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Displaying: 101-120 of 2462 documents


session vi: passions in morality
101. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Leonard Ferry Sorting Out Reason’s Relation to the Passions in the Moral Theory of Aquinas
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This essay challenges a growing consensus among Aquinas scholars who attribute to him a pro-passion attitude, linking his virtue theory to accounts of emotion that see the emotions in a primarily positive light. There are good reasons for thinking Aquinas far more skeptical of the role to be played by emotion in the virtuous life—indeed, one can safely argue, in agreement with Aquinas, that the emotions are often threats to and so in need of control by the virtues (rather than as merely their supports). I focus on the ideal of reason’s control (IRC) over the emotions in the essay in contrast with the work of Robert Miner whose understanding of Aquinas on the passions and virtues tends to downplay the dominating role that reason plays in the moral theory of Aquinas. For Aquinas IRC is central to the normativity of the virtues that relate to the emotions. In contrast, Miner appears to minimize the need for the emotions to be controlled, which entails a certain elevation of the emotions to a nearly co-equal status with reason in Aquinas’s moral theory. Miner adopts two argumentative strategies to achieve this valorization of emotion in Aquinas, but I find both exegetically inaccurate and experientially deficient.
session vii: two defenses of virtue
102. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Justin Matchulat Defending Virtue against the Situationist Challenge: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Contemporary Metaphysicians on Degreed Traits
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My essay addresses the situationist critique of virtue ethics. I defend a rarity of virtue response to this critique, but blunt its tip by developing an account of degrees of virtue. On this account, full virtue will indeed be a statistical rarity, but lesser degrees of virtue more common. I argue for this degreed conception of virtue both on historical and systematic grounds: historically, I show that Aristotle and especially Aquinas thought of virtue as being the sort of property that admits of degrees; and systematically, I draw from recent work in metaphysics on dispositions that challenges a simple counterfactual account of dispositions, and allows for gradable dispositions.
103. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Lindsay K. Cleveland A Defense of Aristotelian Magnanimity against the Pride Objection with the Help of Aquinas
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I defend a broadly Aristotelian account of the virtue of magnanimity against the objection that Aristotelian magnanimity is an expression of the vice of pride and so cannot be a virtue. I identify the essential features of magnanimity on Aristotle’s account and argue that Aquinas preserves these essential features while identifying additional necessary conditions of the virtue of magnanimity that illuminate the virtue and show it to be incompatible with pride. I also show where two other attempts to defend Aquinas’s development of Aristotelian magnanimity against the pride objection fail.
session viii: truth
104. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Michael Bowler Heidegger, Aristotle, and Philosophical Leisure
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I examine the two different accounts of the activity of philosophy and the nature of the philosophical life put forward by Heidegger and Aristotle. I do so by examining Heidegger’s well-known claim that for Aristotle sophia is the arete of techne. It is argued that this claim is the result of Heidegger’s deep engagement with critical philosophy, which his own early philosophy develops in interesting ways, and that this claim results in Heidegger overlooking crucial elements of Aristotle’s account of philosophy. I maintain that Aristotle’s conception of philosophy represents a counter-point to the critical conception of philosophy developed by Heidegger, one that focuses upon the importance of the leisure embodied in philosophical activity. I suggest that it would be especially fruitful to compare and contrast these two conceptions of philosophy from the perspective of the ethical question of the nature and value of philosophical activity and the life of philosophy.
105. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Joshua Lee Harris Does Aquinas Hold a Correspondence Theory of Truth in De Veritate?
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At least since Martin Heidegger’s influential reading of Thomas Aquinas’s account of truth as a precursor to modern philosophy’s unfortunate “forgetfulness of being,” it has been popular to classify the Angelic Doctor as one of the fore­runners of the modern “correspondence theory” of truth. In what follows, I attempt to answer the question of whether or not this is a correct assessment. I want to suggest that Aquinas’s account of truth has superficial concord but deep conflict with modern correspondence theories. The argument proceeds in two major segments: First, I attempt to establish a working definition of correspondence theory by tracing its development in the work of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell. Next, in light of these fundamental features of correspondence theory, I sketch out the way in which Aquinas’s own account is in superficial concord but deep conflict with it.
acpa reports and minutes
106. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
R. E. Houser Minutes of the 2014 Executive Council Meeting
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107. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
R. E. Houser Secretary’s Report (2013–2014)
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108. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Treasurer’s Report (2013)
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109. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Financial Statements
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110. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Necrology (2013–2015)
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111. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 88
Available Back Issues of the Proceedings
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presidential address
112. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
John O’Callaghan The Identity of Knower and Known: Sellars’s and McDowell’s Thomisms
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Wilfrid Sellars’ engagement with Thomism in “Being and Being Known” is examined, specifically for his reformulation of the thesis that the mind in its mental acts is in some sense identical in form to the object known. Borrowing the notion of “isomorphism” from modern set theory, Sellars describes an identity of form between mind and world that is non-intentional in the “Realm of the Real,” while confining all questions of meaning and truth to the “Realm of the Intentional.” John McDowell’s response to Sellars’ reformulation is then examined. McDowell is critical of Sellars’ “blind spot” on the normativity of truth, and argues for the embedding of the intentional in the Realm of the Real under the guise of truth. This paper notes difficulties with both authors’ discussions. Both authors are misled in their discussions of Aquinas by an overemphasis upon the “mental word” as described by Peter Geach. In addition it is proposed that Sellars’ notion of “isomorphisms” has the additional problem of adequately distinguishing various types of mental statements as neural states in the Realm of the Real. The paper concludes by arguing for a deep affinity between McDowell and Aquinas on the normativity of truth.
