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21. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Hamid Vahid Skepticism and Varieties of Transcendental Argument
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Transcendental arguments have been described as disclosing the necessary conditions of the possibility of phenomena as diverse as experience, self-knowledge and language. Although many theorists saw them as powerful means to combat varieties of skepticism, this optimism gradually waned as many such arguments turned out, on examination, to deliver much less than was originally thought. In this paper, I distinguish between two species of transcendental arguments claiming that they do not actually constitute distinct forms of reasoning by showing how they collapse into more familiar inferences. I then turn to the question of their epistemic potentials which I argue to be a function of both their types as well as their targets. Finally, these claims are reinforced by uncovering links between certain recent claims about the efficacy of transcendental arguments and the so-called Moore’s paradox.
22. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Mark Owen Webb A Peace Plan for the Science Wars
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In what has become known as the ‘Science Wars,’ two sides have emerged. Some philosophers of science have claimed that, because science is a social practice, it is hopelessly infected with political bias. Others have claimed that science is a special kind of practice, structurally immune to bias. They are both right, because they are referring to different things when they use the word ‘science.’ The second group is referring the method of theory selection, as practiced by scientists in the laboratory, while the first group is referring to the ongoing social practice of science, of which theory choice is a part. The scientific method of theory choice, when practiced correctly, is resistant to bias, while the socially embedded practice is particularly sensitive to political forces, and so is subject to bias.
debate
23. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, Robert B. Talisse On Epistemic Abstemiousness: A Reply to Bundy
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24. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Guy Axtell Recovering Responsibility
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This paper defends the epistemological importance of ‘diachronic’ or cross-temporal evaluation of epistemic agents against an interesting dilemma posed for this view in Trent Dougherty’s recent paper “Reducing Responsibility.” This is primarily a debate between evidentialists and character epistemologists, and key issues of contention that the paper treats include the divergent functions of synchronic and diachronic (longitudinal) evaluations of agents and their beliefs, the nature and sources of epistemic normativity, and the advantages versus the costs of the evidentialists’ reductionism about sources of epistemic normativity.
25. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Jimmy Alfonso Licon No Suicide for Presentists: A Response to Hales
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Steven Hales constructs a novel argument against the possibility of presentist time travel called the suicide machine argument. Hales argues that if presentism were true, then time travel would result in the annihilation of the time traveler. But such a consequence is not time travel, therefore presentism cannot allow for the possibility of time travel. This paper argues that in order for the suicide machine argument to succeed, it must make (at least) one of two assumptions, each of which beg the question. The argument must either assume that the sequence of moments is invariant, or that time travel through time requires distinct, co-instantiated moments. Because the former disjunct assumes that presentist time travel is impossible and the latter assumes that presentism is impossible, the suicide machine argument fails.
reviews
26. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Eugen Huzum Epistemology and the Regress Problem
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27. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Notes on the Contributors
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28. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope
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29. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 3
Notes to Contributors
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articles
30. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Richard David-Rus Explanation Through Scientific Models: Reframing the Explanation Topic
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Once a central topic of philosophy of science, scientific explanation attracted less attention in the last two decades. My aim in this paper is to argue for a newsort of approach towards scientific explanation. In a first step I propose a classification of different approaches through a set of dichotomic characteristics. Taken into account the tendencies in actual philosophy of science I see a local, dynamic and non-theory driven approach as a plausible one. Considering models as bearers of explanations will provide a proper frame for such an approach. In the second part I make some suggestions for a working agenda that will further articulate a sketchy account of explanation through models proposed by Hartmann and Frigg.
31. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Fantl Infinitism and Practical Conditions on Justification
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This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism (the view thatjustification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons). Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the correct theory.
32. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Vincent F. Hendricks, John Symons Limiting Skepticism
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Skeptics argue that the acquisition of knowledge is impossible given the standing possibility of error. We present the limiting convergence strategy forresponding to skepticism and discuss the relationship between conceivable error and an agent’s knowledge in the limit. We argue that the skeptic must demonstrate that agents are operating with a bad method or are in an epistemically cursed world. Such demonstration involves a significant step beyond conceivability and commits the skeptic to potentially convergent inquiry.
33. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Rhys McKinnon Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning
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This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and practical reasoning. I will conclude by suggesting a prescription for properly using lottery propositions to do the sort of work that Hawthorne wants from them.
34. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nicholas Rescher What Einstein Wanted
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Einstein envisioned a clear difference between a bottom-up physics that moves from observations to the conjecture of explanatory generalizations, and a top-down physics that deploys intuitively natural principles (especially of economy and elegance) to explain the observations. Einstein’s doubts regarding standard quantum mechanics thus did not simply lie in this theory’s use of probabilities. Rather, what he objected to was their status as merely phenomenological quantities configured to accommodate observation, and thereby lacking any basis of derivation from considerations of general principle.
35. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Gerard Leonid Stan Truth and the Critique of Representation
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The correspondence theory of truth was regarded for many centuries as the correct position in the problem of truth. The main purpose of this paper is to establish the extent to which antirepresentationalist arguments devised by the pragmatists can destabilise the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, I identified three types of antirepresentationalist arguments: ontological, epistemological and semantic. Then I tried to outline the most significant varieties for each type of argument. Finally, I evaluated these counterarguments from a metaphilosophical perspective. The point I endeavoured to make is that these arguments are decisive neither in supporting the pragmatist theory of truth, nor in proving the failure of the correspondence theory of truth. Actually, we are dealing with two distinct modes of looking at the same problem, two theoretical approaches based on different sets of presuppositions. By examining the presuppositions of the classical theory of truth, the pragmatists engage in a theoretical undertaking with therapeutical qualities: they contributed significantly to the critical evaluation of a series of dogmas. The belief in the power of the human mind to mirror reality exactly as it is was one of these dogmas.
36. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Zoltán Vecsey Vagueness, Ignorance, And Epistemic Possibilities
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The correspondence theory of truth was regarded for many centuries as the correct position in the problem of truth. The main purpose of this paper is to establish the extent to which anti-representationalist arguments devised by the pragmatists can destabilise the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, I identified three types of antirepresentationalist arguments: ontological, epistemological and semantic. Then I tried to outline the most significant varieties for each type of argument. Finally, I evaluated these counterarguments from a metaphilosophical perspective. The point I endeavoured to make is that these arguments are decisive neither in supporting the pragmatist theory of truth, nor in proving the failure of the correspondence theory of truth. Actually, we are dealing with two distinct modes of looking at the same problem, two theoretical approaches based on different sets of presuppositions. By examining the presuppositions of the classical theory of truth, the pragmatists engage in a theoretical undertaking with therapeutical qualities: they contributed significantly to the critical evaluation of a series of dogmas. The belief in the power of the human mind to mirror reality exactly as it is was one of these dogmas.
debate
37. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Alex Bundy In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness
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The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.
discussion notes
38. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Mark McBride A Puzzle for Dogmatism
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I want to consider a puzzle in the realm of confirmation theory. The puzzle arises from consideration of reasoning with an argument, given certain epistemological commitments. Here is the argument (preceded by the stipulated justification for the first premise):(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) The table looks red.(EK) (1) The table is red.(2) If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining on it.(3) The table is not white with red lights shining on it.(EK) – the easy knowledge argument – has received much epistemological scrutiny of late. My aim, in this discussion note, is to set out an example, leading to the puzzle, putatively troubling for dogmatism. The puzzle takes the form of a pair of arguments which I take to be extractable from the recent work of a number of prominent epistemologists. My aim is modest: I seek not novelty, but rather merely to tie together accessibly some interesting recent work towards the formal end of epistemology which bears on cruxes at the heart of traditional epistemology.
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39. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Dan Chiţoiu On Kuhn`s Philosophy and its Legacy
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40. Logos & Episteme: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Gerard Leonid Stan A New Vision on Physis
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