In “Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason” (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793), Kant points out that personality itself (die Persönlichkeit selbst) always comes along with the idea of a moral law of respect (Achtung) which is intelligence affecting feeling caused only by pure practical. And Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of feeling and Achtung elucidates the ontological relation between moral feeling and personality (Heidegger calls this the essence of the human or subjectivity).This paper discusses Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik and Die Grundfrage der Phänomenologie, specifically, the phenomenological interpretation of moral feeling and the concept of Achtung. The purpose of this paper is to understand how Heidegger relates Achtung to the essential constitution of being of the human, and thereby to grasp the significance of Achtung for the actual construction of the self.

在面對風險轉換案例的時候，一般人直覺上覺得，這些案例顯示，諸如風險這類的實用因素（pragmatic factors）對我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識，扮演非常重要的角色。這個觀察似乎會跟智性主義（intellectualism）的主張有所衝突。根據智性主義，當我們判斷某個主體是否擁有知識的的時候，實用因素並不是需要考量的因素。這篇文章發展一個知識判斷理論，可以調和我們對風險轉換案例的直覺判斷跟智性主義的衝突。筆者將論證，實用因素不會直接影響我們的知識判斷，而只會通過影響我們的知性角度（epistemic perspective），間接地影響我們的知識判斷。

Based on the author’s previous research on the dingjing skill in Zhou Dun-Yi’s “a saint settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice”. This paper attempts to investigate the argumentation and structures of Zhang Zai’s On Moderation. With the evidence of textual analysis and related research, I found that the magnificent philosophical thought of On Moderation certainly has thinking and structures corresponding with Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.”The main idea of this paper is that the context of On Moderation in fact has the theses of “moderation”→ “etiquette”→ “four nos”→ “sincerity”→ “implementing benevolence at ease, being fond of benevolence and disliking cruelty.” The argumentation and logic of these theses truly interlinked with the practical logic of Zhou Dun-Yi’s “one settles himself to moderation, benevolence and justice.” Additionally, to take a look at its profound argumentation, the “moderation” concept of Zhang Zai could be restored to the original form of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance.” Furthermore, on the basis of the practical thought, Zhang Zai further skillfully introduced the concept of “benevolence, justice, courtesy, wisdom and sincerity” through Mencius Jinxin. Upon making a thorough investigation, we conclude Zhang Zai’s dedication of deducing the practical structure of “benevolence → justice → sincerity → courtesy → wisdom” from the theses of “sincere belief”→ “being studious”→ “courtesy and wisdom”. We can thus know that Zhang Zai not only responded to the content of the dingjing skill of Zhou Dun-Yi, but also made important academic contributions in elucidating the Confucian Philosophy.

Smith (2003) proposes a dispositional account of alternative possibilities, called New Dispositionalism, to resist Frankfurt’s claim that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (or the ability to do otherwise). He argues that, in Frankfurt’s case (1969), the agent’s alternative possibility is masked by the intervener, but it is nevertheless a present alternative possibility. Frankfurt’s case, hence, is not a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities at all. However, according to Cohen and Handfield (2007), Smith’s account is shown to be untenable for the reason that it does not work for all Frankfurt-type examples unless it is implausibly committed to intrinsic finks. In this paper, I argue that Cohen and Handfield’s criticism is not conclusive since it presupposes the debatable conditional analysis of dispositions.

《莊子•天道》中輪扁斲輪故事，看似旨在說明技藝之不可言傳性；若連結到其他論及技藝與語言之《莊子》篇章來看，如此詮釋誠然有跡可循，而在現代學界也確實傾向以此脈絡來理解或應用輪扁之故事。鑒於《莊子•天道》中，另有其他段落以「書」為題，本文擬從《莊子•天道》整章的脈絡來探討輪扁故事之旨趣。本文將根據輪扁故事中有關書的問題，分別探究：書的功能何在？為何批判書？書中少了什麼？依據《莊子•天道》提供之線索探討上述諸問題時，可以發現輪扁之故事應視為政治論述之一環；換言之，技藝與語言等議題，或許無關於其宏旨。

Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) is one of the disciples of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and founder of the Kyoto School. Appointed as the professor of philosophy in Taiwan Imperial University in 1928, Mutai’s research of Hegel directly influenced Hung Yao-hsün’s notion of “dialectical existence.” Hong did not develop this notion in a clear way, but it actually served as the foundation of his own philosophy. Moreover, this notion is not Hong’s invention, but it is a concept developed in his dialectical ontology, which is a result of his reading and understanding of the philosophy of spirit by Hegel, the existential philosophy by Heidegger, and the reception and transformation of Western philosophy by Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Mutai Risaku. However, Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence” has a special context, namely the context of Taiwan under the colonization of Japan. Different from the Kyoto School itself, Hong’s philosophy is historically significant as the alienation of Western modern philosophy in Taiwan. In this paper, I shall first describe studies of Hegel in the 1930s, and explain the difference between Nishida’s and Mutai’s reading of Hegel. Then I turn to discuss how Mutai’s study of Hegel and “logic of the expressive world” influenced Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence”. Finally, I shall reflect on Hung’s philosophy in the context of the development of philosophy in East Asia.

This paper shall explain and evaluate Gao Panlong’s criticism of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. Compared to his criticism of Wang’s followers, Gao’s criticism of Wang himself is rather mild: much of his objection is to the concept of wushan wu’e. With respect to his own account of gongfu, however, Gao actually incorporates some of Wang’s crucial ideas. Furthermore, he reverts to the Cheng-Zhu position when reflecting on Wang’s understanding of xin. So, through a careful reading of relevant texts, this paper shall specify Gao’s modifications of Zhu’s and Wang’s philosophy respectively and, on that basis, evaluate the coherence of his reconciliation between the two thinkers.

This article shall explicate the theory and praxis of how to live with others under conventional norms in the Zhuangzi. The theoretical aspect is explicated by analyzing the amplitudinal quality of the movements performed by two types of characters─a bodily deformed figure (the ideal person) and a ritually formed figure (his foil). The main difference between the two is the absence of chengxin (成心，the completed heart-mind) in the former and its presence in the latter. A person restricted by chengxin adheres strictly to conventional norms in order to avoid criticism. By contrast, a person not restricted by chengxin deals with these norms in an adaptive and creative manner. Because of this difference, the movements of a person restricted by chengxin have a narrow amplitude, and so they exhibit inflexibility and stubbornness, while the movements of the ideal person have a wide amplitude and therefore manifest flexibility and creativity. The key to self-transformation is, then, to live without the restriction of chengxin, to concretely exhibit such flexibility concerning norms. To approximate such a state, one can adopt the practical strategy of what I call “Dao-embodying posing”. Roughly put, in imitating the wide amplitude manifested in the movements of the ideal person, one gains flexibility in social interaction and creativity in one’s own life.

Nietzsche ascribes to Herder’s views on aesthetics and further develops the connection between aesthetics and freedom. He advocates an aesthetic realization of a “human of nature” (Naturmensch) echoing Rousseau’s call for getting “back to nature.” The concept of nature in Nietzsche’s aesthetics leads us towards a non-moralism beyond good and evil, its purpose being to liberate the body from Christian asceticism. Nietzsche celebrates the virtuosity of the Renaissance and takes Goethe’s combination of “noble upbringing” and “bodily dexterity” as an example of aesthetically transforming the “binary opposition of good and evil” into the “non-moralism of good and bad.” Cultivated individuals, like artistic geniuses, are good at mobilizing the multiple forces intrinsic and extrinsic to the body, without excluding the bad; yet, they still recognize the contingency in their destinies. In modernity, which is essentially self-destructive, conflicting forces, capable of destroying life, in effect become the source of innovative lifestyles. Free play is the main form of artistic activity and a sign of life’s vitality. This paper takes the relationship between power, nature and freedom as a lens through which to explore the following questions: Does the power of artistic liberation manifest and reinforce subjectivity or is it actually a process of desubjectification? If artistic activities involve individual liberation, is there any dimension of political freedom involved therein as well? What is the relationship between Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideas and critiques of the Enlightenment?

