This essay reads Graeme Nicholson’s Heidegger on Truth in conjunction with Frank Schalow’s Heidegger’s Ecological Turn. It calls for the appropriation of Heidegger’s understanding of Da-sein to elaborate a radically other, earth-based political order. Nicholson and Schalow independently draw the conclusion that the technocratic world order, founded in the metaphysics of presence, is incapable of adequate response to a hermeneutic situation defined by instrumental reason and ecological collapse. Schalow’s carefully elaborated contribution to eco-philosophy offers a creative adaption of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and specifies how it is integrated into the project of the history of being.

This paper aims to underscore a certain continuity in Heidegger’s hermeneutical thinking, while examining the transformations that it undergoes from 1923 to 1959. My analysis of Heidegger’s thought follows the way the author uses the semantic range of the German word “Kunde”. I claim that this transformation can be understood from three different angles: the young Heidegger (1920’s), Heidegger’s “turning” (1930’s) and late Heidegger (1950’s). By analyzing those three steps in Heidegger’s thought, I show that Heidegger’s hermeneutics is a deep reflection on language that aims to shatter its logical, technical, and metaphysical understanding (in other words, as a simple mean of communication). The interpretation of the semantic range of the word Kunde helps us to understand Heidegger’s hermeneutics as an effort to think language as the “house of Being”, in which we find ourselves at home on earth.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the methodical status of phenomenological reduction in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures (1919-1923). Starting from the assumption that the traditional interpretation of reduction focused mainly on Heidegger’s interpretation of its ontological possibility (by explaining reduction from the phenomenon of anxiety), we propose a reading conducted from a methodical perspective. First, we follow the Heideggerian appropriation of reduction as the epoché of the objectivations of life and determine its “phenomenological residue” as essentially evental and “noematic”. Then, by broadening the meaning of reduction understood now as reconduction to the origin, we highlight its essentially interpretative, performative and rearticulatory character. As the “hermeneutical reduction” is accomplished as a critical destruction, the phenomenological seeing is essentially mediated in an interpretative and historical way.

The language of philosophy is based on a philosophy of language, which is considered as instrument. The traditional speech of Being and of God, which makes them objects, is also understood as a designation, not a pointing. Finally, the conventional question about Being moves on its tracks. It takes its starting point from Being, as if it were given without question. Instead, Heidegger poses it in the origin from Being itself.

Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science is expressed in his claim that they are not hostile towards each other, i.e., that philosophy is neither for nor against science, though they differ in ambition, strength, and methodology. Their interaction, as this essay suggests, may contribute to the range and diversification of philosophical thinking and to a deeper grasp of the strength and boundary (potential and limitation) of scientific inquiry and knowing. Heidegger’s rethinking of science, especially in his twenty-four “propositions about science”, includes a critical assessment of the status of science in the epoch of modernity; it discerns (discovers, discloses) the truth of science in its relation to the measure of truth in beings, and to the truth of be-ing. The entire inquiry at hand is grounded in be-ing-historical thinking and mindfulness.