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21. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Vladimir N. Porus
К юбилею В.Н. Поруса

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22. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 4
Vladimir P. Filatov
К 70-летию В.П. Филатова

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23. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Vladimir P. Filatov В.П. Филатов
Problems of Cognition in Karl Marx’s Works
Проблемы познания в работах Карла Маркса

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200 years have passed since the birth of Karl Marx, a century and a half since the publication of the first volume of “Capital”. The theory of Marx had a great impact on the development of socio-political thought and the course of history, his legacy remains rel­evant today for philosophy and a whole range of specific sciences. Marx’s ideas were repeatedly reviewed, subjected to reassess­ment, criticized and refuted, but they resisted all attempts to send them to the intellectual past. The central place in Marx’s works is occupied by a critical analysis of capitalist society, its history and prospects for development. However, Marx made a significant contribution to the theory of knowledge, to the analysis of the social nature of consciousness and knowledge. In this regard, his ideas attracted and continue to attract many researchers today. The article considers the assessments of Marx as a thinker and sci­entist, his social analysis of science and technology, the influence of his ideas on the development of Russian psychology.
panel discussion
24. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
William T. Lynch Уильям Линч
Imre Lakatos and the Inexhaustible Atom: The Hidden Marxist Roots of History and Philosophy of Science
Имре Лакатос и «неисчерпаемый атом»

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Recent work on Imre Lakatos’s missing Hungarian dissertation on the historical sociology of science sheds new light on his mature philosophy of science. Remembered primarily as an “internalist” defender of the autonomy of science, and a Cold Warrior in poli­tics, commentators have mistaken his contribution as primarily a rearguard action against the followers of Thomas Kuhn and the “externalists” influenced by Boris Hessen. It comes as a surprise, then, to find that he developed and retained a fully general soci­ology of scientific knowledge, with Marxist roots that articulated Lenin’s “inexhaustible atom.” He carried forward this emphasis on the fallible, changing, and incomplete nature of our engagement with the natural world by a dialectical account of how research programs advance and recede historically. In his effort to develop a synthesis of Popper and Kuhn, and via his engagement with Paul Feyerabend, he continued to develop a distinctly dialectical ap­proach to science.
25. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Vladimir N. Porus Владимир Натанович Порус
What do the Marxist “Dialectics of Cognition” and Lakatos’s “Sophisticated Falsificationism” Have in Common?
Что общего между марксистской «диалектикой познания» и «утонченным фальсификационизмом» Лакатоса?

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The article shows that Marxist dialectics and the social philosophy of science, whose influence was obvious in Imre Lakatos’s early philosophical experiments, underwent substantial reinterpretation during the mature period of his creative activity. Being implicit heuristic sources of his “sophisticated falsificationism” or methodology of scientific research programs, they take on a conceptual form in which they lose the “excess” of authentic contents. Therefore, the philosophical views of “mature Lakatos” may be called close to the Marxist philosophy of science only with many important reservations and specifications.
26. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Ilya T. Kasavin Илья Теодорович Касавин
Uniting the Cognitive and the Social: Lakatos Unmasked?
Объединяя когнитивное и социальное

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The proposed comment to the paper by W. Lynch provides another indirect argument in favor of the thesis about Lakatos’s hidden Marxist roots. The methodology of research programmes and the sociology of scientific knowledge (social epistemology) share a common object of criticism, and a constant opponent. Lakatos calls him the naïve falsificationist while a social epistemologist dubs him a metaphysical realist, or fact-objectivist. Both criticized the non-critical trust in scientific theories and facts as well as their reification though using different means: the internal dialectic of science’s development and the socio-communicative interpretation of scientific knowledge. Still, the differences between them like the differences between Lakatos’s and Feyerabend’s approaches are two ways of expressing the similar position based on acceptance of some non-dogmatic Marxist ideas.
27. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Lada V. Shipovalova Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Contemporary Science Studies With or Without Hidden Marxist Roots?
Есть ли у современных исследований науки скрытые марксистские корни?

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This article describes the two possible consequences of referring to the Marxist roots of modern research in science to which V. Lynch puts attention. First, referring to various Marxist viewpoints, whether they put an emphasis on reflecting reality or on its social construction process, can contribute to current discussions concerning the status of representation in science. Second, the Marxist legitimization of scientific theory competition protects from judgmental relativism in science that may arise in case of the recognition of their proliferation. Moreover, the appeal to the roots reveals the intersections between various scientific studies, and therefore serves as a condition for their possible constructive interaction.
28. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Svetlana V. Shibarshina Светлана Викторовна Шибаршина
On Some Conceptual Background of Imre Lakatos’ Thought
О некоторых концептуальных основаниях идей Имре Лакатоса

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This paper comments on some problems accentuated in William T. Lynch’s work on the Marxist roots of Imre Lakatos’ history and philosophy of science. This is quite a significant and still debatable issue relating to the adequate interpretations of Imre Lakatos’ complete intellectual growth. Accordingly, any further exploration of the “deep structures” of his conceptual background may help gain a better understanding of his legacy. In this comment, I make a brief review of the studies on the pre-English roots of Lakatos’ theoretical schemes.
29. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
William T. Lynch Уильям Линч
The Challenge to Consensus: The Relevance of the Lakatos-Feyerabend Debate for Contemporary Science and Technology Studies
Консенсус под угрозой: о значении дискуссии Лакатоса и Фейерабенда для современных исследований науки и техники

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Responding to comments on “Imre Lakatos and the Inexhaustible Atom: The Hidden Marxist Roots of History and Philosophy of Science,” an argument is made for reviving a missed opportunity for integrating sociological and normative approaches to science. Lakatos’ mature philosophy of science, though jettisoning a political commitment to Marxism, retains a dialectical approach developed during his Hungarian career. Through his carefully crafted debate with Feyerabend, Lakatos continued to promote a dialectical approach that offers a useful model for integrating the history of science and normative assessments focused on the viability of approaches that challenge dominant perspectives.
epistemology and cognition
30. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Tom Rockmore Том Рокмор
Is Marx a Materialist?
Материалист ли Маркс?

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This paper examines the distinction between materialism (or realism) and idealism, which to the best of my knowledge all forms of Marxism regard as central to Marx as well as to Marxism. Materialism comes into ancient philosophy as a philosophical approach to philosophy of nature, which later becomes a philosophical alternative to idealism, and still later becomes a Marxist view of an extra-philosophical, scientific approach supposedly illustrated by Marx. The paper will review Marxist approaches to materialism in Marxism-Leninism and then in classical Marxism before turning to Marx, with special attention to the Paris Manuscripts. I will suggest that if “materialism” is understood in a standard manner as referring to the priority of matter as the main or even the sole explanatory element, then Marx’s alleged materialism is no more than a Marxist myth. I will further suggest that Marx is a materialist in another, non-standard sense of the term as concerns the focus on concrete, social problems.