In general, people think Annotations to Taijitu or Tongshu (Penetrating the Scripture of Change) were influenced by Zhongyong and Commentary to The Book of Changes. Therefore, the dingjing skill and thought of Zhou Dun-Yi were also considered to be originated from Zhongyong or Commentary to The Book of Changes. However, based on my previous research “Influence of the Guanzi’s Dingjing Thought upon Zhou Dun-Yi’s dingjing Skill: From Perspectives of Thought and Structure of Zhu Dan-Xi’s Triad Melancholy Theory,” it showed that the implementation and discourse system of “with tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance, the world can enjoy benevolence and righteousness” in the Guanzi could certainly correspond to the argument of “one settles himself in moderation, benevolence and justice.” As a result, the concept of moderation in Annotations to Taijitu could interpret from the viewpoint of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye (Internal Work) of the Guanzi and be understood more concisely from another perspective.Therefore, the author first organized the interpretations of Liu Ji-Shan and Mo Zong-San, compared with several viewpoints of Japanese scholars Hiroshi Ogiwara and Takehiko Okada and achieve a possible explanation of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance” in Neiye. On the one hand, the concept could logically cover the argument of Ogiwara who interpreted moderation as “utmost righteousness.” On the other hand, it could satisfy the form of the so-called “no tranquility existing without moderation, benevolence and justice” of Zhuzi in philosophical documents. As in the mode of “tranquility in mind and integrity in appearance,” we could place the doctrine of emphasizing tranquility of Zhou Dun-Yi in the moderation concept and expand the strength of Zhou Dun-Yi’s theory of self-cultivation through the implementation mode of “inner tranquility and outer respect.” Thus, the concepts of “tranquility in mind” and “without desire” contain ontological significance, and are comparable to the cosmological discussion of Zhou Dun-yi.

John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to “justice as fairness” and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability.This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls’s claims but is also theoretically defensible.

This essay aims to discuss the concept of body in the Mozi through the investigation on self-cultivation. First of all, this essay tries to indicate that the body in the Mozi is constructed by‘xing (形, “body”) ─xin (心, “heart”) ─ qi ( 氣, “energy”)’which is in accord with the Pre-Qin thinkers’ understanding to the body. While xing refers to the flesh-bloody part of human being, the concept of xin focuses on the aspect of cognition and is closely related to the concept of shan (善, “goodness”), ai (愛, “love”), zhi (志, “will”) and xing. Despite the concept of qi has not been fully developed in the Mozi, it remains significant in understanding On Dyeing (〈所染〉). Based on this framework on the body, we could assert that the cultivated body which implied in the Mozi is not merely a physical body constituted by flesh and blood, but an integration of mind and body. Through the cultivation (gong-fu 工夫), the physical-mental state of the practitioners will then begin to transform. This essay reveals that the domain of gong-fu should not be restricted in the immanent cultivation of xin-xing ( 心性, “mental disposition”). Regardless of using the approaches of inside-out or outside-in, any practice could change one’s thought and behavior could be regarded as “gong-fu”. Thus, this essay generalizes six kinds of gong-fu from the Mozi, namely qu (去, “removing”), fan-zhi-shen (反之身, “self-reflecting and self-justificating”), li-zhi (立志, “determining”), li-shi (力事, “performing one’s duty”), xue (學, “learning”) and bian (辯, “debating”). This essay concludes that the purpose of self-cultivation on the Mozi is to establish an ideal model of Mohism, so as to promote benefits and eliminate harms for the society. This interpretation of body complies with three dimensions, which are zhi-wu-yu-e-zhi-shen (知無欲惡之身, “the body with intelligence neither desiring nor disliking anything”), li-yong-zhi-shen (力勇之身, “the body with power and bravery”) and jiao-li-zhi-shen (交利之身, “the body with mutual aid”).

