Cover of Logos & Episteme
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discussion notes/debate
21. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Andy Mueller Pragmatic or Pascalian Encroachment?: A Problem for Schroeder's Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment
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I argue against Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder's explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for an objectionable form of Pascalian encroachment or it fails to be a fully general explanation of pragmatic encroachment.
22. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
John N. Williams Still Stuck on the Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke
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Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. In their latest defence of the truth-tracking theories, “Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock,” Fred Adams, John A. Barker and Murray Clarke try again to defend Nozick’s and Fred Dretske’s early analysis of propositional knowledge against Backward Clock. They allege failure of truth-adherence, mistakes on my part about methods, and appeal to charity, ‘equivocation,’ reliable methods and unfair internalism. I argue that these objections all fail. They are still stuck with the fact that the tracking theories fall to Backward Clock, an even more useful test case for other analyses of knowledge than might have first appeared.
reviews
23. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Ioan Alexandru Tofan Philosophie der Kultur- und Wissensformen. Ernst Cassirer neu lesen
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24. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Notes on the Contributors
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25. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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26. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 2
Notes to Contributors
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research articles
27. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Guy Axtell Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice: Philosophical Situationism and the Vicious Minds Hypothesis
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This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also provides a response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ ‘vicious minds’ thesis, and their ‘tradeoff problem’ for virtue theories. A genuine convergence between virtue epistemology and dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may demand new and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and Autonomous virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to epistemic agents).
28. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Umut Baysan A New Response to the New Evil Demon Problem
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The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for this conclusion by making some alterations in the formulation of reliabilism, I argue that, as far as the said problem is concerned, such alterations are redundant. No reliabilist should fear the demon.
29. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
John Biro Non-Pickwickian Belief and ‘the Gettier Problem’
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That in Gettier's alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier's protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If they would not, the examples are not counter-examples to the traditional analysis. I go on to discuss a number of examples inspired by Gettier's and argue that they, too, fail to be counter-examples either for reasons similar to those I have urged or because it is not clear that their subject does not know.
30. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Olga Ramírez Calle Tracing the Territory: A Unitary Foundationalist Account
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The paper offers an integrative interpretation of the different lines of thought Wittgenstein was inspecting in On Certainty and what he might have been looking for through them. It suggests that we may have been focusing our attention too strongly in the wrong place and comes to a new conclusion about where the real import of these reflections lies. This leads to an answer to the initially posed question of foundationalism that revises the way in which there can be said to be a grounding intention in On Certainty.
discussion notes/debate
31. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Murray Clarke, Fred Adams, John A. Barker Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock
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In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
32. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Jonathan L. Kvanvig Reply to Simion
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Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining the difference in a way that keeps it from undermining the knowledge norm. The explanation she offers is in terms of a distinction between doing something that is wrong and doing something that is blameworthy. I respond here by defending the distinction and questioning the explanation she gives of it.
33. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Kevin McCain Undaunted Explanationism
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Explanationism is a plausible view of epistemic justification according to which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations. Despite its plausibility, explanationism is not without its critics. In a recent issue of this journal T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have charged that explanationism fails to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. In this article I examine Byerly and Martin’s arguments and explain where they go wrong.
34. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Moti Mizrahi Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins
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In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in such cases contain ambiguous designators. Atkins denies that Gettier’s original cases contain ambiguous designators and offers his intuition that the subjects in Gettier’s original cases do not know. I argue that his reply amounts to mere intuition mongering and I explain why Gettier cases, even Atkins’ revised version of Gettier’s Case I, still contain ambiguous designators.
35. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen Weighing the Aim of Belief Again
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In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable against other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is capable of being weighed against other aims. Recently, however, Ema Sullivan-Bissett and Paul Noordhof have objected to this response on the grounds that it employs an undefended conception of the aim of belief not shared by Owens, and that it equivocates between importantly different contexts of doxastic deliberation. In this note, I argue that both of these objections fail.
36. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Paul Noordhof Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims
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David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appealing to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim approach remains to be answered.
37. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Thomas Wilk Inferences, Experiences, and the Myth of the Given: A Reply to Champagne
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In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed ‘the Myth of the Given.’ Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, I show that while this argument is sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne’s argument shows only that our empirical beliefs are determined through experience. It does not license the stronger claim that, in order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must be able to justify beliefs.
38. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Notes on the Contributors
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39. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Logos and Episteme. Aims and Scope
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40. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 8 > Issue: 1
Notes to Contributors
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