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Displaying: 181-200 of 2372 documents


book symposium
181. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity
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182. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Keith Derose Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath
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183. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 3
Recent Publications
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articles
184. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Miranda Fricker Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant
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185. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan How We Feel About Terrible, Non-existent Mafiosi
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186. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Shea Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind
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Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.
187. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Antti Kauppinen Meaningfulness and Time
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188. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Lionel Shapiro Objective Being and "Ofness" in Descartes
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It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes "objective being in the intellect" in order to explain or describe an idea's status as being "of something." I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of "materially false ideas" in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of 'idea of'. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can't be introducing objective being to explain or describe "ofness" understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of 'idea of'. I will argue that the notion of objective being can't serve to explain or describe this "ofness" either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind's ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.
189. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Earl Conee Self-Support
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book symposium
190. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Michael Strevens Précis of Depth
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191. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Brian Weatherson Explanation, Idealisation and the Goldilocks Problem
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192. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Ned Hall Comments on Michael Strevens's Depth
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193. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Marc Lange Abstraction and Depth in Scientific Explanation
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194. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Michael Strevens Replies to Weatherson, Hall, and Lange
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195. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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articles
196. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Katalin Balog In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
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197. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Fiona MacPherson Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism
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Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen (at least in certain ways that are identified in the paper) then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects' behefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism.
198. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Carolina Sartorio Resultant Luck
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199. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Caj Strandberg A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language
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It is often observed in metaethics that moral language displays a certain duality in as much as it seems to concern both objective facts in the world and subjective attitudes that move to action. In this paper, I defend The Dual Aspect Account which is intended to capture this duality: A person's utterance of a sentence according to which øing has a moral characteristic, such as "øing is wrong," conveys two things: The sentence expresses, in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that øing has a moral property, and the utterance of the sentence carries a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the person in question has an action-guiding attitude in relation to øing. This account has significant advantages over competing views: (i) As it is purely cognitivist, it does not have the difficulties of expressivism and various ecumenical positions, (ii) Yet, in spite of this, it can explain the close, "meaning-like," connection between moral language and attitudes, (iii) In contrast to other pragmatic accounts, it is compatible with any relevant cognitivist view, (iv) It does not rest on a contentious pragmatic notion, such as conventional implicature. (v) It does not imply that utterances of complex moral sentences, such as conditionals, convey attitudes. In addition, the generalized implicature in question is fully calculable and cancellable.
200. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 84 > Issue: 1
Jessica Brown Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?
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