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Displaying: 1-14 of 14 documents


articles
1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Patrick H. Byrne Lonergan’s Retrieval of Aristotelian Form
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Lonergan’s written reflections on the notion of form span almost thirty years. Beginning with his 1930s manuscripts on the philosophy of history, Lonergan returned again and again to the problem of clarifying that metaphysical concept. His thought on the issue of form reached its mature stage in 1957 with the publication of Insight. This article first presents an account of the mature, Insight stage of Lonergan’s notion of form. It then shows how Lonergan arrived at that position from his interpretation of Aristotle as set forth in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. It concludes with some remarks in response to a criticism of Lonergan, commonly leveled by certain Thomist thinkers, according to which Lonergan’s effort to ground philosophy in self-appropriation rather than metaphysics condemns him to a subjectivist or idealist position. Such a critique, I argue, fails to take into account what Lonergan actually held. Indeed, the preference for a metaphysical point de départ is itself vulnerable to a reverse criticism on Lonergan’s part.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
F.B.A. Asiedu The Elusive Face of Modern Platonism: Iris Murdoch on Anselm and the Ontological Argument
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Iris Murdoch’s Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals ranges wide over the field of Western philosophical thought. Throughout the work, Murdoch proposes and enacts a form of philosophical inquiry that she believes supports a moral philosophy based on the idea of the good. One of her attempts, partly inspired by Paul Tillich and J. N. Findlay, centers on her critique and appropriation of the structure of the so-called “ontological argument” in Anselm’s Proslogion. This study assesses Murdoch’s accomplishment and the tenability of the kind of Platonism she proposes against Anselm’s argument about the good in both the Monologion and the Proslogion. My claim is that Anselm’s conception of the good simply does not permit the kind of interpretation that Murdoch puts on the “ontological argument.”
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Peter Drum The Fourth Way—Mystery, Myth or Meaning?
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The paper contends that, despite certain opinions to the contrary, St. Thomas Aquinas’s fourth argument for the existence of God in the Summa theologica admits of an intelligible interpretation, consistent with a systematic approach to the Five Ways. The argument is to the effect that, since the Third Way is about the conservation of corruptible species in an eternal universe, it might be expected that the Fourth Way would address the question of why corruptible species exist at all. And, in fact, the Fourth Way readily admits of such an interpretation: an informed universe requires an Informer.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
John F.X. Knasas Contra Spinoza: Aquinas on God’s Free Will
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My article confronts three of Spinoza’s four arguments against free will in God with Aquinas’s contrary position in the Summa contra Gentiles, Book I. Spinoza’s three arguments come from his Ethics, props. XVII and XXXII. First, since free choice is always exclusive, free choice in God would leave unactualized power in God. Second, if God’s will could be different without entailing divine mutability, then a divine voluntarism would reign. Third, if God has freedom of will but his willing is his essence, the God’s essence could be otherwise. I note that these pitfalls open by assuming that the divine will bears upon creatures directly and immediately. I then show that since for Aquinas, God wills creatures by principally willing himself, none of Spinoza’s criticisms follow.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Patrick L. Bourgeois Critical Philosophy and Post-Critical Faith: The Christian Philosopher
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This paper focuses on the intertwining of philosophy and Christian faith in the concrete life of the Christian philosopher, with a view toward the compatibility of critical philosophy and a post-critical faith. Philosophy, as an enterprise of reason alone, is independent of Christian faith and theology. In accord with its definition, philosophy seeks evidence along the lines of reason independent of outside authority, and thus is autonomous from such faith. Yet, for the Christian philosopher, without jeopardizing this autonomy and independence, faith and theology do enter the picture in some sense. For, unless the individual is completely dichotomized in personality, her/his concrete life and existence must involve commitments both to the Christian faith and to philosophy, even though the commitment of faith is more basic. This paper explores this paradox of the independence and mutual intertwining of these two poles; then, focuses on the philosophical pole of the tension; and finally, resolves the tension for the Christian philosopher.
discussion articles
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
John P. O’Callaghan Aquinas, Cognitive Theory, and Analogy: A Propos of Robert Pasnau’s Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages
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Is it the case that God, human beings, and air all share the same capacity for cognition, differing only in the degree to which they engage in cognitive acts? Robert Pasnau has recently argued that according to St. Thomas Aquinas they do, a conclusion that for Pasnau follows straightforwardly from Aquinas’s discussion of God’s cognition in the first part of the Summa theologiae. Further, Pasnau holds that Aquinas’s relation to contemporary cognitive theory should be understood in light of the discussion of God. This essay argues that Pasnau’s analysis is mistaken. It begins by explaining Pasnau’s position. It then considers the problems this reading introduces into Aquinas’s discussion of God’s cognition, as well as those it faces when addressed to air and other cognitive media. Finally, it shows the role that Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy plays in understanding how “cognition” is said of human beings, how it is said of God, and how it is not said in the case of air and other cognitive media. It concludes by suggesting that the logic of analogy is Aquinas’s most crucial contribution to contemporary discussions of mind and cognition.
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Robert Pasnau What Is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics
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In an earlier work, I proposed understanding Aquinas’s theory of cognition in terms of the possession of information about the world. This proposal has seemed problematic in various ways. It has been said to include too much, and too little, and to be the wrong sort of account altogether. Nevertheless, I continue to think of it as the most plausible interpretation of Aquinas’s theory.
review article
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Lewis S. Ford Can Thomas and Whitehead Complement Each Other?
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Two essays relating Thomas and Whitehead have recently appeared. Coming To Be by James W. Felt, S.J., modifies Thomas by replacing his substantial form with Whitehead’s notion of subjective aim, the essencein-the-making introduced by God to guide the occasion’s act of coming into being. Felt also substitutes subjective aim for matter as the means of individuation. This is one of Whitehead’s individuating principles, although a case can be made that matter (the multiplicity of past actualities as proximate matter) is another. “God and Creativity” by Stephen T. Franklin develops a reconciliation of these two ultimates by conceiving of God as the source of creativity, and seeing creativity in terms of the Thomistic esse. In my reflections on this project I explore four alternativeswith respect to the source of creativity: (a) creativity as derived from the past; (b) creativity as inherent in the present; (c) God as the source of transitional creativity (Franklin); (d) God as the source of concrescent creativity (Ford). The last two differ with respect to being’s relation to becoming. Does being undergird becoming, or does becoming bring about being, such that apart from it there would be no being? Our theory of creation depends upon this question.
book reviews
9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Charles Bambach Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics
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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Janet E. Smith Catholic Bioethics and the Gift of Life
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11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Gregory A. Clark Reason in Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy
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12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Antonio Calcagno Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe
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13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Brian Davies The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being
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14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 76 > Issue: 3
Books Received
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