presentation of the aquinas medal
113. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Theodore R. Vitali, C.P. Introduction of Eleonore Stump: 2013 Aquinas Medal Recipient
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aquinas medalist’s address
114. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Eleonore Stump The Nature of a Simple God
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plenary sessions
115. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Alasdair MacIntyre Philosophical Education Against Contemporary Culture
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Four stages in an adequate philosophical education are distinguished. The first is that in which students learn to put in question some commonly shared assumptions about what happiness is and to ask what the good of engaging in this kind of questioning is. The second is a conceptual and linguistic analysis of “good” which enables questions about what human goods are to be formulated. The third is an investigation into the nature and unity of human beings designed to enable us to propose rationally justifiable answers to those questions. In the fourth and final stage those questions are posed.
116. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Candace Vogler Good and Bad in Human Action
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According to Aristotle, every action is aimed at some good. Neo-Aristotelians argue that all intentional actions are pursued “under the guise of the good.” Contemporary critics find this thesis either perplexing or obviously false. In this essay, I survey a recent attempt to defend the guise of the good thesis, urge that the critic will reject the defense, and sketch a novel direction for defense of the thesis based on the thought that practical reason’s orientation to the future is fundamentally different from a modern predictive stance. Practical reason is directed to what is supposed to happen next, whether or not things go as they are supposed to go.
117. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
V. Bradley Lewis Aristotle, the Common Good, and Us
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While the notion of the common good figures frequently in both rhetoric and the inquiries of academic political theory, it is often neither closely examined nor precisely defined. This article examines Aristotle’s use of the idea, focusing primarily on two sets of key texts: first, Politics 1.1–2 and Nicomachean Ethics 1.2; and second, Nic. Ethics 8.9 and Politics 3.7. The first set of texts emphasizes the common good as flourishing and the city as its necessary condition; the second emphasizes the common good as the good of all citizens as distinct from that of the rulers alone and leads to Aristotle’s notion of the generic political regime with its focus on the middle class and the rule of law. The conclusion notes both continuities and discontinuities with and challenges to contemporary politics posed by Aristotle’s view, which is neither as readily supportive of modern political programs nor as opposed to modern practices as is sometimes thought.
session i: reviving aristotelian natural science?
118. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Christopher O. Blum The Prospect of an Aristotelian Biology
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In recent decades, a growing number of biologists has testified to the priority of the whole organism with respect to its parts and protested against the dominance of mechanist and reductionist accounts of the organism in biological science. To see disinterested inquiry thus shaped “by constraint of facts” (Parts of Animals 1.1.642a28) will delight, but cannot surprise, an Aristotelian. Taking this rediscovery of nature by biologists as an occasion for reflection, this essay considers, first, what is presupposed by any healthy biological inquiry, second, the prospects of renewal for the science itself, and, finally, a good that could follow from such a renewal. Aristotelian biology is an invitation to consider the forms of living things. Since “philosophy claims to know” (Metaphysics 4.2.1004b25), philosophers are called to bear witness to the primacy of form and, like biologists, to be models of attentiveness to form.
119. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Michael W. Tkacz Albertus Magnus and the Animal Histories:: A Medieval Anticipation of Recent Developments in Aristotle Studies
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During the past three decades, Aristotle studies have been significantly influenced by a series of ground-breaking investigations of the zoological works, especially the Historia animalium. As a result, contemporary Aristotle scholars have developed a clearer and more consistent interpretation of the zoology and have demonstrated its consonance with Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics. This revolution in Aristotle studies was anticipated by the medieval natural philosopher Albertus Magnus. As the first thinker since Theophrastus to pursue an Aristotelian research program in the life sciences, he interpreted Aristotle’s animal histories as a series of pre-demonstrative researches preparatory to causal explanation as prescribed in the Posterior Analytics and the Topics. The medieval anticipation of these recent developments in Aristotle studies provides a compelling comparison of the interpretation of Aristotle now and then.
session ii: aristotle on the intellect
120. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 87
Mary Elizabeth Tetzlaff An Alternative Reading of De Anima 413a8–9
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This paper presents three interpretations of the infamous “sailor / ship” sentence that concludes Aristotle’s De Anima II.1. The first two interpretations represent the ones most popular in contemporary scholarship; the final is the author’s original. The interpretations are then evaluated with respect to grammatical plausibility and explanatory strength. The paper makes a case that the new reading answers to both points of evaluation and contributes to an interpretive approach to Aristotle that values the coherence and cogency of his De Anima as a whole.