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1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Dmitry M. Koshlakov, Alexander I. Shvyrkov Дмитрий Михайлович Кошлаков
Conception and Philosophy of Science
Концепт и философия науки

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The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. We provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be conceptions within this definition. Thus, the article interprets conception as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.
case-studies – science studies
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Alexander M. Dorozhkin, Anna V. Sakharova Александр Михайлович Дорожкин
Obvious and Improbable in Kuhnian Normal Science
Очевидное и невероятное в нормальной науке Томаса Куна

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The article is devoted to the analysis of some specific characteristics of the language of normal science described by Thomas Kuhn. We would like to draw attention to two problems associated with some features of the concept of paradigms. The first problem relates to the question, how scientists belonging to one paradigm record the position of a group of scientists adhering to another paradigm. Precisely, the article examines how the problem of “synchronous fragmentation of knowledge” is solved in the language of science. The second issue concerns the age of “normal” knowledge and the question, how the anomalous content of knowledge can appear and accumulate, and what is the status of scientists developing the “anomalous” knowledge. We reveal some possible parameters by which we can determine the early stage of the functioning of normal science, the periods of its heyday and decline. In this article, we try to find an approach to these problems by examining the natural language of scientists, using techniques of content analysis, as well as complex linguistic analysis, including discursive, semantic and pragmatic components. Linguistic analysis can’t finally solve the problems of philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge, in particular, the state of the paradigm concept by Thomas Kuhn. But it helps us to identify the boundaries of paradigms, as well as the state of normal knowledge. The problem of fragmentation of knowledge by paradigms, as well as the problem of “aging” of knowledge inside a “normal science” are not directly expressed by scientists. But they can be recorded by analysis of everyday language, which often becomes entangled with the language of science. The high rate of words that semantically indicate the “obvious” knowledge in scientific texts points to a “good” state of the paradigm. And vice versa, the words denoting “improbable” indirectly indicate its crisis state or express an attitude to the knowledge belonging to a different paradigm. The analysis of the data shows that the alleged complete replacement of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm by the concept of “trading zones” by Peter Galison does not appear to be accomplished. Just as the concept of scientific paradigm did not completely replace the falsificationalism, the Galison’s “trading zones” do not fully reflect the real state of affairs in science. Therefore, the Kuhnian paradigms are recorded at the lexical level in the communication of scientists.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Alina R. Latypova Алина Раилевна Латыпова
Between Mutation and Glitch: Digital Evolution of Media
Между мутацией и глитчем

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The following paper considers the immanent principles of digital media evolution. The features of the evolutional route of digital objects are conditioned by glitches, errors and bugs, which appear in media functioning, what in its turn gives birth to the new forms, structures and configurations of digital reality. The glitches are considered not only as a kind of digital mutations, but also as a sign of activity of media. Decisions elaborated from the programs’ failures enlarge the resolution capacity of new technologies. The paper provides an analysis of certain errors and glitches, which engineers, programmers, game designers faced with during their work with digital environment. The theoretical framework includes Henri Bergson’s theory of creative evolution, Gram Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, media philosophical approach to the problem of the activity of object proposed by Valery Savchuk and the theory of self-organisation and autopoiesis of the social systems worked out by Niklas Luhmann. The analysis of digital objects activity demonstrates two levels of functioning. The first one, fictional level, reveals mainly (but not only) in the computer games and concerns the content of media, when we gain a habit to interact with digital objects/characters as if they are real. The second level, operational, realises in the digital environment in general and concerns the form of media. On this level, glitches and bugs have crucial meaning, because they might evoke the changes in the digital world organisation, starting from the local decisions for the certain program (e.g. the elaboration of the new ways in solving locomotional tasks in simulations, which might be later use in other projects) and ending with the replacement of practices and representations typical for the human of digital era. The paper shows that it is possible to talk about digital evolution not in terms of the history of technological inventions, but in terms of the changes in digital objects caused by the inner logic of media, independently from the human will and expectations.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Alexander A. Pechenkin Александр Александрович Печенкин
Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism: A Methodology of Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Научный реализм и конструктивный эмпиризм

