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Displaying: 21-40 of 378 documents

ousia dans la tradition platonicienne grecque et syriaque
21. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Riccardo Chiaradonna Essere e vita in Plotino (VI, 2 [43]; III, 7 [45]).
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This paper focuses on Plotinus’ account of life and being in treatises VI, 2 [43] On the genera of being and III, 7 [45] On eternity and time. Life and being play a key role in Plotinus’ ontology since they characterise incorporeal realities as such (life and being cannot be drawn from the analysis of bodies). Therefore, focusing on these items makes it possible to attain an account of intelligible reality according to the principles appropriate to it. Three issues are considered: (1) the cognitive process through which the soul grasps being and life when it turns its cognitive activity away from the bodies and reverts to itself (VI, 2, 4‑6); (2) the status of being and life as genera of the intelligible reality (life is equivalent to intelligible motion: VI, 2, 7); (3) Plotinus’ account of life as the way of being typical of intelligible realities (III, 7); (4) his gradualist account of the hierarchy of life (III, 8 [30], 8; VI, 3 [44], 7; I, 4 [46], 3).
22. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Sylvain Roux De l’intellect a l’un: la notion de “συνυποστασις” chez Plotin
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At the end of Treatise 38 (VI 7), Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object (οὐσία) and its intellection is not the act of a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 (VI 8) to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle.
23. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Izabela Jurasz Itutā ‑ ītyā / ītyē comme synonymes d’ousia dans la polémique d’Éphrem contre Bardesane
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In his critic of the doctrine of Bardaisan († 222), Ephrem the Syrian († 373) devotes a lot of space to reflection on the meaning of the terms ītutā and ītyā (plural ītyē) which, as he denounces, are used inaccurately by his opponent. These Syriac terms can be translated by “being” or “essence”, but also by “substance”. This observation leads us to propose the comparison with the Greek term οὐσία, taking into account many difficulties raised by its uses in theological discourse. The article is devoted to the analysis of the uses of the terms ītutā and ītyā ‑ by Ephrem and by Bardaisan ‑ in their different ways of describing the divine essence. This comparison reveals the peculiarities of the two systems of thought and also their connections with the Greek philosophical doctrines.
24. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Tiziano F. Ottobrini Intorno al teologhema della שכינה e all’antiallegorismo dello ἱλαστήριον presso Filone Alessandrino
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This essay analyses the use of the term/concept hilasterion (‘propitiatorium’, i.e. the cover of Ark of Covenant) in the hypomnematic corpus by Philo of Alexandria. This subject needs to be examined in relationship with the Greek translation of the Septuagint and the exegesis of the Hebrew kapporeth ; so it will be argued that here Philo deals with semitic thought more than with the categories of Greek philosophy, since the real and bodily presence of God on hilasterion differs ontologically from any allegoric interpretation : only a sound Hebrew contextualisation of the theme as šekhînâ might take away this concern. As a result it means that, speculatively, there does not exist Philo Gracus only but this coexists with a sort of often neglected Philo Hebraicus too, when Greek allegory and allegorism fail to make sense, just as in the case of the special point of view of hilasterion, due to its semitic nature not totally compressible into Greek forma mentis.
25. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Eleni Procopiou Essence, individualité et personne chez Thomas d’Aquin
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The rediscovery of the Hellenic philosophy, but also of the Patristic thinking is a typical feature of Thomistic thought, which consists of a new synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that raises anew the issue of the relation between Christianity and philosophy as a focal point of medieval philosophy. Acknowledgement of Hellenic Patristic thought that focuses primarily on man as an inseparable union of body and soul, joined in a whole, has been a determining factor in the Thomistic approach of being, through the distinction between a person (or hypostasis) from essence (or nature). Through this distinction and because of the Aristotle’s hylomorphism, the notion of ‘person’ is placed in the field of individuality and the unity of the human composite. The metaphysical notion of a person as individual, complemented by the notion of “relation” is directly related to the ontological unity of human nature and is founded upon the metaphysical notion of “essence” (substance).
26. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Monica Brinzei New Evidence for Nicholas Aston’s Principia on the Sentences: Basel, UB, A.X.24
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Cet article propose d’identifier le fragment anonyme du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ff. 1‑73v avec les questionnes sur les Sentences de Nicholas Aston, connu grâce aux travaux pionniers de Zenon Kaluza. Une analyse des détails techniques de ce texte permet également d’avancer l’hypothèse que les Articuli d’Aston peuvent être lus comme des traces des principia. En annexe, nous éditons la liste des questions du manuscrit Basel, UB, A.X.24, ainsi qu’une concordance entre ce manuscrit et les autres témoins manuscrits d’Aston, afin de démontrer que ce nouveau témoin contient la tradition la plus complète du texte d’Aston.
comptes rendus
27. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Gweltaz Guyomarc’h David Lefebvre, Dynamis. Sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance, Paris, Vrin («Bibliotheque d’histoire de la philosophie»), 2018
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28. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Izabela Jurasz Vito Limone, Origene e la filosofia greca. Scienze, testi, lessico, coll. Letteratura Cristiana Antica. Nuova Serie 30, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2018
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29. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Izabela Jurasz Lucia M. Tissi , Helmut Seng , Chiara O. Tommasi (Hrsg.), Stimmen der Götter. Orakel und ihre Rezeption von der Spätantike bis in die Frühe Neuzeit, coll. Bibliotheca Chaldaica 8, Heidelberg, Universitatsverlag Winter, 2019
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30. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Anna Motta Bettina Bohle , Olympiodors Kommentar zu Platons Gorgias, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag Winter («Studien zu Literatur und Erkenntnis», 11), 2020
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31. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Amalia Salvestrini Olivier Boulnois , Isabelle Moulin (dir.), Le beau et la beauté au Moyen Âge, Paris, Vrin («Institut d’études médiévales»), 2018
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32. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Oana‑Corina Filip Christophe Grellard , Frédérique Lachaud (éd.), Jean de Salisbury, nouvelles lectures, nouveaux enjeux, Medievi, Volume 19, Florence, Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2018
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33. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
Christophe Grellard Jean Duns Scot , Questions sur la métaphysique, Volume I, Livres I à III, traduction et études sous la direction d’Olivier Boulnois, Paris, PUF, «Épiméthée», 2017
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34. Chôra: Volume > 18/19
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35. Chôra: Volume > 17
Anca Vasiliu Note liminaire
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36. Chôra: Volume > 17
Annick Jaulin, Michel Crubellier Présentation
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37. Chôra: Volume > 17
Olivier Renaut Le plaisir dans la cite platonicienne
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This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.
38. Chôra: Volume > 17
Charlotte Murgier Platon et les plaisirs de la vertu
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How does Plato conceive the pleasures attendant on the virtuous life? Does he provide a specific account of them ? By reading through key passages from Laws book 5, Republic book 9 and the Philebus, I try to assess the way Plato endeavours to demonstrate that the virtuous life is also happy and thereby pleasant. I investigate to what extent these texts put forward any specificity of the pleasures of being virtuous, and how far the account they provide harmonizes with Plato’s general views about pleasure.
39. Chôra: Volume > 17
Karine Tordo·Rombaut Protagoras 351b3‑358d4 : le plaisir et rien d’autre
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In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : (1) the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; (2) the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; (3) the compatibility of his “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem (2). I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem (1), through a distinction between so‑called pleasures (to which Socrates objects) and real ones (which he might accept). My conclusion answers problem (3), by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach.
40. Chôra: Volume > 17
Michel Crubellier Aristote : poursuivre et fuir
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ARISTOTLE ON PURSUIT AND AVOIDANCE. Pleasure and pain play an essential role in Aristotle’s conception of the goal‑directed activities of animals and human beings, since they trigger the reactions of pursuit or avoidance, and hence the entire behavior. The present paper inquires into Aristotle’s analysis of this phenomenon on the basis of De Anima III , chapter 7 and De Motu Animalium, chapters 6‑7‑8. The crucial move in this analysis is the definition of pleasure and pain given in both treatises : “To feel pleasure or pain is to actualize through the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad, as such”. The paper examines the meaning of this definition and shows how it connects and agrees with the explanation of the principles of the physical motions of animals in the De Motu Animalium.