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panel discussion
21. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Olga B. Koshovets, Igor E. Frolov Ольга Борисовна Кошовец
Brave New World: On Science Transformation Into Technoscience
«Прекрасный новый мир»

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The article focuses on the crucial changes that science as an established social institution and an epistemological enterprise is undergoing, the key one is the loss of its monopoly on the production of socially useful knowledge and gradual transformation into something new, which, due to institutional and cultural reasons, we continue to call ‘science’. We suppose that the most appropriate conceptualization of the new phenomenon, which is replacing science as an institution, is “technoscience”, since the technical component in scientific practices has now taken a dominant position and technology production has become more important than fundamental knowledge. Technoscience has at least two sources: 1) capitalization of scientific activity that has led to classical science has been replaced with technoscience developing on first-priority funded applied research; 2) theorization and autonomy of the techno sphere, which have resulted in instrumentalization of all levels of knowledge production as well as in technological / symbolic construction of reality and tangled ontology of technoscientific objects. We discuss both of these sources, with particular attention being paid to such trends as epistemic strategies transformation, modified reality, social sciences and humanities conformation to technoscience norms, and knowledge bearers egalitarianization. A crucial transformation of both science itself and its position in society breaks inevitably a demarcation line that separates scientific knowledge from other types of knowledge while promotes the replacement of scientific theory with discourses. Apparently, in “technoscience” an ethos of its own is being formed, where interaction with the “external environment” (with other social spheres) is crucial. In this context, scientific activity is becoming more and more transepistemic, transinstitutional practice, and accordingly ceases to be guided by the classical scientific ethos determined by the goals and objectives of academic community itself.
22. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Taras A. Varkhotov Тарас Александрович Вархотов
Technoscience – Science Without Scientists?
Технонаука – наука без ученых?

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The article outlines a look at technoscience or mode 2 as a results of the development of statistics as a mathematical method and an instrument of social management, as well as the deprofessionalization of science due to the overproduction of specialists and the introduction of design forms of work into the practice of the scientific community. A decrease of the scientists’ expert status is noted, and an assessment is given of the prospects for the complete degeneration of classical science into the technoscience.
23. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Stanislav M. Gavrilenko Станислав Михайлович Гавриленко
Technoscience, Biopolitics and Biobanking
Технонаука, биополитика и биобанкинг

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The author considers two additions to analysis of technoscience, suggested by Olga Koshovets and Igor Frolov. First, technoscience is not just regime of knowledge production, which brings into play enormous technological and organizational resources, but is a regime, regulated by mandatory requirement to produce knowledge, which should be transformed into endowed with market value goods and services (technoobjects). Second, technoscience is an ever-faster colonization of natural and social worlds by technoobjects. In the author's view, the main problem with technoscience is not to hold the next round of conceptual clarification and theoretical reorganization of previous distinctions (nature/society, basic science/applied science, scientific fact/technoobject, social connections/technological connections) or introduction of new ones. The challenge is how to turn the concrete realization of technoscience into empirical research objects. The complexity of such enterprise is demonstrated in the case of research biobanking, which has become one of exemplary embodiment of technoscience and contemporary mode of biopolitics.
24. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Lada V. Shipovalova Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Technoscience: “Where the Danger Is, Grows the Saving Power Also”
Технонаука: «Где опасность, там вырастает и спасительное»

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The article is a response to the arguments by O.B. Koshovets and I.E. Frolov on the emergence of "technoscience”. Technoscience is opposed by the authors to the classical science characterized by the dominance of the technological component of research and capitalization of knowledge. The article focuses on two tasks. The first one supposes an appeal to the historical origins of technoscience and demonstrates significant relationship between technoscience and classical science. The second one involves the disclosure of contemporary negative trends of technoscience as creating conditions for their own overcoming. In conclusion it associates the work on the autonomy of science with the constructive dialogue between scientific and non-scientific knowledge.
25. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Olga B. Koshovets, Igor E. Frolov Ольга Борисовна Кошовец
Science in Danger, or Technoscience Becomes Dangerous?
Наука в опасности или (техно)наука становится опасной?