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Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version
interdisciplinary studies
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Vladimir S. Smolin Владимир Сергеевич Смолин
The Prospects of the Mankind in the Era of Technological Singularity
Перспективы человека в эпоху технологической сингулярности

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The book by Max Tegmark draws attention to the dangers and benefits that await humanity as a result of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies development. Cosmologist and astrophysicist Tegmark, realizing the impossibility to predict the AI development, offers exciting scenarios of civilization development options for tens, thousands, millions and billions of years. The analysis of the opposite scenarios is aimed at the idea formation that the consequences of creating a general AI, superior to the human level, will be more significant than from all other achievements of civilization. Tegmark is one of the founders and leaders of the “Beneficial AGI” movement, he presents the results of the discussion of the issues he raises with leading experts in the field of AI. Tegmark concludes his book with a call to optimism: “My book urge you to think about what future you would like, and not what future scares you, this way we can find goals for which it’s worth working”.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Anait Meloian, Andrey V. Sharypin Анаит Мелоян
Epistemological Analysis of the Concept of Time in Esai Krymetsy’s Scientific Heritage
Эпистемологический анализ концепции времени в научном наследии Есаи Крымеци

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Modern science leaves the specific nature of temporality unclear, despite the generally accepted notions of the unity and diversity of the forms of time. In contrast to the nature of space, the history of the development of views on the nature of time is neither evolutionary nor revolutionary. As a result, the focal point of the person biological and cognitive unity is regarded only as an auxiliary tool for constructing a computable world. Considering that the activity of consciousness was and remains the condition for the synthesis of Time, the way out of the current situation is in a constructive transition from the ontological claims of science to the study of epistemology of temporality, from the question “what is time” to the question “why is it possible to move”. Using the example of little-known data from the Armenian history of science about Esai Krymetsy, 15th century medieval astronomist, authors reconstruct the primary cognitive mechanisms of secularization and desacralization of the nature of time.
new trends
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Kirill V. Karpov Кирилл Витальевич Карпов
Is Wisdom an Epistemic Virtue?
Мудрость и интеллектуальные добродетели

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The article discusses the problem of parallelism of epistemic and moral virtues. The author presents the problem along with other methodological obstacles in virtue epistemology. The importance of the problem of parallelism becomes evident when we turn to the criteria of intellectual (epistemic) evaluation and to the framework of possible intellectual ethos. This problem is discussed in the paper by the example of definitions of master virtue and wisdom proposed by A.R. Karimov.
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Alina O. Kostina Алина Олеговна Костина
Epistemology of Belief: Blameworthiness, Credibility and Virtues of Epistemic Agent
Эпистемология убеждений

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The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. The author considers virtue epistemology as a new way of performing normativity.
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 2
Jubilee of Alexander L. Nikiforov
Юбилей А.Л. Никифорова

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10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Ilya T. Kasavin, Vladimir N. Porus Илья Теодорович Касавин
Turning Back to Kuhn: Is Normal Science Conservative?
Возвращаясь к Т. Куну:

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The article examines the problem of interpreting normal and revolutionary science in the concept of Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that the “normal science” is the central concept of the Kuhn’s history of science, designed in accordance with the normative definition of science adopted by him. Such a story serves an internal purpose – to justify the special epistemical status of expert knowledge. But there is also an external goal – to establish professional science as an institution with special epistemological status and social function, which is situated in a center of intellectual power and property. Historians are those who are forced to constantly rewrite history – either following the methodology of “rational reconstruction” or responding to the challenges of their time. To be a “conservative” or a “revolutionary” in the history of science is a choice made not only for philosophical reasons, but also under the influence of the general socio-cultural situation of the epoch.
panel discussion
11. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Olga B. Koshovets, Igor E. Frolov Ольга Борисовна Кошовец
Brave New World: On Science Transformation Into Technoscience
«Прекрасный новый мир»

