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Displaying: 21-33 of 33 documents


21. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Ana Gavran Miloš Epicurus on the Origin and Formation of Preconceptions
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The paper deals with one of the key notions in Epicurean epistemology, preconception. Together with perceptions, preconceptions are the second criterion of truth. The aim of the paper is to explore their epistemological status on the basis of their origin and formation. I argue that the process of formation of preconception is purely empirical, since they are produced through repeated perceptions of individual instances of a particular type of thing. Given the way they are formed, I claim that preconceptions are the means by which we recognize types of object and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ account of how we gain knowledge of things. Exactly this gives them a distinctive criterial role, since preconceptions––unlike perceptions––enable us to engage in the process of interpretation of perceptual content.
22. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Josip Talanga Doubt and Dogmatism in Cicero
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In his numerous philosophical writings Cicero mostly adapted contemporary Greek sources, but occasionally he took up certain positions of his own. His propensity to scepticism in epistemology and dogmatism in ethics and political philosophy appears to be a further development of the model set forth by Carneades. Though Cicero was influenced by both Antiochus of Ascalon and Philo of Larissa—both of them claimed the heritage of the Platonic Academy—he owed a life-long allegiance to the Academic tradition of Carneades. Very often we are faced with a poor state of his own argument. But it seems to me very likely that in main questions his position was consistent throughout his life, and I consider his own philosophy as the beginning of the rising Middle Platonism.
23. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
ISTVÁN M. BODNÁR Sôzein ta phainomena: Some Semantic Considerations
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Saving the appearances (sôzein ta phainomena) often features as a programmatic description of the aim and objective of ancient astronomical theory. The paper, after an expository section, discusses some earlier proposals for what such a programme presupposes. After this, through a survey of the usage in Plato and Aristotle of some key terms—among them the verb sôzein—describing the relationship of an account to what it is an account of, submits that the phrase in this semantic framework could express the crucial property of an account that it is faithful to the phenomena, and it does not overrule or discard them.
articles
24. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Fritz J. McDonald Why Language Exists: Stating the Obvious
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There are words. There are sentences. There are languages. Commonsense linguistic realism is the conjunction of the three preceding claims. Linguists and philosophers including Noam Chomsky (1986, 2000), Georges Rey (2006, 2008), and Barry C. Smith (2006) have presented skeptical doubts regarding the existence of linguistic entities. These doubts provide no good reason to deny commonsense linguistic realism. Some skeptical doubts are in fact not directed at the metaphysical thesis of commonsense linguistic realism but rather only at non-metaphysical methodological concerns. In some instances, linguistic antirealists make their case by foisting upon the realist assumptions that she need not hold regarding the nature of linguistic entities. Furthermore, those who have denied the existence of linguistic entities have not themselves presented an alternative account of words, sentences, or languages that is coherentor defensible. I present an elaboration and defense of commonsense linguistic realism as a metaphysical thesis, with the aim of deflating concerns that have arisen about the existence of language.
25. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Matjaž Ezgeta From the Streets to the White House: The Influence of Social Factors on Interspeaker Variation in African-American Vernacular English
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Most linguists have defined African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) as a regular and systematic form of vernacular language which contains distinctive grammatical and phonological features. AAVE is considered a social dialect or a non-standard variety of American English, which is spoken by the majority of African Americans. This article explores variability of the selected AAVE features in the interviews with ten African-American public figures, ranging from Hip Hop artists and blues musicians (Redman, Chuck D, Prodigy, MC Lyte, B.B. King) to talk show hosts (Oprah Winfrey), from Hollywood actresses (Queen Latifah,Whoopi Goldberg) to former government officials (Colin Powell) and residents of the White House (Michelle Obama). The selected features of AAVE treated in this study include the absence of copula, the third person singular –s absence, the possessive –s absence, the plural –s absence, and the generalization of is and was to plural and second person pronouns.We consider the influence of social parameters (i.e., gender, age, social status, ethnicity, and affiliation with Hip Hop culture) on the degree of speech formality within a frame of interspeaker variation by examining the correlation between the frequencies of AAVE features and social factors of individual interviewees. The frequencies of individual AAVE variants are calculated into percentages which represent the levels of vernacular usage of each interviewee. Our results are then compared with the outcomes of previous sociolinguistic findings on external factors that have been reported to affect the degree of linguistic formality in a spoken discourse.
26. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
J. Jocelyn Trueblood Moral “Ought”-Judgments and “Morally Ought”-Judgments
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In this paper I distinguish moral “ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”- judgments that qualify as moral judgments, from “morally ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”-judgments whose “ought” is either prefaced (or followed) by the word “morally” or construable as so prefaced. Specifically, I argue that the former class of judgments is wider than the second. (As I show in section 3, this is not to argue for the already familiar distinction, or putative distinction, between a broad and a narrow sense of “moral.”) I also speculate as to why the distinction exists, and, more important, show that it has important consequences. For instance, it undermines a tempting argument for moral subjectivism.
27. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Glen Hoffmann Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions
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On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justifi ed, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
28. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Justin Marquis Contra Leiter’s Anti-Skeptical Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism
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29. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Søren Flinch Midtgaard On the Scope of Justice: In Defence of the Political Conception
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The paper defends the so-called political conception of the scope of justice proposed by Thomas Nagel. The argument has three stages: (a) I argue that A. J. Julius’ influential criticism of the political conception can be answered. Pace Julius, actual and (relevant) hypothetical cases of state coercion do in fact involve a claim to the effect that people have a duty to obey, so the problem of justice does arise, according to Nagel’s criterion, in the critical cases scrutinised by Julius. Hence the ‘perverseness’ objection lapses. (b) I argue, against other critics of Nagel’s view, that in central instances of international coercion such as immigration control people are not asked to accept the ongoing coercion. Consequently, the problem of justice does not, on Thomas Nagel’s view, arise internationally. Furthermore, to the extent that political authority is exercised internationally, it does not give rise to justificatory burdens involving principles of distributive justice.(c) I relate the notion of authority to other aspects of the political conception, including responsibility, and argue that together they constitute an attractive alternative to an influential allocative conception of justice.
book reviews
30. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Iris Vidmar David Davies, Philosophy of the Performing Arts
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31. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Laurynas Adomaitis Richard Gaskin: The Unity of the Proposition
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32. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Julija Perhat Saunders, W. K. (2011), Degradation: What the History of Obscenity Tells Us about Hate Speech
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33. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Viktor Ivanković G. A. Cohen: Socijalizam – zašto ne? (Why not socialism?)
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