Cover of Phenomenology 2005

Phenomenology 2005

Selected Essays from North America Part 2
2007, ISBN 978-973-88632-6-2
Editors: Lester Embree, Thomas Nenon

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Displaying: 21-28 of 28 documents

21. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Scott D. Churchill Experiencing the Other within the We: Phenomenology with a Bonobo
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In this article I will consider, both theoretically and experientially, an improvisational style of comportment by means of which one can enter into a potentially meaningful exchange or Ineinander with animal others. In such moments of communicative comportment, it would be appropriate to say that one is utilizing empathy as an investigatory posture—as a way of “feeling into” the gesticulating body of the other, and possibly even “seeing into” the other’s world. As a reference point for reflection, I will draw upon my encounters over the course of a decade with bonobos held in captivity at the Fort Worth Zoo.
22. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Richard Cohen Levinas: Thinking Least about Death: Contra Heidegger
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Philosophers have traditionally aimed to die in life. From Socrates who argued that death was nothing to Spinoza who claimed “to think of death least of all things,” the “life” of the mind was an escape from the death of the body. In a sharp break from this tradition, Martin Heidegger in the groundbreaking phenomenological-ontology of Being and Time (1927), and thereafter, made death—as a person’s anxious ”being-toward-death”— the basic revelatory structure, the very self-understanding of the human person. As such, it is for Heidegger the privileged access to being’s historical revelation of itself to itself. Emmanuel Levinas, in independent and, as this essay shows, deeper phenomenological studies, fundamentally criticizes and rejects Heidegger’s vision. This is because without turning back to an escape into the eternal he discovers in human mortality and suffering a completely different meaning: the moral primacy of caring for the mortality of the other person before my own mortality, up to the point of “dying for” the other person and, even beyond this personal extremity, to the point of caring for the justice of the world “beyond my own death.” These meanings—whose exigency transcends a purely phenomenological science yet remain bound to human sociality—re irreducibly ethical. As such, as imperatives of greater and higher bearing than the call to ontological thinking, they impose the demands of ethics as “first philosophy.”
23. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Carolyn M. Cusick The Problem of Psychology and Public Service Advertising
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In much the same way that psychology mimics the goals and methods of natural science for purposes of studying the inner life of the mind instead of outer life, non-profit advertising mimics the methods of commercial advertising for social goods instead of profits. Using a few public service advertisements, particularly an anti-rape campaign poster, this essay lays out the parallel between psychology and non-profit advertising, and further, it explores how the failure of psychology to overcome the problem of naturalism is at the root of the growth of all forms of advertising and the attempt to manipulate citizen consumers.
24. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Christine Daigle A Sartrean Phenomenological Ethics
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In this essay, I explain how Sartre’s phenomenological ontology forms the ground for his elaboration of an ethics of freedom. I demonstrate that the ethics of absolute freedom is the logical outcome of Sartre’s views concerning the notion of consciousness as intentional. This ethics, despite the fact that it gives “no recipes,” entrusts the human being with full ethical responsibility and allows him to flourish as the creator of the world, of values and of meaning.
25. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
James Dodd The Problem of Givenness in Husserl’s Phenomenology
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What is the problem of givenness in Husserl’s phenomenology? This essay seeks to answer this question by developing the problem in terms of both static and genetic phenomenological analysis. Together, both dimensions of analysis lead to the importance of the question of time and temporality for phenomenology: the problem of givenness is the problem of time. It is suggested that Husserl’s approach to these questions is both rich and subtle enough to meet the objections of those who would argue that his phenomenology is unable to handle problems of being, intersubjectivity, and individuation.
26. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier
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“Frontier” signifies not only a line between areas but also the area beyond one’s home area. The early giants in phenomenological philosophy were often concerned with other disciplines. Husserl knew much about the psychology as well as the mathematics of his time. Heidegger had an involvement with Greek philology that others have continued. Gurwitsch and then Merleau-Ponty gained much from the psychiatry of Kurt Goldstein and they plus Sartre took Gestalt psychology very seriously. And Schutz founded the phenomenological theory of the cultural sciences. This pattern of interest in and benefi t from disciplines beyond philosophy continues in Klaus Held, Thomas Seebohm, and Bernhard Waldenfels, but is becoming increasingly atypical because of, among other reasons, the non-German model for the preparation of philosophers. The present essay is an attempt to remind phenomenological philosophers of this component of their deeper tradition and then to explore how it can be revived.
27. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree Disciplines beyond Philosophy: Recollecting a Phenomenological Frontier
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28. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 1
Shaun Gallagher Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology
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Th e neurophilosophical project, as envisioned by Churchland, involves intertheoretic reduction, moving from (or eliminating) theories formulated in terms of common sense and folk psychology, to theories that have stood the test of scientific experiment. In her view, folk psychology, as well as introspective phenomenology, will be eliminated in favor of neuroscience. Neurophenomenology holds that phenomenology (as a practice)is not only possible, but is in fact a useful tool for science; and that phenomenology is ineliminable if the project is to pursue a neurobiology of consciousness. Clarification of these issues rests on an understanding of how phenomenology can be an alternative source of testable theory, and can play a direct role in scientific experiment. Rather than talking in the abstract about the role of theory formation in science, I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.