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This paper summarizes the discussion on technoscience and its key question whether the phenomenon indicated by this term means a radical transformation of science and its replacement with some new social objectification. Based on the remarks of the discussion participants, we raise questions on mathematical rationality contribution in technoscience development, technical (magical) domination on nature (environment) and man as the leitmotif of the New European culture and the connection of techno-science, financial capital and liberal capitalism.
epistemology and cognition
26. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Lolita B. Makeeva, Mikhail A. Smirnov Лолита Брониславовна Макеева
Conceptual Schemes and Relativism: Donald Davidson’s Critical Arguments
Концептуальные схемы и релятивизм

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The idea of conceptual schemes is one of the most influential and widely used notions in contemporary philosophy. Within the analytic tradition the idea occupies a fundamental position in positivist views as well as in replacing them post-positivist conceptions. Outside the analytic tradition a similar idea is of key importance in structuralist and post-structuralist theories. Despite the broad applicability of the notion of a conceptual scheme, its precise sense is far from being evident in the context of various philosophical trends. Moreover, the well-known American philosopher Donald Davidson's position is that any clear, non-metaphorical meaning cannot be as - cribed to that notion at all – the statement which he tried to substantiate in his famous paper On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme published in 1974.The present paper is aimed, firstly, at outlining the historico-philosophical evolution of the idea of conceptual scheme, concentrating on its development in logical positivism and post-positivist theories of such philosophers as Quine, Sellars, Kuhn, et al., and, secondly, at examining Davidson's criticism of both the idea and the position of conceptual relativism which was raised on its ground, revealing the assumptions which that criticism relies on and which concern relations between language and thought, truth and translation, as well as the role of the scheme-content dualism for empiricism and the place of extensionalism in semantics, etc. Our purpose, on the one hand, is to evaluate the historico-philosophical significance of Davidson's criticism; on the other hand, it is to show that his critical arguments remain to be actual since they shed a new light on the idea of conceptual schemes and allow us to determine their place in tackling the fundamental philosophical question of a relation between reality, thought and language.
language and mind
27. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Maria A. Sekatskaya Мария Александровна Секацкая
Causal Efficiency of Intentional Acts
Каузальная эффективность интенциональных актов

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Willusionists claim that recent developments in psychology and neuroscience demonstrate that consciousness is causally inefficient [Carruthers, 2007; Eagleman, 2012; Wegner, 2002]. In section 1, I show that willusionists provide two types of evidence: first, evidence that we do not always know the causes of our actions; second, evidence that we lack introspective awareness of the causal efficiency of our intentional acts.In section 2, I analyze the first type of evidence. Recent research in the field of social psychology has shown that irrelevant factors affect human behavior. For example, it has been shown that pleasant smells make a person more helpful toward strangers [Baron, 1997], whereas images of eyes that a person sees on a poster reduce the likelihood of cheating [Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006]. I argue that minor influences do not necessarily lead to something more sinister, and the contrary has not been empirically proven so far.In section 3, I analyze the second type of evidence that Daniel Wegner [2002] provides in favor of willusionism. Wegner claims that conscious will is usually understood in one of two ways: (1) «as something that is experienced when we perform an action» [Wegner, 2002, p. 3] or (2) «as a force of mind, a name for the causal link between our minds and our actions» [ibid.]. According to Wegner, it is a conceptual truth that for something to count as an instance of conscious will it must both be (1) felt as voluntary, and (2) causally efficient in bringing about a certain effect. Wegner claims that what satisfies (1) can fail to satisfy (2), and vice versa. The major part of Wegner’s book is the review and analysis of diverse psychological phenomena: automatisms, hypnosis, illusions of control, influence of unconscious factors on human behavior, as well as some neuroscientific data. I briefly review the data provided by Wegner, and come to the conclusion that, although they show that there is a double dissociation between consciously willed processes and the acts that are supposedly caused by these processes, they do not justify further conclusions made by Wegner.According to Wegner, the feeling of conscious will is just an indicator of unconscious processes which, in fact, cause our behavior. I argue that the data considered by Wegner do not provide direct information about the neuronal processes that underlie conscious intentional processes. Moreover, double dissociation can only show that one process neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of another process. It cannot show that one process is not among the causes leading to another process.In section 4, I argue that the experimental data discussed in the article are important for philosophical theories of intentionality.
28. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Vadim M. Rozin Вадим Маркович Розин
The Basic Ideas for Constructing Methodological Concept of Sociality
Основные идеи построения методологической концепции социальности

