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Displaying: 21-30 of 2435 documents


session 8: justice in twentieth century thomism
21. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
William Matthew Diem Obligation, Justice, and Law: A Thomistic Reply to Anscombe
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Anscombe argues in “Modern Moral Philosophy” that obligation and moral terms only have meaning in the context of a divine Lawgiver, whereas terms like ‘unjust’ have clear meaning without any such context and, in at least some cases, are incontrovertibly accurate descriptions. Because the context needed for moral-terms to have meaning does not generally obtain in modern moral philosophy, she argues that we should abandon the language of obligation, adopting instead the yet clear and meaningful language of injustice. She argues further that we should develop an account of human flourishing to answer the question why we need to be just. The essay contends that Aquinas has an account of obligation that requires neither a god nor an account of human flourishing, and that proceeds immediately from the common apprehension of justice Anscombe noted.
22. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
James Dominic Rooney, OP Goods and Groups: Thomistic Social Action and Metaphysics
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Hans Bernhard Schmid has argued that contemporary theories of collective action and social metaphysics unnecessarily reject the concept of a “shared intentional state.” I will argue that three neo-Thomist philosophers, Jacques Maritain, Charles de Koninck, and Yves Simon, all seem to agree that the goals of certain kinds of collective agency cannot be analyzed merely in terms of intentional states of individuals. This was prompted by a controversy over the nature of the “common good,” in response to a perceived threat from “personalist” theories of political life. Common goods, as these three authors analyze them, ground our collective action in pursuit of certain kinds of goals which are immanent to social activity itself. Their analysis can support an alternate position to “intentional individualism,” providing an account of collective practical reasoning and social metaphysics based on shared intentional states, but without involving implausible “group minds.”
acpa reports and minutes
23. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Minutes of the 2016 Executive Council Meeting
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24. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Secretary’s Report (2016)
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25. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Treasurer’s Report (2015)
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26. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Financial Statements (2014 and 2015)
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27. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
ACPQ Editor’s Report (2016)
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28. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Necrology
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29. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 90
Available Back Issues of the Proceedings
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presidential address
30. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 89
J. L. A. Garcia From Neighbor-Love to Utilitarianism, and Back: Uncovering Some Structures and Dynamics for Ethical Theory
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Contrasting loving our neighbors with utilitarians’ demand to maximize good reveals important metatheoretic structures and dynamics that I call virtues- basing, input drive, role centering, and patient focus. First, love (good will) is a virtue; such virtues are foundational to both moral obligations and the impersonally valuable. Second, part of loving is acting lovingly. Whether and how I act lovingly, and how loving it is, is a matter of motivation; this input-driven account contrasts with highlighting actions’ outcome. Third, in regarding someone as our neighbor we view her in relation to ourselves; a role-centered perspective shows that a wide range of person-to-person role-relationships constitute moral life. Fourth, if our moral task is loving each person, the moral question is how we respond to each person’s relevant welfare and needs, focusing on those toward someone acts (moral patients), not on maximizing good across persons or producing an optimal world.