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Displaying: 101-120 of 1471 documents


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101. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Leigh C. Vicens Agentive Phenomenology and Moral Responsibility Agnosticism
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Most incompatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility require, for a person to count as morally responsible for an action, that specific events leading up to the action be undetermined. One might think, then, that incompatibilists should remain agnostic about whether anyone is ever free or morally responsible, since whether there are such undetermined events would seem to be an empirical question unsettled by scientific research. Yet, a number of incompatibilists have suggested that the phenomenological character of our experiences already gives us good reason to believe that much of our behavior is freely undertaken, so that we are justified in believing that the free will condition for moral responsibility is often satisfied. I argue, however, that on the assumption that free will is incompatible with determinism, reflections on the character of our experiences do not provide good support for the claim that we ever act freely.
102. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Madeleine Hyde The Rationality and Cognitive Phenomenology of Deliberation
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The phenomenal character of a perceptual experience describes ‘what it is like’ for an agent undergoing it. This is a familiar notion when it comes to our sensory states. Recently, there has been increased discussion about how certain cognitive states can also have phenomenal characters. A further, more interesting question asks what links, if any, might between what the phenomenal character of a mental state and when that mental state is considered rational. I will assume that some cognitive states can have phenomenal characters and will focus on a prominent phenomenal feature of a particular cognitive state: namely, deliberation over how to act. I aim to expose one way in which we can describe the phenomenology of deliberating, as well as its potential link to the rationality of deliberation.
103. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Daniel Campana The Coherence of Emerson’s Epistemology
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104. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Michael J. McNeal, Ph.D. Subversive Joy: Nietzsche’s Practice of Life-Enhancing Cheerfulness
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105. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Toby Eugene Bollig Desire Satisfactionism and Not-So-Satisfying Deserts: The Problem of Hell
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This paper appeals to certain popular doctrines about human welfare and morality to offer a new response to the problem of hell. In particular, I contend that the combination of desire satisfactionism, a subjective theory about welfare, with an objective theory of morality leads to a surprisingly intuitive and compelling argument for the consistency of the post-mortem punishment of people in hell with the existence of an omniperfect God. In fact, under these conditions, the existence of such a divine being may actually require that there be at least some type of hell/post-mortem punishment. Finally, I suggest that positing the existence of hell can strengthen desire satisfactionism against an objection tied to base or immoral desires.
106. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Don A. Merrell The Atheological Argument from Geography
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commentaries
107. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Allysson Vasconcelos Lima Rocha Limits for Genuinely Understanding: Comments on Heikes’ Paper “Don’t be Ignorant”
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108. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Landon W. Schurtz Comments on Dadlez’s “Kitsch and Bullshit as Aesthetic and Epistemic Transgressions”
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109. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Nathan L. Cartagena A Commentary on “Human Plurality as Object: An Arendtian Framework for Making Sense of Trump”
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110. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Jerry Green Maybe We Should Take Human Rights Seriously: A Reply to Nelson
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111. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Matthew Z. Donnelly Commentary on Fischer’s and Wiegman’s “The Disassociation Intuition”
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112. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Karl Aho Sharpening our Tools for Moral Inquiry: Comments on Justin Bell’s “Depression Applied to Moral Imagination”
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113. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Chelsea Bowden Moral Motivation and Epistemic Virtue: Comments on Thomas Metcalf’s “An Epistemic-Virtue Solution to Some Peer-Disagreements in Philosophy”
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114. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Jonathan McKinney Comments on Bromhall: Calkins and Nishida
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115. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Noell Birondo Whose Metaethical Minimalism?
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116. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Todd M. Stewart Comments on Morton’s “A Dilemma for Streetian Constructivism”
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117. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Susan V. H. Castro Why Ever Doubt First-Person Testimony about Disability?
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118. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Mary Gwin Commentary on Peter Westmoreland’s “Act Like a Right-Hander: Right Hand Bias in Norms of Proximate Space Inhabitation”
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119. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Fiacha Heneghan Reply to Justin Remhof
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120. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 34 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken Hegel and the Habit of Language: Theme and Variation
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