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101. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Joshua Cockayne Common Ritual Knowledge
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How can participating in a liturgy allow us to know God? Recent pathbreaking work on the epistemology of liturgy has argued that liturgy allows individuals to gain ritual knowledge of God by coming to know-how to engage God. However, since liturgy (as it is ordinarily practiced) is a group act, I argue that we need to give an account to explain how a group can know God by engaging with liturgy. If group know-how is reducible to instances of individual know-how, then the existing accounts are sufficient for explaining a group’s knowing-how to engage God. However, I argue, there are good reasons to suppose that reductive accounts of group know-how fail. In this paper, I propose a non-reductive account of common ritual knowledge, according to which the group knows-how to engage God in liturgy.
102. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Tyler Paytas Of Providence and Puppet Shows: Divine Hiddenness as Kantian Theodicy
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Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.
103. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Adam C. Pelser Temptation, Virtue, and the Character of Christ
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The author of Hebrews writes that Jesus Christ was “tempted as we are, yet without sin” (Hebrews 4:15). Many Christians take the sinlessness of Jesus to imply that he was perfectly virtuous. Yet, susceptibility to the experience of at least some temptations, plausibly including those Jesus experienced, seems incompatible with the possession of perfect virtue. In an attempt to resolve this tension, I argue here that there are good reasons for believing that Jesus, while perfectly sinless, was not fully virtuous at the time of his temptations, but that he grew in virtue through overcoming temptation. If this is right, then Jesus Christ is an exemplar of character formation who is able to “sympathize with our weaknesses” in an important way that Christians have largely overlooked.
104. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Kegan J. Shaw A Plea for the Theist in the Street: A Defense of Liberalism in the Epistemology of Religious Experience
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It can be easy to assume that since the “theist in the street” is unaware of any of the traditional arguments for theism, he or she is not in position to offer independent rational support for believing that God exists. I argue that that is false if we accept with William Alston that “manifestation beliefs” can enjoy rational support on the basis of suitable religious experiences. I make my case by defending the viability of a Moorean-style proof for theism—a proof for the existence of God that parallels in structure G. E. Moore’s famous proof for the existence of the external world. I argue that this shows that even if the theist in the street has nothing to offer for helping to convince the religious sceptic, this needn’t entail that she cannot offer independent rational support in defense of her theistic belief.
reviews
105. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Andrew Moon Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited by Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz
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106. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Adam Green New Models of Religious Understanding, edited by Fiona Ellis
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107. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Stangl The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, by Christian B. Miller
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108. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Kyla Ebels-Duggan God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, by Mark C. Murphy
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109. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Richard Kim Exemplarist Moral Theory, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
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articles
110. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Dawn Eschenauer Chow The Passibility of God: A Plea for Analogy
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The traditional doctrine that God is impassible (here, invulnerable to suffering) is subject to the objection that it is incompatible with belief that God is loving and compassionate. However, the doctrine that God is passible has grave difficulties as well. I argue that Christian believers should take an analogical approach, by believing that God does something relevantly similar to loving us in a way that involves vulnerability to suffering, and thus conceiving of God as loving us in that way, while simultaneously believing that God is in fact impassible. I conclude with answers to several likely objections.
111. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Dean Zimmerman Ever Better Situations and the Failure of Expression Principles
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William Rowe argues that if an omnipotent, omniscient being were faced with an infinite hierarchy of better and better worlds to create, that being could not also be unsurpassably morally excellent. His argument assumes that, at least in ideal circumstances, degree of moral goodness must be perfectly expressed in the degree of goodness of the outcomes chosen. Reflection upon the application of analogous expression principles for certainty and desire shows that such principles can be expected to fail for anyone capable of facing an infinite range of options.
112. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Therese Scarpelli Cory Embodied vs. Non-Embodied Modes of Knowing in Aquinas: Different Universals, Different Intelligible Species, Different Intellects
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What does it mean to be an embodied thinker of abstract concepts? Does embodiment shape the character and quality of our understanding of universals such as “dog” and “beauty,” and would a non-embodied mind understand such concepts differently? I examine these questions through the lens of Thomas Aquinas’s remarks on the differences between embodied (human) intellects and non-embodied (angelic) intellects. In Aquinas, I argue, the difference between embodied and non-embodied intellection of extramental realities is rooted in the fact that embodied and non-embodied intellects grasp different kinds of universals by means of different kinds of intelligible species (intellectual likenesses), which elicit in them different “modes” of understanding. By spelling out what exactly it means to be an embodied knower, on Aquinas’s account, I argue, we can also shed new light on his mysterious claim that the embodied intellect “turns to phantasms”—the imagination’s likenesses of individuals—in its acts of understanding.
113. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Andrew Brenner Theism and Explanationist Defenses of Moral Realism
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Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the purported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good explanations of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic explanations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is ineliminable in an important respect—remove the moral facts from those explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral explanations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered by moral explanationists.
114. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
J. L. Schellenberg A New Logical Problem of Evil Revisited
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In this article I state concisely the central features of a new logical problem of evil developed elsewhere and take account of a response to this problem recently published in this journal by Jerome Gellman. I also reflect briefly on how theology can play a role in such philosophical discussions.
115. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
James R. Beebe Brower and Saenz on Divine Truthmaker Simplicity
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Jeffrey Brower has recently articulated a way to make sense of the doctrine of divine simplicity using resources from contemporary truthmaker theory. Noël Saenz has advanced two objections to Brower’s account, arguing that it violates constraints on adequate metaphysical explanations at various points. I argue that Saenz’s objections fail to show that Brower’s account is explanatorily inadequate.
book reviews
116. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Bryan Cross Roman but Not Catholic: What Remains at Stake 500 Years after the Reformation, by Kenneth J. Collins and Jerry L. Walls
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117. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Kevin Vallier Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination, by John Corvino, Ryan T. Anderson, and Sherif Girgis
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118. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Alicia Finch Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will, by John Martin Fischer
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119. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Stewart Goetz God and the Meanings of Life: What God Could and Couldn’t Do to Make Our Lives More Meaningful, by T. J. Mawson
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120. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 4
Eleanor Helms Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life, edited by Stephen Minister, J. Aaron Simmons, and Michael Strawser
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