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21. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Dale Jacquette Justification and Truth Conditions in the Concept of Knowledge
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The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-typecounterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the proposition’s negation. A pragmatic perspective argues that truth is unnecessary and unattainable as a condition of knowledge beyond the requirement for practically attainable best justified belief. The key argument with respect to the eliminability of the truth condition in favor of a properly tailored justification condition is that there is nothing we do or can do in trying to satisfy the truth condition for knowledge beyond considering the epistemic merits of the justification that a believer accepts in coming to believe that the proposition is true.
22. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon Sceptical Thoughts on Philosophical Expertise
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My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or notphilosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise on philosophical positions themselves such as the nature of mind, causality, normativity and so forth). Throughout the paper, I respond to potential objections.
23. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Nicolás Lo Guercio Philosophical Peer Disagreement
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It has been widely discussed, in recent years, which is the rational doxastic reaction in the face of peer disagreement. But not much has been said about aninteresting instance of that debate: philosophical peer disagreement. That is precisely what I will be concerned with in this paper. First, I will offer a definition ofphilosophical peer that introduces the idea of an epistemic perspective. The proposed definition allows for a doublé distinction: between Strong and Weak Peers, and between Strong and Weak Disagreements. Based on these distinctions, I will defend that different doxastic reactions are required depending on the type of disagreement at issue. On the one hand, in the face of Weak Disagreement, we should be conciliatory. Cases of Strong disagreement, in turn, shouldn’t motívate a doxastic revision. In order to argue for that, some refinements into the notion of Rational Uniqueness will be needed.
24. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Noah Roderick After Universal Grammar: The Ecological Turn in Linguistics
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25. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Cristinel Ungureanu Mental Representations and the Dynamic Theory of Mind
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In this paper I will investigate the possibility of defending the concept of ‘mental representation’ against certain contemporary critiques. Some authors, likeAnthony Chemero, argue that it is possible to explain offline actions with dynamic concepts. Hence, the dynamic discourse preempts the representational one. I doubt that this is a recommendable strategy. A form of representation is necessary, though one which is different from the classical one. Instead of eliminating the concept of representation (as radical dynamicists do) or of splitting cognitive explanation in two separate discourses (as the adepts of the hybrid cognition version do), I consider that a dynamic concept of ‘representation’ is a better option. In my view, the higher level order resulted from the complex brain-body-environment coupling can be interpreted as being representational in nature. The dynamic paradigm involves a significant change concerning the intentional nature of representational states: the basic forms of representations are not maps of reality implemented as such in the brain, but limit conditions, attractors constraining the cognitive system’s evolution in its space state to reach its goals. On a certain threshold of complexity, the system develops stable attractors and attractor landscapes which could be interpreted as standing for something outside the system. This conception offers the advantages of avoiding preemptionargument, of unifying the cognitive explanation and, by its interscalar account, offers dynamic tools for building more complex artificial intelligent systems.
debate
26. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Ben Bronner Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge
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Rachel Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. Thedispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking theory: the original but not the dispositional theory can avoid Gettier-style counterexamples. Future attempts to improve the tracking theory would be wise to bear these problems in mind.
27. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Clayton Littlejohn Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions
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Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do notagglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.
28. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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29. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
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30. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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31. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Emma C. Gordon Is There Propositional Understanding?
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Literature in epistemology tends to suppose that there are three main types of understanding – propositional, atomistic, and objectual. By showing that all apparent instances of propositional understanding can be more plausibly explained as featuring one of several other epistemic states, this paper argues that talk of propositional understanding is unhelpful and misleading. The upshot is that epistemologists can do without the notion of propositional understanding.
32. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Ettore De Monte, Antonino Tamburello The Logical Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Historical and Integrative Perspectives
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This work investigates some of the most important logical limits of scientific knowledge. We argue that scientific knowledge is based on different logicalforms and paradigms. The logical forms, which represent the rational structure of scientific knowledge, show their limits through logical antinomies. The paradigms, which represent the scientific points of view on the world, show their limits through the theoretical anomalies. When these limits arise in science and when scientists become fully and deeply aware of them, they can determine logical or paradigmatic revolutions. These are different in their respective courses, although the logical forms and the paradigms are parts of the same type of knowledge. In the end, science can avoid or can integrate its different limits. In fact, the limits of science can become new opportunities for its growth and development.
33. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alexander R. Pruss The Badness of Being Certain of a Falsehood is at Least 1/(Log 4 − 1) Times Greater than the Value of Being Certain of a Truth
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Surprisingly precise results are provided on how much more one should disvalue being wrong than one values being right.
34. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Shaffer Not-Exact-Truths, Pragmatic Encroachment, and the Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning
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Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is closely tied to practical matters. On the one hand, radical pragmaticencroachment is the view that facts about whether an agent has knowledge depend on practical factors and this is coupled to the view that there is an important connection between knowledge and action. On the other hand, one can argue for the less radical thesis only that there is an important connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. So, defenders of both of these views endorse the view that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This thesis has recently come under heavy fire and a number of weaker proposals have been defended. In this paper counter-examples to the knowledge norm of reasoning will be presented and it will be argued that this view – and a number of related but weaker views – cannot be sustained in the face of these counter-examples. The paper concludes with a novel proposal concerning the norm of practical reasoning that is immune to the counter-examples introduced here.
35. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix Rethinking the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction
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This paper offers an account of the a priori/a posteriori distinction utilizing the insights of reliabilism, focusing on the inputs to reliable belief-forming processes. Ipropose that a belief possesses a priori justification if it is the result of a reliable belief-producing process whose input is ‘non-sensory’ and the reliability of this process does not ‘causally depend’ on the reliability of a prior process taking in ‘sensory’ input. One of the interesting consequences of this account is in the treatment of introspective knowledge of one’s belief-states; it was classically considered a posteriori, but comes out a priori on this model.
debate
36. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Trent Dougherty Internalist Evidentialism and Epistemic Virtue: Re-reply to Axtell
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In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value.
37. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
John Turri Stumbling in Nozick’s Tracks
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Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan have recently proposed an improved version of Nozick’s tracking account of knowledge. I show that, despite its virtues, the new proposal suffers from three serious problems.
history of epistemology
38. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Valentin Sorin Costreie Frege on Identity. The Transition from Begriffsschrift to Über Sinn und Bedeutung
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The goal of the paper is to offer an explanation why Frege has changed his Begriffsschrift account of identity to the one presented in Über Sinn und Bedeutung.The main claim of the paper is that in order to better understand Frege’s motivation for the introduction of his distinction between sense and reference, which marks his change of views, one should place this change in its original setting, namely the broader framework of Frege’s fundamental preoccupations with the foundations of arithmetic and logic. The Fregean thesis that mathematics is contentful, and its defense against formalism and psychologism, provides us an valuable interpretative key. Thus, Fregean senses are not just the mere outcome of some profound reflections on language, rather they play an important role in the articulation of Frege’s program in the foundations of arithmetic.
39. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Adrian Muraru Epistemological Perspectives in Late Antiquity – A Dialog Between Rationalism and Empiricism in the Scientific Writings
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Given the particular character of Ancient Literature, I considered it useful to approach the issue from the perspective of the Philosophy of Science: Epistemologyand the Philosophy of Science stem from the same source, and this aspect is all the more patent for Antiquity. In fact, the two perspectives that I mentioned in the subtitle, Empiricism and Rationalism, both represent epistemological choices and approaches specific to the Sciences, as well as to the Philosophy of Science, in the manner that they were practiced in Antiquity. This present study argues that Empiricism noticeably distinguishes itself from Rationalism, not merely in the philosophical works of the above-mentioned period, but also in its non-philosophical literature, especially the one pertaining to Science. Consequently, this study aims to indicate the major lines of thought in the Ancient Philosophy of Science, which reflect themselves in Epistemology in an unmediated manner.
40. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Robert C. Trundle Aristotle Versus Van Til And Lukasiewicz On Contradiction: Are Contradictions Irrational In Science And Theology?
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The Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz and the American theologian Cornelius Van Til are famous for challenging Aristotle’s Principle of Contradiction.Whereas apparent contradictions such as God and physical reality being both One and Not One (Many) are accepted in terms of an idealism held by Van Til, the Principle’s violations in theology and science reflect a realism held by Lukasiewicz. Lukasiewicz is favored for explaining why the Principle’s violation may be rational for a scientific and theological realism.