Scottish philosophy and intellectual history have become the increasingly fashionable fields of academic studies. Alexander Broadie, one of the pioneers and an accomplished scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, returns to the basic question, namely, “what is Scottish philosophy?”, and presents a comprehensive work on the history of Scottish philosophy. Broadie successfully elucidates the nature and significance of Scottish philosophy both historically and philosophically. He argues that Scottish philosophy must be studied in its historical context, for it is not only a philosophical enterprise but also a persistent tradition which has united the Scottish nation for centuries. The advancements in science, literature, politics, and culture in Scotland would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible, without such an intellectual culture established by thinkers in that tradition. This article is intended as a review of Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy in the background of his shifting academic interests from philosophy to history while he holds the professorship in University of Glasgow. His commitment to Scottish philosophical culture deserves the attention of contemporary historians and philosophers, for his work opens up a space for

In the demonstration of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (B274-9), Kant brings up a persuasive strategy for seriously refuting skeptics’ position concerning the reality of outer world. He attacks directly the core presupposition of skeptics. First of all, Kant takes as a starting point the conception of self-knowledge that should be accepted by all skeptics. Kant then uncovers step by step the sceptics’ contradiction and he hence puts them in a dilemma. Under the sceptics’ assumption, either they must acknowledge the impossibility of self-knowledge or they must give up that assumption. In other words, not only must skeptics acknowledge the direct veridicality of self-knowledge, but also accept the direct veridicality of the existence of outer things as the condition of the possibility of self-knowledge.This paper argues that (1) the ‘refutation’ is persuasive, and (2) the ‘refutation’ and the core theses of ‘transcendental idealism’ are compatible.This essay contains three parts. The first part is to clarify the systematic status of the ‘refutation’ in transcendental philosophy and, by this clarification, to expound the empirically cognitive significance of the ‘postulate of actuality’; the second part is to critically analyze the structure of demonstration and justification of the ‘refutation’; the third part is to expound the compatibility of ‘refutation’ with ‘transcendental idealism’ by clarifying the ambiguity of key terms. The paper ends with a conclusion summarizing the strategy of the ‘refutation’.

The doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” is one of the core concerns of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. This paper is trying to elucidate Wang’s theory by investigating: 1. The philosophical origin of this doctrine. 2. The justification of its ethical theory. Regarding the investigation of its “origin”, I will show the philosophical inheritance between Wang’s doctrine and classical texts by the support of relevant textual evidence, instead of examining the linkage between different general ideas in the School of mind. The common ground is revealed in Book 4A of Mencius, of which has been stated clearly that to know is to act. The relationship between knowing and acting is analytic. Since knowing is the richest content of wisdom, and genuine knowing is the observance of action, the knowing of benevolence and righteousness is also the observance of such values. Such Mencius’ idea serves not only the lexical origin as suggested by Lao Sze-kwang, but also as the textual ground of Wang’s understanding of the knowing function of the mind of discerning right and wrong. The second purpose of this paper is to justify the doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” by ethical interpretation. Lao emphasizes the significance of activity in the concept of “acting”, and transforms the meaning of “acting” from common sense to the level of school of mind and philosophy of language. Nevertheless, if the ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” has to be justified, i.e. the reason why knowing necessarily entail acting, a further explanation is needed. In this paper, ideas in School of mind will be explained in terms of ethical concepts in order to achieve a transcendental analysis. The “unity of knowing and acting” is possible in subjective identity, which is the a priori condition to make the concept of an ethical norm and imputation possible. The ethical necessity of the “unity of knowing and acting” can thus be revealed. In the subjective identity, the ethical “ownness” of knowing and acting is justified, and an ethical norm and the possibility of imputation can also be possible. Since knowing and acting belong to one’s own self, the ethical norm and its imputation is then valid. This is a formal argument constituted by the self-relation of one’s subjectivity.