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The article discusses the crisis situation in sociology, and in connection with this, ideas are outlined aimed at constructing a methodological concept of sociality. It is noted that the crisis in sociology takes place due to the transition of sociologists to interdisciplinary research. It seems that such an interdisciplinary turn is unsafe for sociology as a scientific discipline, primarily in terms of understanding the subject and the integrity of the reality being studied. Analyzing the crisis in sociology, the author considers himself as methodologist and culturologist, setting the task to implement cultural, historical and phenomenological approaches in the social sciences. In this regard, the methodological, cultural, historical and phenomenological features of the study are characterized. They are compared with sociological ones. The sociological approach is distinguished by four characteristics: 1) assessment of sociality as well as an indication of the type of social action aimed at changing or optimizing sociality, 2) description of the mass behavior of people and the social order that determines this behavior, 3) attitude toward the study of sociality and a description of “social nature”, 4) consideration of sociality only within the framework of the modern culture (this approach is contrasted with the cultural-historical interpretation of sociality). The author agrees with these characteristics, although believes that they need to be problematized. He considers the current understandings of justice and social nature and concludes that sociality is not equal to itself, it is rather a historically determined phenomenon. In conclusion, the author outlines the stages of research and the construction of a methodological concept of sociality. The author believes since the problematization and case studies have already been carried out, the next step is the cultural and historical reconstruction of the main types of sociality (mainly, the European types).
case-studies – science studies
29. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Ekaterina V. Vostrikova, Petr S. Kusliy Екатерина Васильевна Вострикова
Language as a Dynamic System: the Legacy of W. von Humbodlt and Contemporary Linguistics
Язык как динамическая система

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In this article, we examine the key ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt about language and their relevance to the contemporary research in the field of linguistics. In his works, N. Chomsky describes Humboldt as a key predecessor of the generative approach. The authors discuss the concrete aspects of Humboldt’s influence on generative linguistics drawing special attention to his notion of Form. The authors also observe that Humboldt’s works also contain statements about the deep differences that exist between different languages, as well as statements that different languages can form different pictures of the world. These ideas resonate with philosophical ideas about linguistic relativity (the famous Sapir – Whorf hypothesis), which are incompatible with generative linguistics. The authors try to reconcile an apparent contradiction by appealing to two different perspectives on language that they call the dynamic and the static one. They provide arguments in favor of the former and explore existing arguments against the later, which is associated with the aforementioned hypothesis. The authors conclude by pointing out that Humboldt’s legacy has so many facets that it introduces to incompatible views on language each of which had a serious impact on the studies of language in the 20th century.
30. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Elena E. Chebotareva Елена Эдуардовна Чеботарева
Russian Engineering in the Context of Philosophical and Sociological Studies: Dramas and Phantoms
Российская инженерия в контексте философских и социологических исследований

