Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 101-120 of 510 documents


101. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 3
Marty J. Wolf A Case for Information as a Basis for Ethics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
102. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Neelke Doorn, Diane Michelfelder Editorial: Introducing the New Editorial Team
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
103. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Galit Wellner Celling while Driving: Guest Editor's Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
104. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Stacey O. Irwin Technological Reciprocity with a Cell Phone
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Perception and reciprocity are key understandings in the lived experience of driving while using a cellular phone. When I talk on a cell phone while driving, I interpret the world through a variety of technologically mediated perceptions. I interpret the bumps in the road and the bug on the windshield. I perceive the information on the dashboard and the conversation with the Other on the other end of the technological “line” of the phone. This reflection uses hermeneutical phenomenology to address the things themselves in life with which we relate and interact with in our everydayness, as we talk on a cell phone while driving.
105. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Robert Rosenberger The Phenomenological Case for Stricter Regulation of Cell Phones and Driving
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The case is made here for stricter regulations on the use of cell phones (both handheld and hands-free) while driving. I review, contextualize, and expand on a phenomenological account of distracted driving that I have developed across a series of papers. This account remains consistent with the empirical literature on the driver distraction of cell phones, but it also offers an alternative theory on why the distraction of cell phone conversation poses such a considerable danger. My argument is that cell phone distraction results from learned perceptual habits, and that breaking these deeply engrained habits is no simple matter.
106. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Galit Wellner Multi-Attention and the Horcrux Logic: Justifications for Talking on the Cell Phone While Driving
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Attention has been addressed either as a distinction of a figure from background or as a searchlight scanning of a surface. In both ways, attention is limited to a single object. The aim of this article is to suggest a platform for an interpretation of multi-attention, that is, attention based on a multiplicity of objects and spaces. The article describes how attention can be given to more than one object, based on the experiences of pilots, parents and car drivers.
107. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Yoni Van Den Eede On the (In)compatibility of Driving and Phoning: Ask the Technology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I comment on the arguments put forth by Robert Rosenberger and Galit Wellner on the issue of using a mobile phone while driving a car, and I do this by way of a detour through the work of Kevin Kelly and Marshall McLuhan. While Rosenberger and Wellner focus first and foremost on the possibilities and impossibilities within the human organism, I seek to add to the debate the however experimental standpoint of the technologies “themselves.”
108. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Lyat Friedman Evenly Suspended Distractive Attention
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article reviews recent cognitive and neurological approaches to the study of attention. It argues that such research is based on the notion that attention has a positive cognitive function selecting, like a sieve or a filter, elements from the background and foreground, to then be processed by the brain and made conscious when required. These approaches fail to explain cognitive overload and recent findings demonstrating that recognition and understanding—sensory, visual and semantic—also occur prior to attention. Merleau-Ponty and Freud offer a different model: a negative distractive attention. Negative distractive attention serves as a threshold for stimuli excluded by neurological processes regulating overload and ensuring that consciousness can concentrate on the singularity of its objects. Such approach to attention explains how one can drive and talk. It is not a positive multi-tasking model but a negative distractive one.
109. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Rob Spicer Long-Distance Caring Labor: Fatherhood, Smiles, and Affect in the Marketing of the iPhone 4 and FaceTime
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article is an exploration of Apple’s iPhone 4 as both a technology and an object of marketing. This analysis looks at the FaceTime app and how its marketing created a visual hand-phone-face Deleuzian assemblage while playing on affective connections of parenthood and long-distance caring labor. This is connected to the ways in which mobile telephony creates divided attention between home and labor and the mobile phone and car while driving. This analysis is especially concerned with technological transparency and how it creates divided attention in the home and in the car.
110. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Diane Michelfelder Driving While Beagleated
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this contribution to the philosophical debate over distracted driving, I defend the idea that talking on the cell phone while driving is an activity that ought neither to be regulated by public policy means nor addressed by means of automotive safety design features, such as the augmented-reality windshield. I arrive at this conclusion through taking a phenomenologically-influenced look at what an average driver pays attention to during the act of driving an automobile. More specifically, I suggest that if driving while “celling” is taken to involve a single act of attention within a single experience, or taken to involve a “weak” form of multi-attention, a way opens up to see driving while “celling” as being “good” driving.
111. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Kirk Besmer Dis-Placed Travel: On the Use of GPS in Automobiles
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I pursue a postphenomenological analysis of navigating with GPS in an automobile. I argue that GPS use is essentially different from navigating with a map insofar as one need not establish nor maintain orientation and directionality. Also, GPS provides a disembodied, omniscient navigational perspective. These aspects stem from the fact that GPS relies on earth-orbiting satellites, thereby reinforcing the modern view of the space/place relation that privileges abstract space over concrete, lived places. Following a postphenomenological thesis that technologies are non-neutral mediators of human experience, I examine some important qualitative aspects of traveling with GPS.
112. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/2
Don Ihde Embodiment and Multi- versus Mono-Tasking in Driving-Celling
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In my discussion of the articles in this special issue of Techné I will relate the multiple perspectives on the phenomenon of driving-celling to the core debate, which concerns how this dual activity may be related to the need to have a concentrated focus, on the one hand, or to the possibility of a form of multitasking, on the other. The contributors show multiple perspectives on this phenomenon and draw from a range of authors on the roles of attention, embodiment and perception.
113. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Joseph Pitt Letter from the Editor-in-Chief
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
114. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Linda Johansson The Pragmatic Robotic Agent
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Can artifacts be agents in the same sense as humans? This paper endorses a pragmatic stance to that issue. The crucial question is whether artifacts can have free will in the same pragmatic sense as we consider humans to have a free will when holding them responsible for their actions. The origin of actions is important. Can an action originate inside an artifact, considering that it is, at least today, programmed by a human? In this paper it is argued that autonomy with respect to norms is crucial for artificial agency.
115. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Golfo Maggini Bodily Presence, Absence, and their Ethical Challenges: Towards a Phenomenological Ethics of the Virtual
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper I deal with Hubert Dreyfus’s phenomenological ethics regarding information technologies and the use of the Internet. From the 1990s on, Dreyfus elaborates a multi-faceted model of ethical expertise which may find a paradigmatic field of application in the ways in which information technologies transform our sense of personal identity, as well as our view of ethical integrity and commitment. In his 2001 On the Internet, Dreyfus investigates further several of the ideas already present in his groundbreaking 1997 Disclosing New Worlds. A phenomenological ethics of the virtual aims at going beyond both the objectivist ideal of moral universalism, which departs from the dominant Cartesianism both in epistemology and in ethics, as well as from the postmodernist, Nietzsche-inspired moral relativism. By referring back to existentialism, especially to Kierkegaard, and to phenomenology, especially to Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, Dreyfus sketches a model of ethical expertise which can be particularly useful for internet users and researchers, as it combines a phenomenological anthropology of the virtual with a theory of cultural innovation and change. In my view, Dreyfus’s model may help overcome the strict either determinist or relativist accounts of the ethical challenges posed by information technologies. By endorsing a strongly anti-intellectualist view of information technologies, Dreyfus poses the necessity of identity and ethical integrity not only as abstract principles that require rational justification, but also as context-bound everyday practices that are in conformity with the “style” of a culture and several disclosive activities within it.
116. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Bonnie Talbert Screened Conversations: Technologically Mediated Interactions and Knowledge of Other Minds
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Social scientists have documented some recent, dramatic changes in the nature of our social lives. Many scholars have thought that our reliance on technology to communicate with others is in large part responsible for that loss. However, there is also data to support the opposite conclusion—it might be the case that social networking technologies have helped, rather than hindered our social interactions. What I would like to propose is a philosophical argument, which I hope will offer a different sort of answer to the questions about whether we know people in the same ways, or perhaps more or less well, than we once did, in the days before Facebook, email, and such. Whether or not technology has enhanced our social lives, it is worth considering whether coming to know another person is a different sort of exercise than it used to be, when face-to-face interactions with others were the preferred way to find out what was going on in someone else’s life. What is different in sharing my thoughts, beliefs, feelings, desires, and such with another over the Internet versus in person? Is there any kind of knowledge that is available only in a face-to-face context? If so, what is the nature of that knowledge? In philosophical terms, what I want to examine is how our knowledge of others’ minds changes with various technologies that we use to communicate the contents of our mental states.
117. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Pak-Hang Wong The Public and Geoengineering Decision-Making: A View from Confucian Political Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In response to the Royal Society report’s claim that “the acceptability of geo­engineering will be determined as much by social, legal, and political issues as by scientific and technical factors” (Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty [London: Royal Society, 2009], ix), a number of authors have suggested the key to this challenge is to engage the public in geoengineering decision-making. In effect, some have argued that inclusion of the public in geoengineering decision-making is necessary for any geoengineering project to be morally permissible. Yet, while public engagement on geoengineering comes in various forms, the discussion in geoengineering governance and the ethics of geoengineering have too often conceptualized it exclusively in terms of public participation in decision-making, and supported it by various liberal democratic values. However, if the predominant understanding of public engagement on—or, the role of the public in—geoengineering decision-making is indeed only grounded on liberal democratic values, then its normative relevance could be challenged by and in other ethical-political traditions that do not share those values. In this paper, I shall explore these questions from a Confucian perspective. I argue that the liberal democratic values invoked in support of the normative importance of public participation are, at least, foreign to Confucian political philosophy. This presents a prima facie challenge to view public participation in geoengineering decision-making as a universal moral requirement, and invites us to reconsider the normative significance of this form of public engagement in Confucian societies. Yet, I contend that the role of the public remains normatively significant in geoengineering governance and the ethics of geoengineering from a Confucian perspective. Drawing from recent work on Confucian political philosophy, I illustrate the potential normative foundation for public engagement on geoengineering decision-making.
118. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Sven Ove Hansson A Milestone in the Philosophy of Technology
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
119. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
D. E. Wittkower, Evan Selinger, Lucinda Rush Public Philosophy of Technology: Motivations, Barriers, and Reforms
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Philosophers of technology are not playing the public role that our own theoretical perspectives motivate us to take. A great variety of theories and perspectives within philosophy of technology, including those of Marcuse, Feenberg, Borgmann, Ihde, Michelfelder, Bush, Winner, Latour, and Verbeek, either support or directly call for various sorts of intervention—a call that we have failed to heed adequately. Barriers to such intervention are discussed, and three proposals for reform are advanced: (1) post-publication peer-reviewed reprinting of public philosophy, (2) increased emphasis on true open access publication, and (3) increased efforts to publicize and adapt traditional academic research.
120. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Anthony Ross Distance and Presence in Analogue and Digital Epistolary Networks
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper considers the particular ways in which the familiar letter (for thousands of years the predominant means of communicating over distance) and twenty-first century technologies like the Internet differingly shaped and shape our experience of distance and presence. It follows Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Borgmann in critiquing the kinds of experience and action the Internet makes possible, and—by way of Benjamin’s concept of “aura”—argues that while mediated communication over distance might have never been easier, faster, or cheaper, this increase in our effective power comes at the cost of a diminution of the affective power of the messages carried.