In this paper I reconstruct how Aristotle sees the medium receiving color in De anima 2.7, 418a26-b20 and offer my own interpretation. I argue that Aristotle intends to establish a causal chain for a perception event, which begins with the color of the perceived object as the efficient explanation of the whole causal chain. And color moves the medium, i.e., something transparent such as air, in the manner of alteration. On the other hand, I argue that we should construe the actuality of the transparent thing to be the state of exhibiting the nature of transparency, which air shares with things such as fire. And receiving color in the transparent thing requires the transparent thing to be in actuality. If this line of interpretation is correct, it may reshape the current reading of how the faculty of perception “receives form without matter” (De anima 2.12, 414a18-19).

Bishop sentences such as “If a bishop meets a bishop, he blesses him” have long been considered problematic for the descriptivist (or E-type) approach of donkey anaphora (e.g. Evans, 1977; Heim, 1990; and Neale, 1990). Elbourne (2005) offers a situational descriptivist analysis that allegedly solves the problem, and furthermore extends its explanatory coverage to bishop sentence with coordinate subjects. However, I throw serious doubts on Elbourne’s analysis. Specifically, I argue that the purported solution is committed to the use of unbound anaphora, and it cannot sustain the claimed empirical adequacy.

In contrast with the late 19th century German Philosophy, most historians of philosophy emphasize the achievements of the first half of the century. In After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840-1900, Frederick Beiser stands against this academic current and coins five different narratives, including “the rise of neo-Kantianism”, “the materialism controversy”, “the growth of historicism”, “the root of modern logic”, “the rise of pessimism” to allow readers to reengage with the second half of the 19th century. He takes the responsibility of enlivening the so-called “lost traditions”, and of course, for those readers who have similar taste and interest, this book is their cup of tea. However, if we, by the name of the book, anticipate this work to illustrate a general picture of the “mainstream” philosophical traditions from those times, we may be disappointed. From the academic point of view, this book is certainly well written, with rich references and a comprehensive understanding of the related topics. Through Beiser’s reconstruction of the philosophical controversies, the stiff narratives of the history of philosophy can be softened and refreshed. If the readers themselves are able to incorporate the details provided by the book into the wider historical context and the specific problems in the history of philosophy, the reward can be even bigger.

Hung Yao-Shun (1903-1986), one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in the Japanese ruled period, whose research deserves more attention today. My intention in this paper is twofold: First, to clarify some basic concepts of his “absolute dialectics of alethiological dialectics”, and secondly to indicate some possible developments of his logic. The paper is divided into five sections. After a brief introduction to the leading question of my paper (section one), I focus on his main philosophical work “Being and Truth - A Study of Schalwa Nuzubidse’s Alethiology” published in April 1938 (totally 145 pages). Nuzubidse attempts to explicate the traditional metaphysics as an aletheological realism, aiming at the disclosure of the truth-in-itself. Some of the basic concepts of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and Hung’s interpretation are discussed here (sections two, three, four). Through these discussions, we can see that Hung goes deeply into the core of Nuzubidse’s alethiology and radicalizes his alethiological realism step by step to an “Absolute Dialectics of Alethiology”. Finally, Hung’s critique on Nuzubidse is discussed in the last section (section five). Hung’s project remains an unfinished ideal, which makes some of his creative thoughts still obscure. By explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments, some of the possible contributions and new perspectives that Hung provided to philosophy will be expounded in this section.

本文探討極小命題成立與否的基礎。首先，本文將以Emma Borg 為極小主義之代表，釐清極小主義者所謂的極小命題是種語句本身抽象而結構化的核心意義，並被賦予三種特色：直覺的、不變的、有真假可言的。本文論證具有此三種性質的極小命題是難以成立的。首先針對此主張的基礎─字詞本身的極小內容是一種不可再分、密碼般、概念化的對象─本文論證字詞展現在語句中的意義並非如此不變，因此難以支持極小命題的不變性。其次，本文論證，抽象而結構化的極小命題是邏輯分析後的產物，因此難以有真假值可言。