysed changeability is of an existential character  it pertains to the existence of those substances. The formalised description of the chosen changes, constructed in part (1) of the study, takes into consideration the necessary condition for their occurrence: the disappearing and coming into being of successively becoming substances. Part (2) presents the manner in which it is possible to reformulate the obtained characteristic of substantial change in order to create a description of a particular variety of situational changes, which belong, in turn, to the intended interpretation of modal sentential logic of change LCG  a calculus in which change is a primitive concept precised with the help of two oneargument operators C and G, read respectively as: it changes that…, a change is enabled by this, that …..



14.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Margarita Vázquez
Logic and the Surprise Exam Paradox
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In this paper, I analyze the "surprise exam paradox". I think that the paradox can be avoided and I am going to focus on three points: 1) A conflict arises between reasoning and the confidence in the person that makes the original statement. If we examine the situation by reasoning we conclude that the statement is not going to come true, because we trust the person that states it. However, if it is not possible to happen, it happens, and the person told the truth; 2) There is a disjunction among the days of the week: “or it is the first day or it is the second day or … it is the last day” (or Monday or Tuesday or Wednesday or Thursday or Friday). If I still have not been given the exam by Friday, the only possible conclusion is that the exam will be given on Friday. On Thursday, however, thesituation is completely different; 3) It seems that this paradox is a case of contingent futures, which branching time logics usually solve. The truthvalue of the sentences is only relative to the branch that takes place in the end.



15.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
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13
Adrian Vizitiu
Constructive Mediated Interferences
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In the article we present, we draw the reader’s attention on the possibility that mediated inferences could become means of making categorical sentences representing new data in the chain of human knowledge. These new classes of objects, which are expressed by the intersection of two classes of given objects, should appear as conclusions in a deductive inference where the premises are true. The truth of certain such data becomes a criterion of existence for theobjects described by the data.



articles in russian 
16.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
Volume >
13
Evgeny Loginov
To the Question about the Classification of Conception
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articles in chinese 
17.

Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy:
Volume >
13
FangWen Yuan
“The Strict Deduction System Is Impossible to Derive the Contradiction” And the Proof
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Based on the strict definitions of concepts, such as deduction, the deduction rule and the deduction system, the form axiom, the substantive axiom, this article clearly shows the essence of the deductive reasoning, namely “Related attribute and the related restriction relations, which are conveyed in what the main concept of the deduction refers to, must be contained in those conveyed in what the premise proposition refers to”。Then puts forward the theorem “contradiction can not be derived from the strict deduction system”, and gives the proofs.