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The article focuses on the crucial changes that science as an established social institution and an epistemological enterprise is undergoing, the key one is the loss of its monopoly on the production of socially useful knowledge and gradual transformation into something new, which, due to institutional and cultural reasons, we continue to call ‘science’. We suppose that the most appropriate conceptualization of the new phenomenon, which is replacing science as an institution, is “technoscience”, since the technical component in scientific practices has now taken a dominant position and technology production has become more important than fundamental knowledge. Technoscience has at least two sources: 1) capitalization of scientific activity that has led to classical science has been replaced with technoscience developing on first-priority funded applied research; 2) theorization and autonomy of the techno sphere, which have resulted in instrumentalization of all levels of knowledge production as well as in technological / symbolic construction of reality and tangled ontology of technoscientific objects. We discuss both of these sources, with particular attention being paid to such trends as epistemic strategies transformation, modified reality, social sciences and humanities conformation to technoscience norms, and knowledge bearers egalitarianization. A crucial transformation of both science itself and its position in society breaks inevitably a demarcation line that separates scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge while promotes the replacement of scientific theory with discourses. Apparently, in “technoscience” an ethos of its own is being formed, where interaction with the “external environment” (with other social spheres) is crucial. In this context, scientific activity is becoming more and more transepistemic, transinstitutional practice, and accordingly ceases to be guided by the classical scientific ethos determined by the goals and objectives of academic community itself.
12. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Taras A. Varkhotov Тарас Александрович Вархотов
Technoscience – Science Without Scientists?
Технонаука – наука без ученых?

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The article outlines a look at technoscience or mode 2 as a results of the development of statistics as a mathematical method and an instrument of social management, as well as the deprofessionalization of science due to the overproduction of specialists and the introduction of design forms of work into the practice of the scientific community. A decrease of the scientists’ expert status is noted, and an assessment is given of the prospects for the complete degeneration of classical science into the technoscience.
13. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Stanislav M. Gavrilenko Станислав Михайлович Гавриленко
Technoscience, Biopolitics and Biobanking
Технонаука, биополитика и биобанкинг

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The author considers two additions to analysis of technoscience, suggested by Olga Koshovets and Igor Frolov. First, technoscience is not just regime of knowledge production, which brings into play enormous technological and organizational resources, but is a regime, regulated by mandatory requirement to produce knowledge, which should be transformed into endowed with market value goods and services (technoobjects). Second, technoscience is an ever-faster colonization of natural and social worlds by technoobjects. In the author's view, the main problem with technoscience is not to hold the next round of conceptual clarification and theoretical reorganization of previous distinctions (nature/society, basic science/applied science, scientific fact/technoobject, social connections/technological connections) or introduction of new ones. The challenge is how to turn the concrete realization of technoscience into empirical research objects. The complexity of such enterprise is demonstrated in the case of research biobanking, which has become one of exemplary embodiment of technoscience and contemporary mode of biopolitics.
14. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Lada V. Shipovalova Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Technoscience: “Where the Danger Is, Grows the Saving Power Also”
Технонаука: «Где опасность, там вырастает и спасительное»

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The article is a response to the arguments by O.B. Koshovets and I.E. Frolov on the emergence of "technoscience”. Technoscience is opposed by the authors to the classical science characterized by the dominance of the technological component of research and capitalization of knowledge. The article focuses on two tasks. The first one supposes an appeal to the historical origins of technoscience and demonstrates significant relationship between technoscience and classical science. The second one involves the disclosure of contemporary negative trends of technoscience as creating conditions for their own overcoming. In conclusion it associates the work on the autonomy of science with the constructive dialogue between scientific and non-scientific knowledge.
15. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Olga B. Koshovets, Igor E. Frolov Ольга Борисовна Кошовец
Science in Danger, or Technoscience Becomes Dangerous?
Наука в опасности или (техно)наука становится опасной?