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This article explores the problems of Russian engineering in the context of the world studies in philosophy of engineering. Firstly, the author highlights the main questions and topics of the modern philosophy of engineering: what engineering is, the “magic” and “human-oriented” nature of technologies, and models of engineering ethics. Secondly, the article presents a specific mythological narrative of domestic engineers (“the theory of a missed chance”) and shows the inclusion of this “theory” in alternate historical fiction. Thirdly, the article identifies the reasons for emergence of such mythology in the engineering environment. The author highlights a historical context of “missed chances” for the turning of technical inventions into innovations and claims that the country's engineering potential was not used to a full extent. For greater objectivity, the article uses the works both of foreign and domestic researchers. In addition, the author raised a question about the relatedness of the concepts of engineer and innovation. Finally, the article gives an answer to the question about the essence of the engineer; the author believes that the engineering is primarily an environment, close to the human life world, understanding and maintaining the links between science and technology, providing the necessary channels for transforming inventions into innovations, i.e. commercially realized technologies. The given definition demonstrates the prospects for the development of socio-humanitarian research in the field of engineering.
interdisciplinary studies
31. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Dimitri A. Bayuk, Olga B. Fedorova Дмитрий Александрович Баюк
G.W. Leibniz: Sign and the Problem of Expression
Знак и проблема выражения у Лейбница

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The disciplinary differentiation of sciences attracted Leibniz’s attention for a long period of time. From nowadays prospects it looks very well grounded as soon as in Leibniz’s manuscripts a modern scholar finds clue ideas of any research field which would tempt him to consider Leibniz as one of the founders of this particular discipline. We argue that this is possible only in retrospection and would significantly distort the essence of Leibniz’s epistemology. Our approach implies, in contrary, the investigation of the Leibniz doctrine of signs on the background of the related philosophical problem, that of expression. The choice of semiotics is justified by the fact that it took a central place in his theoretical constructions, both those of natural sciences and of philosophy. In Leibniz system of knowledge the concept of notes (notae) and sings (signa) served a theoretical foundation of his most important and long-life aspiration to build up practical science of universal characteristics (characteristica universalis). In his eyes this practical science was the science of sciences (Scientia scientiarum), and we can consider it as the matrix for all possible scientific knowledge.
32. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Vadim V. Vasilyev Вадим Валерьевич Васильев
David Hume’s Epistemology and Its Contemporary Importance
Эпистемология Дэвида Юма и ее современное значение

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The paper is about some epistemological ideas of David Hume. At first, I give a review of his most influential epistemological conceptions: his exposition of the problem of induction in the context of his investigation of the nature of empirical reasonings, his analysis of epistemic status of the principle of causation, and his skeptical arguments concerning existence of external world and demonstrative knowledge. Then I discuss those Hume’s epistemological ideas which, as I believe, are usually not rightly understood in literature about Hume’s philosophy. They are connected to his theory of probabilistic reasonings. It is quite common to contrast his theory with approach of Thomas Bayes, but I try to show that in reality Hume’s theory is in perfect agreement with the Bayes’ theorem. In order to do this I interpret a topic of probability of our belief in testimonies of miracles, which Hume discusses, in terms of Bayes’ theorem: P(miracle/testimony) = P(testimony/miracle) x P(miracle) // P(testimony). According to this interpretation a probability of veracity of testimony of a miracle diminishes with diminishing of probability of miracles and diminishes when probability of testimonies increases. That’s very Hume’s position. At the end of the paper I discuss Hume’s insights on non-rational aspects of human cognition, which had anticipated some recent developments in cognitive psychology. In this context I also consider a possibility of justification of our principles of empirical cognition in Hume’s epistemology. I argue that Hume gave a kind of justification of them after all in terms of final causes, and quite legitimate.
33. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Igor S. Dmitriev Игорь Сергеевич Дмитриев
The Gay Science of Francis Bacon
Веселая наука Фрэнсиса Бэкона

