Cover of Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical
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the work of matthew b. crawford
101. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Richard W. Moodey Convivial Craft-Work and the Fiduciary Program
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Matthew Crawford compares his program of convivial craft-work to Polanyi’s fiduciary program. He argues that both are good ways of grappling with reality, and that both can help persons to focus their attention in an age of distraction. Crawford criticizes the Enlightenment philosophers for an overemphasis on the representations of things at the expense of grappling with the real things. He argues that attention is a scarce resource, analogous to water. He sometimes uses language that can be interpreted as expressing a belief in group minds.
articles
102. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Milton R. Scarborough Mapping Poteat on the Buddha and Zen
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Despite the fact that none of William H. Poteat’s former students on the Yale Conference email list recall ever having heard Poteat mention the Buddha or Buddhism, this article argues for a hitherto unnoticed and striking correspondence of thought between William H. Poteat, the Buddha, and Ch’an (Zen). Both the Buddha and Poteat bear closer analogies to physicians than to metaphysicians and their thought can be compared to a kind of philosophical therapy. While the Buddha’s diagnosis pinpoints egoistic desire as the cause of human dissatisfaction with life, Poteat’s diagnosis is gnostic apocalypticism. Both physicians are moved to employ unusual pedagogical methods in order to effect a “cure,” which consists of a fundamental unity or nonduality of mind and body, a therapy requiring a practice.
103. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 2
Jon Fennell “Balance of Mind”: Polanyi’s Response to the Second Apple and the Modern Predicament
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Among the most arresting images in Personal Knowledge is “the second apple.” Through this metaphor Polanyi describes a fall of man comparable to the expulsion from paradise recounted in Genesis. But here, too, redemption is possible. It comes, says Polanyi, in the form of a maturation of perspective that he calls “balance of mind.” Under this heading Polanyi offers his conception of human fruition, a fruition requiring a loss of innocence that follows from not only departure from the original paradise but also the utter collapse of the allegedly autonomous citadel of critical reason that followed in its train. Interestingly, “balance of mind” has much in common with the Christian life, as understood by Polanyi. Thus, the encounter with “the second apple” is simultaneously both an advance and a return.
journal and society information
104. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Editorial Board and Submissions Guide
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105. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Paul Lewis Preface
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james e. loder and michael polanyi
106. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Notes on Contributors
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on william h. poteat
107. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Dale Cannon Introduction to Poteat and Polanyi III
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108. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
David H. Nikkel Curing Dualistic, Disembodied Patterns of Thinking in the Academy
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This essay develops aspects and implications of Poteat’s critique of the Enlightenment’s critical paradigm and development of post-critical thinking in dialogue with Pascal in his dissertation and four post-critical thinkers who figured prominently in his project: Kierkegaard, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Polanyi. Then it critiques from a Poteatian perspective the critical, dualistic, discarnate picture that still dominates the academy, especially attending to the cognitive science of religion. CSR involves both a reductive physicalism involving unconscious mental mechanisms and a re-inscribing of subjectivistic or mentalist (alleged) beliefs in disembodied supernatural and human spirits.
109. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Murray Jardine The Political Implications of William H. Poteat’s Philosophy
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Since World War II, political theory has increasingly focused on the question of the origins and nature of the modern age. William H. Poteat’s explication of the Greek and Hebraic ontologies and his argument that modernity is the result of their incoherent combination in Christian theology can provide a framework to synthesize and extend the major competing theories about the modern era.
110. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Elon G. (Jerry) Eidenier Six Poems
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on epistemology
111. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 44 > Issue: 1
Mihály Héder, Daniel Paksi Non-Human Knowledge According to Michael Polanyi
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Three recent interpreters of tacit knowledge, Harald Grimen, Harry Collins, and John McDowell, either deny it is appropriate to attribute knowledge of any sort to animals or ignore the relevance of the tacit knowledge of animals to human knowledge. In this article, we seek to show that in Michael Polanyi’s understanding, tacit knowledge in animals underlies and supports human explicit knowledge. For Polanyi, tacit knowledge arises in increasingly complex forms in evolutionary history, and explicit knowledge emerges from it. Both forms of knowledge are personal achievements that can be true or false; animal behavior is not simply deterministic. Polanyi’s view on non-human tacit knowledge thus explains features of human knowledge that those denying or ignoring non-human knowledge leave unexplained.
journal and society information
112. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Editorial Board and Submissions Guide
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113. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Paul Lewis Preface
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journal and society information
114. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Notes on Contributors
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engagements with retrieving realism by herbert dreyfus and charles taylor
115. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
John V. Apczynski A Polanyian Epistemology Manqué: Reflections on Retrieving Realism
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These reflections attempt to clarify and strengthen Dreyfus and Taylor’s defense of a realist understanding of knowing by comparing it to features of Michael Polanyi’s theory of personal knowledge. I believe this overcomes some ambiguities such as their use of “mediation” and strengthens their case in discussing science without recourse to the notion of a “view from nowhere.” These in turn provide a more robust understanding of their understanding of realism within a pluralist framework. For students of Polanyi’s thought, this comparative effort provides an opportunity to place Polanyi’s theory within the wider world of contemporary philosophical thinking that they bring to their exposition of a “contact” theory of knowing. This might provide a basis for developing Polanyi’s thought through these contemporary channels.
116. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Esther L. Meek Contact with Reality: Comparing Michael Polanyi and Dreyfus and Taylor, Retrieving Realism
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This essay contrasts Michael Polanyi’s insight regarding contact with reality to the idea of direct contact theory that Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor develop in their recent effort to “retrieve” realism. Whereas the latter locates a “direct” contact “beneath” articulation in a preconceptual layer “accessible only by phenomenology,” Polanyi locates contact in discovery—not beneath, but rather beyond, our efforts to know. It is also apparent that the authors of Retrieving Realism presume an epistemology less sophisticated than Polanyi’s subsidiary-focal integration, as well as omitting the critical epistemic component of commitment. The essay concludes that Polanyi offers the superior challenge to “the picture that held us captive”—Cartesian epistemology with its resultant anti-realism, one which additionally unleashes a lively, surprising real to its proper primacy.
117. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
David W. Rutledge Dreyfus, Taylor, and Polanyi’s Prescience
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Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor argue explicit conceptual knowledge has an essential pre-conceptual “background” fully embedding the knower in the world. This refutes the Cartesian view that knowledge of the outside world is mediated through the mind of the observer. This “mediational” view is undermined by Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Todes, and the “contact theory” they make possible. I add Polanyi to the list, as tacit knowing accomplishes similar things in better fashion.
118. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Charles Lowney Robust Moral Realism: Pluralist or Emergent?
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In Retrieving Realism, Taylor and Dreyfus aim to correct mistaken modern assumptions and their post-modern reactions in order to affirm a robust realism about a world for scientific and moral exploration. Their critiques and solutions have much in common with Polanyi’s approach; they all emphasize tacit body-knowing, background frameworks, and our ability to develop epistemological structures that better and better grasp the world considered independent from us. Dreyfus-Taylor and Polanyi diverge, however, when it comes to choosing a framework from which to understand a robust moral realism. The former endorse a Heideggerian “reveal but conceal” pluralist approach, while a Polanyian view advocates a “progress but with risk” emergentist approach. I argue that the emergentist approach provides a better defense against deflationary realism and better reconciles apparent contradictions, such as physical causality and free will, engaged contact and progress in knowing reality in-itself, and cultural relativism and objective morality. While a pluralist account may have the strength of endorsing tolerance, it is more vulnerable to an ethical relativism; and while an emergentist view is more clearly at risk of illicit dogmatism, it has the strength of endorsing the search for moral truth that we all can share.
book reviews
119. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Andrew Grosso The Language Animal: the Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity
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120. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Dale Cannon To Flourish or Destruct: A Personalist Theory of Human Goods and Motivation
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