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This paper summarizes the discussion on technoscience and its key question whether the phenomenon indicated by this term means a radical transformation of science and its replacement with some new social objectification. Based on the remarks of the discussion participants, we raise questions on mathematical rationality contribution in technoscience development, technical (magical) domination on nature (environment) and man as the leitmotif of the New European culture and the connection of techno-science, financial capital and liberal capitalism.
epistemology and cognition
16. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Lolita B. Makeeva, Mikhail A. Smirnov Лолита Брониславовна Макеева
Conceptual Schemes and Relativism: Donald Davidson’s Critical Arguments
Концептуальные схемы и релятивизм

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The idea of conceptual schemes is one of the most influential and widely used notions in contemporary philosophy. Within the analytic tradition the idea occupies a fundamental position in positivist views as well as in replacing them post-positivist conceptions. Outside the analytic tradition a similar idea is of key importance in structuralist and post-structuralist theories. Despite the broad applicability of the notion of a conceptual scheme, its precise sense is far from being evident in the context of various philosophical trends. Moreover, the well-known American philosopher Donald Davidson's position is that any clear, non-metaphorical meaning cannot be as - cribed to that notion at all – the statement which he tried to substantiate in his famous paper On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme published in 1974.The present paper is aimed, firstly, at outlining the historico-philosophical evolution of the idea of conceptual scheme, concentrating on its development in logical positivism and post-positivist theories of such philosophers as Quine, Sellars, Kuhn, et al., and, secondly, at examining Davidson's criticism of both the idea and the position of conceptual relativism which was raised on its ground, revealing the assumptions which that criticism relies on and which concern relations between language and thought, truth and translation, as well as the role of the scheme-content dualism for empiricism and the place of extensionalism in semantics, etc. Our purpose, on the one hand, is to evaluate the historico-philosophical significance of Davidson's criticism; on the other hand, it is to show that his critical arguments remain to be actual since they shed a new light on the idea of conceptual schemes and allow us to determine their place in tackling the fundamental philosophical question of a relation between reality, thought and language.
language and mind
17. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Maria A. Sekatskaya Мария Александровна Секацкая
Causal Efficiency of Intentional Acts
Каузальная эффективность интенциональных актов

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Willusionists claim that recent developments in psychology and neuroscience demonstrate that consciousness is causally inefficient [Carruthers, 2007; Eagleman, 2012; Wegner, 2002]. In section 1, I show that willusionists provide two types of evidence: first, evidence that we do not always know the causes of our actions; second, evidence that we lack introspective awareness of the causal efficiency of our intentional acts.In section 2, I analyze the first type of evidence. Recent research in the field of social psychology has shown that irrelevant factors affect human behavior. For example, it has been shown that pleasant smells make a person more helpful toward strangers [Baron, 1997], whereas images of eyes that a person sees on a poster reduce the likelihood of cheating [Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006]. I argue that minor influences do not necessarily lead to something more sinister, and the contrary has not been empirically proven so far.In section 3, I analyze the second type of evidence that Daniel Wegner [2002] provides in favor of willusionism. Wegner claims that conscious will is usually understood in one of two ways: (1) «as something that is experienced when we perform an action» [Wegner, 2002, p. 3] or (2) «as a force of mind, a name for the causal link between our minds and our actions» [ibid.]. According to Wegner, it is a conceptual truth that for something to count as an instance of conscious will it must both be (1) felt as voluntary, and (2) causally efficient in bringing about a certain effect. Wegner claims that what satisfies (1) can fail to satisfy (2), and vice versa. The major part of Wegner’s book is the review and analysis of diverse psychological phenomena: automatisms, hypnosis, illusions of control, influence of unconscious factors on human behavior, as well as some neuroscientific data. I briefly review the data provided by Wegner, and come to the conclusion that, although they show that there is a double dissociation between consciously willed processes and the acts that are supposedly caused by these processes, they do not justify further conclusions made by Wegner.According to Wegner, the feeling of conscious will is just an indicator of unconscious processes which, in fact, cause our behavior. I argue that the data considered by Wegner do not provide direct information about the neuronal processes that underlie conscious intentional processes. Moreover, double dissociation can only show that one process neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of another process. It cannot show that one process is not among the causes leading to another process.In section 4, I argue that the experimental data discussed in the article are important for philosophical theories of intentionality.
18. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Vadim M. Rozin Вадим Маркович Розин
The Basic Ideas for Constructing Methodological Concept of Sociality
Основные идеи построения методологической концепции социальности