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The article is the study of some aspects of the methodology of scientific knowledge that F. Bacon addressed in his treatise “New Organon” (1620) and in other works in one way or another related to his work on the project of the Instauratio Magna Scientiarum. The article focuses on the following three questions: Bacon’s attitude to Aristotle’s legacy, the context of Bacon’s doctrine of idols and the reasons for the English philosopher to choose a fragmented (aphoristic) form of presentation of his ideas in the “New Organon” and in some other works. Based on an analysis of Bacon’s works related to the above project, it was shown that his statements about Aristotle and his philosophy were differentiated depending on whether the corresponding text was intended for printing or served as a working draft. In the latter case, the estimates of Aristotle by Bacon were more stringent. Baconian criticism of Aristotelianism was formed in the context of the development by the English philosopher of the doctrine of the idols of knowledge. The article shows that developing this doctrine, Bacon proceeded from the idea of mass insanity of the human race (insania publica), which has ancient roots and was shared by a number of contemporaries of F. Bacon. At the same time, the latter considered Aristotle as the creator of “a kind of art of insanity (artemque quondam insaniae componere)”. As a cure for “insania universalis”, Bacon proposed a new method (the “new organon”) of cognition, and the presentation of his ideas in the form of separate, but conceptually related aphorisms, as a way of activating the reader’s thought process.
new trends
34. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 57 > Issue: 1
Evgeniy N. Blinov Евгений Николаевич Блинов
Deciphering Hume: Life, Times and Heritage of the Reformer of Metaphysics
Разгадывая Юма

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The present article analyzes an ambitious attempt to revisit and reevaluate Hume’s metaphysical project in the early 21th century, proposed by Vadim Vasilyev. His claim is to demonstrate that the problems raised by the author of Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry concerning Human Understanding are far from being completely resolved and could provide us some valuable hints into the problems of contemporary analytical metaphysics. Against a widespread consensus that the evolution in Hume’s had been insignificant, Vasilyev maintains that his philosophical project underwent crucial transformations. He provides evidence of a gradual shift from a radical empiricism to a moderate rationalism by re-examining some classical problems of Hume’s studies and providing a critical analysis of the problems of causality and personal identity. This review provides some arguments for and against Vasilyev’s claims.
35. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Irina A. Gerasimova Ирина Алексеевна Герасимова
Uncertainty in Cognition and Social Practices
Неопределенность в познании и в социальных практиках

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The article discusses the theoretical status of the category of uncertainty. Instead of the classical definitions of uncertainty as an ontological or epistemological concept, a composite theoretical construct is proposed. In classical science, the objectivist representation of the subject of research was preferred. With the nonclassical type of rationality, there rises problem of including subjective elements in a theoretical description. Attention to subject-subject-object methodologies is increasing due to the complication of communicative interactions in science and society in the digital era. One of the consequences of active innovative projective activity on a planetary scale and increasing risks is the perception in the public mind of uncertainty as a challenge. The author considers it appropriate to study the uncertainty-certainty as a paired category. The category of uncertainty was considered in philosophy, science, and management. The status of uncertainty as infinity and formlessness was recognized by Greek natural philosophers. Classical science developed the methodology of knowing the “infinite limit” through the construction of theoretical schemes (forms) and types of empirical testing. The paradox served as a means of destroying dogmatic schemes. In the context of increasingly complex communications in science, the importance of cognitive problems in the study of collective thinking and the personal beginning of creativity is increasing. Modern economic positivism is distinguished by its rejection of objective uncertainty, and the installation of the ability to efficiently manage exclusively accurate calculations is brought to extremes.
panel discussion
36. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Svetlana V. Shibarshina Светлана Викторовна Шибаршина
Social Networks for Researchers on the Internet: A New Sociality?
Социальные сети для ученых

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This article considers the digital transformations of scientific communication focusing on social networks for researchers. The author argues that such communities possess certain prospects for turning into a kind of new sociality. She highlights and critically evaluates the major features of interactions on such platforms, including: a network nature; communication “here-and-now”; mobility of ideas, methods, approaches, and solutions; open access to information and its evaluation; blurring the boundaries of previously stable social ties and relations, and overcoming cultural barriers. She argues that social networks for researchers, potentially enabling Merton’s communalism as an ethical norm and partly externalizing dispersed knowledge, can become a new sociality for those researchers who possess fewer opportunities for career fulfillment in offline mode.
37. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Ilya T. Kasavin Илья Теодорович Касавин
The Gift Illusion: How Networks Turn Selfless Knowledge Sharing into Obsessive Crowdsourcing
Иллюзия дарения

