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commentaries
101. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nathan Jackson Ameliorative Potential in the Relational Autonomy Debate
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102. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez On the Category of Nonconsensual Sex: A Reply to Shannon Fyfe and Elizabeth Lanphier
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103. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Bob Fischer Comments on J. P. Andrew’s “The Insignificance of Taste”
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104. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andy Piker Comments on Alastair Norcross’s “The Impotence of the Causal Impotence Objection”
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105. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken The Virtuous Artist: A Commentary on “Is Art a Virtue”
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106. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Stefan Sencerz “Epistemic Goods”: A Reply to Jerry Green
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107. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Dave Beisecker The Consequences of Falsehood: Comments on Nikolaus Breiner’s “Charles Peirce on Assertion: Assuming Liabilities as Offering Evidence”
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open submission articles
108. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Heidi Savage The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Non-Literalism and The Habits of Sherlock Holmes
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Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is true. However, this attitude confl icts with speakers’ assignment of the value true to this sentence. Furthermore, making these assignments seem in no way distinct from the process that leads speakers to assign true to other sentences, sentences like ‘Bertrand Russell smokes.’ I will explore the idea that when speakers assign the value true to the first sentence, they are not making any kind of confused mistake — that we ought to take these assignments at face value. I show how the alternative view is inadequate for explaining various examples of fi ctional discourse. In addition, evidence that these truth value assignments to sentences are tracking semantic content, rather than pragmatic effects, is offered.
109. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Fischer Why are You Proud of That?: Cognitivism About “Possessive” Emotions
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Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).
110. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Tebben The Paradox of Patience
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Some normative theories—act utilitarianism and rational decision theory among them—both designate some range of outcomes as particularly important, and, with an eye towards securing those outcomes, provide agents with advice concerning what is to be done. In this paper I argue that there are situations in which these two aspects of such theories are in tension. I provide a handful of conditions that, when jointly satisfi ed, pick out situations in which these theories recommend that agents act in ways that do not contribute to the outcomes on which they place value.
presidential plenary session: philosophy and wine
111. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Julie Kuhlken Confessions of a Recovering Philosopher: Introduction to Panel on Philosophy and Wine
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112. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Michelle Williams Spirituality and the Wine’s Soul
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presidential address
113. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Scott Aikin The Owl of Minerva Problem
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articles
114. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Dan Larkin Inconsistency in Socratic Consistency: The Curious Case of Socrates’ δαιμόνιον
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115. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Zak A. Kopeikin A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions
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The aim of this paper is to clarify the use of contrast cases—which are pairs of cases in which the feature under examination is varied and all else is held fixed—in ethical methodology. In another paper, I argue that we must reject a separability principle which is thought to allow one to use contrast cases to infer truths about intrinsic value (Kopeikin, 2019). Here I offer a different criticism that has a positive upshot about what we are licensed to infer from contrast cases. This provides clarification about the epistemic use of contrast cases in value theory and insight into what we can glean from contrast cases.
116. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Jonah Goldwater Six Arguments Against ‘Ought Implies Can’
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117. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Chris King Hypothetical Consent and Political Obligation
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Hypothetical Consent Situations are widely employed in normative argument as if they help to justify normative claims or to explain normative facts. Historically, however, there is plenty of suspicion about them. In this light, there is a tendency to prefer theories of political obligation that do not depend upon hypothetical consent to explain political obligations – those that appeal, for instance, a general moral principle (like a natural duty) or to actual consent. This paper makes no full-throated defense of hypothetical consent. But it does try to identify more carefully than is usually done what sorts of cases they represent and to show that at least two concerns about them are unwarranted.
118. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Bryan Smyth De-Moralizing Heroism: Ethical Expertise and the Object of Heroic Approbation
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Agents’ self-reports in cases of reactive heroism often deny the optionality, and hence the supererogatory status, of their actions, while conversely supporting a view of these actions in terms of nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. Taking such claims seriously thus makes it puzzling as to why such cases elicit strong approbation. To resolve this puzzle, I show how this necessity can be understood in the predispositional embodied terms of unreflective ethical expertise, such that the agent may be said literally to incarnate generally accepted norms of a shared ethical environment. On this basis I argue that the object of the relevant approbation is the agent’s embodied predispositionality itself—expressing a deep continuity with her social context, it is in virtue of this alone that her action can be both spontaneous and ethically outstanding. By way of conclusion I briefly discuss how this suggests an important categorial distinction between heroism and saintism.
119. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Joseph Spino The Broader Threat of Situationism to Virtue Ethics
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120. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Timothy C. Lord Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind
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