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The article discusses the crisis situation in sociology, and in connection with this, ideas are outlined aimed at constructing a methodological concept of sociality. It is noted that the crisis in sociology takes place due to the transition of sociologists to interdisciplinary research. It seems that such an interdisciplinary turn is unsafe for sociology as a scientific discipline, primarily in terms of understanding the subject and the integrity of the reality being studied. Analyzing the crisis in sociology, the author considers himself as methodologist and culturologist, setting the task to implement cultural, historical and phenomenological approaches in the social sciences. In this regard, the methodological, cultural, historical and phenomenological features of the study are characterized. They are compared with sociological ones. The sociological approach is distinguished by four characteristics: 1) assessment of sociality as well as an indication of the type of social action aimed at changing or optimizing sociality, 2) description of the mass behavior of people and the social order that determines this behavior, 3) attitude toward the study of sociality and a description of “social nature”, 4) consideration of sociality only within the framework of the modern culture (this approach is contrasted with the cultural-historical interpretation of sociality). The author agrees with these characteristics, although believes that they need to be problematized. He considers the current understandings of justice and social nature and concludes that sociality is not equal to itself, it is rather a historically determined phenomenon. In conclusion, the author outlines the stages of research and the construction of a methodological concept of sociality. The author believes since the problematization and case studies have already been carried out, the next step is the cultural and historical reconstruction of the main types of sociality (mainly, the European types).
case-studies – science studies
19. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova, Petr S. Kusliy Екатерина Васильевна Вострикова
Language as a Dynamic System: the Legacy of W. von Humbodlt and Contemporary Linguistics
Язык как динамическая система

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In this article, we examine the key ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt about language and their relevance to the contemporary research in the field of linguistics. In his works, N. Chomsky describes Humboldt as a key predecessor of the generative approach. The authors discuss the concrete aspects of Humboldt’s influence on generative linguistics drawing special attention to his notion of Form. The authors also observe that Humboldt’s works also contain statements about the deep differences that exist between different languages, as well as statements that different languages can form different pictures of the world. These ideas resonate with philosophical ideas about linguistic relativity (the famous Sapir – Whorf hypothesis), which are incompatible with generative linguistics. The authors try to reconcile an apparent contradiction by appealing to two different perspectives on language that they call the dynamic and the static one. They provide arguments in favor of the former and explore existing arguments against the later, which is associated with the aforementioned hypothesis. The authors conclude by pointing out that Humboldt’s legacy has so many facets that it introduces to incompatible views on language each of which had a serious impact on the studies of language in the 20th century.
20. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Elena E. Chebotareva Елена Эдуардовна Чеботарева
Russian Engineering in the Context of Philosophical and Sociological Studies: Dramas and Phantoms
Российская инженерия в контексте философских и социологических исследований

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This article explores the problems of Russian engineering in the context of the world studies in philosophy of engineering. Firstly, the author highlights the main questions and topics of the modern philosophy of engineering: what engineering is, the “magic” and “human-oriented” nature of technologies, and models of engineering ethics. Secondly, the article presents a specific mythological narrative of domestic engineers (“the theory of a missed chance”) and shows the inclusion of this “theory” in alternate historical fiction. Thirdly, the article identifies the reasons for emergence of such mythology in the engineering environment. The author highlights a historical context of “missed chances” for the turning of technical inventions into innovations and claims that the country's engineering potential was not used to a full extent. For greater objectivity, the article uses the works both of foreign and domestic researchers. In addition, the author raised a question about the relatedness of the concepts of engineer and innovation. Finally, the article gives an answer to the question about the essence of the engineer; the author believes that the engineering is primarily an environment, close to the human life world, understanding and maintaining the links between science and technology, providing the necessary channels for transforming inventions into innovations, i.e. commercially realized technologies. The given definition demonstrates the prospects for the development of socio-humanitarian research in the field of engineering.