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The epitome of modern scientific infrastructure and distributed knowledge systems is scientific social networks (NSS). Their number, as well as the number of their users, is constantly growing and reaches millions. They are in demand, and, therefore, perform significant social functions. It is still unclear what their own nature is, what their functions are and how they perform and, finally, what are the consequences of their integration with the social institute of science. Along with the obvious advantages, the NSS creates clear cultural dissonances and challenges that change the usual ways of communication. There is already enough evidence that the NSS not only bring about positive change, but also face rejection. Science policy, the scientist's moral code, the scientific citation and evaluation systems are all affected by the activities of the NSS and become an important subject matter of science and technology studies (STS). This text is a response to the article “Social Networks for Researchers on the Internet: A New Sociality?” by S.V. Shibarshina.
38. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Evgeny V. Maslanov Евгений Валерьевич Масланов
Do Scientists Need Social Networks for Scientists?
Нужны ли социальные сети для ученых ученым?

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The article analyzes the functioning of social networks for scientists on the Internet. The Internet has emerged as a social network for scientists. Then its development led to the formation of various network segments not related to scientific knowledge. It was based on the normative ideal of science. In the process of development, the Internet began to unite not only scientists. The normative ideal began to penetrate into network segments that were not directly associated to the activities of scientists. The development of the network has led to the formation of special social networks for scientists. However, as shown in the paper, such networks are not able to serve the basis either for the solidarity of scientists, or the formation of a new sociality of scientists, since the development of science has led to the formation of studies that cannot be represented in such networks. Scientists are better use general, not specialized, Internet social networks. In such communicative spaces, they can better deal with the tasks related to the communications with other social actors.
39. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Svetlana V. Shibarshina Светлана Викторовна Шибаршина
Why Social Networks for Researchers Still Matter
Почему социальные сети для ученых все-таки важны

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The paper is a short reply to the comments given on the paper ‘Social Networks for Researchers on the Internet: A New Sociality?’. The author emphasizes some essential differences of such communities from the traditional forms of scientific communication. Agreeing with the argument about the danger that social networks potentially carry, she associates it with the general features of the Internet space. In conclusion, it is accentuated that, despite their shortcomings, social networks offer a kind of new sociality based on the idea of visibility.
epistemology and cognition
40. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 56 > Issue: 4
Angelina V. Baeva Ангелина Викторовна Баева
Historization of Scientific Observation in Modern Scientific Researches
Историзация научного наблюдения в современных исследованиях науки

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This article is devoted to historization of scientific practices as one of the central points in problem field of modern science studies. The subject of our article is scientific observation as one of the epistemic practices. Historization of scientific observation in modern scientific studies is possible, because of material practices and social relations begin to problematize in the scientific field. Science is no longer characterized only by a propositional order of representations. It is an assemblage of connections and relations between different agents and network of things, people and practices. This network is complexly arranged and branched, but in the same time it is coordinated in a certain optics and it is producing the visual closure to constructed object. This new optics, that makes visible the material and routine practices, puts in a new way the task to understand, how to work with heterogeneous and historically changeable field of practices and different “ways to do science”. There is a rethinking of the self-evident epistemic categories and particularly scientific observation. As an epistemic genre and scientific practice observation begins to take shape relatively late – only in the XVII century, when there is a complication and multiplication of practices of production of the visual images, that are making concrete from abstract and visible from invisible. To historicize scientific observation is to show how it has become a self-evident epistemic category and an integral scientific function. Scientific observation can be historicized as a set of practices that emerged and spread throughout a particular historical period, on the one hand, as practices of production, coordination, presentation and description of observational data. And on the other hand, it can be historicized as practices of production of “scientific self” as instances of observation. This article attempts to show that observation as a practice and as historically varied object of science is characterized, on the one hand, by the production of “that is visible” and, on the other hand, by “scientific self”.