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Displaying: 21-40 of 344 documents


21. Chôra: Volume > 17
Auteurs
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22. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Anca Vasiliu Note liminaire: Quelques réflexions en guise d’introduction
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études
23. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Mario Vegetti To siôpoumenon agathon
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La discussione sull’idea del buono (to agathon) occupa uno spazio marginale nel libro VI della Repubblica, ma comporta un eccezionale impegno teorico : di qui la vastita della letteratura esegetica che contrasta con la brevita del testo platonico. Il problema cruciale e questo : in Repubblica VI 504a‑509c to agathon non e piu solo un principio di valorizzazione e un criterio di valutazione di cose e condotte – com’e consueto in Platone – ma assume il ruolo di principio ontologico ed epistemologico. Questa posizione ha spesso suggerito interpretazioni di tipo “teologico” dell’idea del buono (identificata a volte con l’Uno neoplatonico, altre con il Demiurgo del Timeo). Quello che si puo affermare sulla base del testo, e che Platone ha conferito in queste pagine della Repubblica un primato al vertice etico del triangolo i cui altri vertici sono quello ontologico e quello epistemologico ; l’intento e quello di offrire una fondazione etica assoluta (antiprotagorea), mediante la connessione della sfera del valore con quelle dell’essere e della verita (quindi anche in ambito politico una giustificazione ultimativa al diritto dei filosofi a governare).L’unificazione delle dimensioni etica, ontologica ed epistemologica sarebbe parsa teoricamente insostenibile ad Aristotele, cui si deve una critica devastante alla teoria platonica del buono.
24. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Rafael Ferber Le Bien de Platon et le problème de la transcendance du Principe. Encore une fois l’ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας de Platon
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The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?≫ (Rufus Jones, 1863‑1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940‑2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tes ousias) in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (I) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good.
25. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Suzanne Husson Autarcie du Bien et dépendance de l’être?: De la République au Sophiste
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Self‑sufficiency of the Good and dependency of Being ? From Republic to Sophist. Even thought Parmenides doesn’t use αὐτάρκης and any noun derived from this root, the Being is conceived by him as self‑sufficient (v. 8,33). Plato, for its part, never uses this term concerning the intelligible reality ; however, in the Sophist, he allusively challenges Parmenides self‑sufficiency of Being and outlines an ontology that is conflicting with it. On the other hand self‑sufficiency is explicitly ascribed by Plato to the human good (Philebus, 20d, 67a), to the divine world (Timaeus, 33d), and also to the virtuous man (Republic, 387d). This paper aims to demonstrate that these facets (theological or anthropological) of self‑sufficiency are consistent with the supremacy of the idea of the Good in the Republic, which can be understood as a structural kind of self‑sufficiency.
26. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Franco Ferrari Platone ha effettivamente identificato il demiurgo del Timeo e l’idea del bene della Repubblica?: Riflessioni intorno a un’antica querelle filosofica
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Un debat tres vif eut lieu parmi les commentateurs medioplatoniciens sur le rapport entre la forme du bien de la Republique et le demiurge du Timee. Certains d’entre eux, comme Plutarque et Atticus, parvinrent a identifier ces deux entites, d’autres, comme Numenius, a situer les deux principes dans une relation hierarchique, en attribuant au bien la qualification de ≪premier dieu≫ et de pere (pater) et au demiurge celle de ≪second dieu≫ et de producteur (poietes). Cet article se propose d’examiner la question de l’identite de la forme du bien avec le demiurge sur des bases nouvelles, en prenant comme point de depart une interpretation metaphorique de la figure du demiurge, qui ne se presente pas comme un principe metaphysique independant, mais comme une description metaphorique de l’element causal‑efficient du monde des formes, c’est a dire du vivant intelligible. Le demiurge coinciderait donc avec la totalite active et dynamique du monde intelligible (panteles zoon). Dans la seconde partie de l’article est prise en consideration l’hypothese que la superiorite de la forme du bien par rapport aux autres formes est du meme genre que celle du demiurge, dans la mesure ou le bien aussi peut etre compris comme la totalite du kosmos intelligible. Il s’agit d’une hypothese qui ne va pas sans difficultes, mais qui merite d’etre examinee jusqu’au bout.
27. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Ricardo Salles Bonté, rationalité et impuissance chez le démiurge Stoïcien
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Why does the Stoic demiurge cause the conflagration ? In this paper, I revisit some issues addressed in Salles 2005 and argue that the conflagration is the result of an incapacity in the demiurge for creating an everlasting and uninterrupted cosmic order. Also, I bring out in more detail (a) the parallel between the Stoics and Plato at Tim. 75a‑c (section 1), (b) why cosmic order is the ultimate end pursued by the demiurge (section 2), (c) what is the physical mechanism that leads up to the conflagration (section 3), and (d) why the conflagration is contrary to the cosmic order (sections 1 and 4).
28. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Francesca Calabi Il bene migliore del bene in Filone di Alessandria
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Il y a chez Philon des expressions pour parler du bien qui sont apparemment contradictoires ou qui, au moins, font difficulte. Dans quelques passages l’Alexandrin parle de Dieu en termes de bien ; ailleurs il en parle comme de cause ou source du bien ; dans autres textes, enfin, Dieu est meilleur que le bien.Le theme de la possibilite de connaitre Dieu aussi pose des problemes : d’un cote nous avons le Dieu inconnaissable dont meme pas le nom ne peut etre dit, d’un autre, le Dieu demiurgique et providentiel dont quelques personnages parviennent a avoir une connaissance, au moins indirecte et partielle. Telle vision est proportionnelle au niveau du voyant. Cet article s’interroge a propos d’une solution similaire concernant la perception du bien, saisi par les hommes de facon differente selon leur niveau. Non pas, alors, Dieu comme bien, comme bon, comme meilleur que le bien, per se, mais en relation aux hommes qui n’arrivent pas a atteindre to agathon et cherchent vainement a lui attribuer un nom – quoique impropre –, de determiner ce qui est au dela de toute nomination, qualification, definition.
29. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Mauro Bonazzi Le Bien selon Numénius et la République de Platon
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Among Plato’s dialogues, the Timaeus was the most authoritative for Middle Platonists. But alone it does not suffice to explain some of the most important tenets defended by these philosophers. A remarkable example is the doctrine of the three Principles (God, Ideas, matter), which characterizes imperial Platonism, and which cannot be stated on the basis of the Timaeus alone. In my paper I show that Numenius was influenced by the Republic as well : in the metaphor of the Sun he found the Good as first principle and an indication of a second principle which is further subdivided into an Intellect thinking the Ideas and a Demiurge ordering the universe. This interpretation provides him with some interesting solutions. But such an influence also raises difficulties insofar as the causal role of the first principle is concerned.
30. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Fabienne Jourdan Sur le Bien de Numénius. Sur le Bien de Platon: L’enseignement oral de Platon comme occasion de rechercher son pythagorisme dans ses écrits
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Mauro Bonazzi has shown how Numenius based his theology on his interpretation of Plato’s Timaios and Politeia. However, by giving the title On the Good (Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ) to his own dialogue, Numenius inserts it in the line of the teaching that, according to the tradition, Plato would have orally given on this topic. After focusing briefly on this teaching and its problems, the paper examines how Numenius appropriated it, as it reached him. It will appear that Numenius conceives of the oral tradition as the Pythagorean core of Plato’s teaching, a core that, according to him, its transmitters did not understand properly, and that he claims to find himself in a good interpretation of that which he has direct access to : the writings of the Master.
31. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Luc Brisson Sur le Bien de Platon: Métamorphose d’une anecdote
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The anecdote recounted by Aristoxenus, who claims to be reporting Aristotle’s words, has been used by several interpreters to maintain the existence of a doctrine of the Good reserved for the members of the Academy, and transmitted orally, after the model of Pythagorean teaching. Yet a close analysis of these few lines shows that this interpretation has no basis : instead, what is at issue is a reading, for a broad audience, of a text corresponding to a doctrine of the good that can be found in the Republic and the Laws.
32. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Pierre Destrée La contemplation du Beau et la pratique du bien: Pour une lecture éthique du discours de Diotime dans le Banquet de Platon
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This paper focuses on the conclusion of Diotima’s speech : “Do you not reflect that it is there alone, when he sees the Beautiful […] that he will give birth not to mere images of virtue but to true virtue, because it is not an image that he is grasping but the truth. And when he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue it is possible for him to be loved by the gods and to become, if any human can, immortal himself ” (212a). It is not clear what exactly Diotima takes “true virtue” to be. Many interpreters (esp. F. Sheffield) argue that that virtue amounts to the exercise of the intellect, the moral, or political virtues being only “secondary” (as Aristotle would famously say) in the eudaimonia. Opposing this in fact Aristotelian reading, I contend that “true virtue” amounts to the moral‑cum‑political virtues once enlightened by the contemplation of the Form of Beauty. My main arguments come from a close reading of some passages of Alcibiades’s speech which should be read as a diptych to Diotima’s.
33. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Giulia Sissa Le Peuple philosophe: Le souci du bien dans la République de Platon et chez les Athéniens
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Une premisse majeure met en place les arguments les plus normatifs de la Republique : les caracteres des hommes sont la cause des caracteres des cites. Le gouvernement de Kallipolis est le meilleur de tous, explique Socrate, pour une raison tres simple : c’est le gouvernement des meilleurs (aristokratia). Dans une demokratia, en revanche, n’importe qui peut revetir un role de pouvoir par tirage au sort, et n’importe qui peut dire n’importe quoi. Tandis que les meilleurs des Gardiens se soucient du bien politique au superlatif, le peuple n’en a cure. Il foule aux pieds l’idee meme qu’il faudrait choisir et eduquer les magistrats. Le Peuple ne saurait être philosophe. Et pourtant, à Athènes, la parole politique et le langage à l’oeuvre dans l’administration de la cite (serments, decrets, eloges) montrent une quete acharnee du mieux possible. Le temoignage epigraphique nous devoile une citee pavee de bonnes intentions, engagee dans un perfectionnisme democratique que Platon refuse de reconnaitre.
34. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Valérie Cordonier Traduction, translittération, réinterprétation: la kalokagathia chez Albert le Grand
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In the significant body of existing research on the notion of kalokagathia – an ideal of the accomplished man who combines physical beauty with social status and moral goodness –, the focus has so far been on the history of the formation of the terms that denoted this quality (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, καλoσκἀγαθός, καλοκἀγαθία) in ancient Greece, on their usage during the classical period and – to a lesser extent – on the changes in their meaning during the Hellenistic period. Our history of this concept therefore lacks a mediaeval chapter. I propose to address this gap by analysing how Albert Magnus understood the Latin terms corresponding to kalokagathia in the Aristotelian texts of practical philosophy made accessible by Latin translators at the time (Nicomachean Ethics, Magna Moralia, Politics and Eudemian Ethics). I also offer a reflection on the factors that determine how a text is understood within the contingency space left open between its translation and its interpretation by the reader.
35. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Enrico Berti Bien en soi ou bien humain?: Aristote et Platon
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Aristotle criticizes the Idea of Good admitted by Plato because it is not a human, i.e. a practicable, good. But Aristotle himself admits, besides the human good, i.e. happiness, a supreme impracticable good, which coincides with the unmoved mover. And Plato himself, in his Philebus, speaks of a human good as the mixed life, which depends for its measure on the Idea of Good. This means that Aristotle does not criticize Plato because he identifies the supreme principle with the Good, a Good which cannot be attained by men, but because Plato conceives this supreme Good as the One, i.e. a formal cause, not as an efficient cause of the cosmic order. For Aristotle the supreme good, i.e. the divinity, is not the end of human actions, but he is the object, among the other first causes, of the wisdom, which is the true end of the wise man.
36. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Sylvain Delcomminette Platon et Aristote sur le bien en soi
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In this paper, I examine Plato’s and Aristotle’s contrasted treatment of the “Good itself ” and its relation to the human good. Contrary to a common view, Aristotle does not attack the very concept of a Good itself, but rather Plato’s interpretation of it as the Idea of the Good. One of his central criticisms is that such an Idea would have no practical use. By an analysis of the Philebus, I try to show why and how this Idea does have such a use in Plato, but in a way which could not satisfy his pupil, because for Aristotle, the Good itself must be an ultimate end which must have a direct efficiency on the whole world, without any need of the mediation of knowledge. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle shows that such an end can be identified with a purely active intelligence, which he names God. Although this Good itself is absolutely necessary and thus cannot be a “practical good” in Aristotle’s terms, its contemplation by human intelligence (i.e. what Aristotle calls sophia) can be, because it is for its part contingent. I conclude in assessing the main consequences of Plato’s and Aristotle’s different views of the Good itself on their philosophy as a whole.
37. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Charlotte Murgier Aristote critique de Platon sur le bien pratique
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This paper aims at investigating Aristotle’s criticism of Plato on the practical good. It confronts the practical functions attributed to the Idea of the good in Plato’s Republic to Aristotle’s objections against this Idea in the Ethics, objections that point out its practical inefficiency. Then I turn to Aristotle’s own elaboration of the practical good, showing how indebted it is to the treatment of the human good in the Philebus. This leads to assess how and how far Aristotle distances himself from Plato’s views on the practical good.
38. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Francesca Alesse La notion du bien chez Aristote, Métaphysique VII 6. Quelques remarques
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The question I deal with is Aristotle’s treatment of agathon in Metaphysics VII 6, as compared to the treatment of the same notion in famous passages from Ethics (EE 1217b26 ff. ; EN 1096a19 ff.) and Topics (107a5 ff.). In these latter agathon is considered as homonymous in that it assumes as many meanings as the categories, whereas in Metaphysics VII 6 (1031a29‑b14) Aristotle employes the example of agathon in order to examine the relationship between every reality in itself and its essence. In this context Aristotle uses the notion of “good in itself ”, as an example of ἕκαστον which should be identical to its essence : as a consequence of such an identity, “good in itself ” shoud be a synonymous notion and have a univocal definition. Is the treatment of agathon in Metaphysics VII 6 opposed to what Aristotle claims in Ethics and Topics ? In my opinion, what is to be pointed out is not a contradiction, but a difference in perspective, which has rarely been emphasised. My aim is to analyse the possible reasons for this difference in perspective.
39. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Fabienne Baghdassarian Principe du bien et principe du mal chez Aristote
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This paper deals with Aristotle’s criticism of a metaphysical principle of evil. On several occasions in the Metaphysics, Aristotle notes that some of his predecessors, e.g. Empedocles and Plato at least, have been forced to admit the existence of a principle of evil, for the very same reasons that led them to define the good as a principle. Needless to say Aristotle too admits that the good belongs to the range of principles, but he obviously does not think he is committed to the same position concerning evil. This article tries to determine why it can legitimately be so, i.e. on which grounds Aristotle’s conception of the good as a principle can save him from having to make room for its contrary too among the principles. In the first part of this paper, I define the two main logical rules which, according to Aristotle, led Empedocles and Plato to admit the evil among the principles : the rule of homogeneity between a principle and its effect, and the rule of contrary principles. In the two following parts, I study how Aristotle manages to avoid the undesirable consequences of these logical rules : first, by providing a definition of an absolutely first principle which has no contrary ; second, by providing a new definition of the relation of contrariety itself, thanks to which the hypothesis of a principle of evil turns to be both useless and contradictory.
40. Chôra: Volume > 15/16
Silvia Fazzo L’epilogo del libro Lambda della Metafisica di Aristotele : il Bene come principio
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Not many texts from the Greek classical literature focus on the nature of the Good more closely than Aristotle’ Metaphysics Lambda 10. The first section raises the question to be answered henceforth : is the Good to be conceived as anything separated or does it intrinsically belong to the universe, as a way of being ? And if both ways, how so, and which way first, and why ?According to a current reading, which is well established in the commentary tradition, Aristotle’s Good comes, first of all, as a separate being, namely God ; as a consequence, it also belongs to every kind of being. My aim is to show that this view, though playing a significant role in late Aristotelian scholastics, is scarcely supported in Aristotle’s text. In fact, it is unlikely to grasp whatever Aristotle has been willing to say in this final chapter of book Lambda, which brings to conclusion his overall theory about the principles of the world.