Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 21-40 of 847 documents


21. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos Discourse as Talk and Discourse as Logos: The Work of Philosophy
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
22. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Stephen Leighton Aristotle on Fear’s Expression
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
23. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Georgia Mouroutsou Plato in Search of a Language Without Particulars: Timaeus 49a6-50a4 in a New Light
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The paper starts by setting the stage for two perennial pairs of problems about the receptacle: “metaphysics / physics” and “matter / space” (I.). Then it provides a close reading of 49a6-50a4 that reinforces the reconstructionist interpretation, but also deviates from Cherniss in some respect. When applying the proposals Plato makes in 49a6-50a4, it reveals a Plato in search of a feature-placing language or language without particulars (LWOP) (II. and III.): though not formulating it himself, Plato provides all necessary material for doing so. Having argued ex negativo and against the exclusivity-thesis regarding the first debate about the receptacle (in III.), the paper offers a new piece of evidence for the space interpretation of the receptacle—though not breaking new ground—because my LWOP thesis presupposes the interpretation of the receptacle as space and argues against the material-substrate reading (IV). Throughout the paper, I have consciously operated with a less Aristotle-centered framework than those most often applied, a procedure that does justice to Plato’s different ontology and semantics of the sensible phenomena. My Plato does not pave the way to Aristotle in this passage because he does not wish to do so.
24. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Select Publications—Thematic Grouping
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
25. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Gerasimos Santas Economic Inequalities and Justice: Plato and Rawls
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
26. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Christian Pfeiffer Aristotle and the Thesis of Mereological Potentialism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
According to Aristotle, the way in which the parts of a whole are is different from the way in which the whole exists. Parts of an object are only potentially, whereas the whole exists actually. Although commentators agree that Aristotle held this doctrine, little effort has been made to spell out precisely what it could mean to say that the parts are only potentially. In this paper, I shall attempt to elucidate that claim and explain the philosophical motivation behind it. I will argue that the motivation of mereological potentialism is to account for the unity of material substance. For a part to be potentially is, I will argue, a form of ontological dependence of the part on the whole. Potential parts have their being as a possible division of the whole. I will further explain this by specifying how the parts are grounded in the capacities of the whole and how the parts are individuated by the whole.
27. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Christos Terezis Prolegomena in Proclus’ Theory on the Divine Henads
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
28. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Mika Suojanen The “Philosophy-Ladenness” of Perception: A Philosophical Language and Perception in Husserl and Sartre
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is “theory-laden” is true, then perception can also be “philosophy-laden”. These philosophers have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher’s background language can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre’s denial of the distinction between appearance and reality lies behind his claim to know the phenomenon, however. By examining Husserl's Ideas and Sartre's Being and Nothingness I conclude that these philosophers’ philosophical languages influence their experience of the phenomenon and perceptual knowledge. Philosophical traditions affect the thoughts of perception.
29. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
W. Balzer, A. Eleftheriadis, D. Kurzawe Digital Humanities and Hermeneutics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
30. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Mohammad Alwahaib Al-Ghazali and Descartes from Doubt to Certainty: A Phenomenological Approach
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that the doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito and so reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi in a sheer state of passivity, waiting for the truth to be revealed to him by God. This paper proves this is not the case. Under close textual scrutiny and through the use of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali's position was misunderstood, thus disclosing his true philosophic nature.
31. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Justin Mc Brayer A Value Argument Against Incompatibilism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can’t require a lack of determinism.
32. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Dionysios A. Anapolitanos The Humean Notion of Sympathy
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
33. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Alexiadou Anastasia-Sofia Locke on Language, Meaning and Communication
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
34. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Grigoriou Christos The Concept of Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
35. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
William Outhwaite Habermas and (the) Enlightenment
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
36. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Kolja Möller Popular Sovereignty, Populism and Deliberative Democracy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article investigates the relationship between popular sovereignty, populism, and deliberative democracy. My main thesis is that populisms resurrect the polemical dimension of popular sovereignty by turning “the people” against the “powerbloc” or the “elite”, and that it is crucial thatthis terrain not be ceded to authoritarian distortions of this basic contestatory grammar. Furthermore, I contend that populist forms of politics are compatible with a procedural and deliberative conception of democracy. Ifirst engage with the assumption that populism and a procedural model of democracy are incompatible, demonstrating that this assumption relies on a conservative bias which tiesthe exercising of communicative power to a “duty of civility” (Rawls). I then engage with radical-democratic reconstructions of the procedural notion of popular sovereignty which emphasize the unleashing and diversification of peoplehood in communication circuits and the mutual permeability of constitutional politics, parliamentary legislation, and the public sphere. Thirdly, I conclude that populisms are an essential part of communicative power in modern democracies and part of its dialectical structure.
37. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Wilhelm Dagmar Responding to the challenges of Globalisation: Habermas on Legitimacy, Transnationalism, and Cosmopolitanism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
38. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Anastasia Marinopoulou Defining cosmopolitanism: European politics of the twenty-first century
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
39. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Julian Nida-Rümelin A cosmopolitan legitimization of state borders
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
40. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Cristina Lafont Alternative visions of a new global order: what should cosmopolitans hope for?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this essay, I analyze the cosmopolitan project for a new international order that Habermas has articulated in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is a very ambitious model for a future international order geared to fulfill the peace and human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the obligation to protect human rights by the international community is circumscribed to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts and those due to regulations of the global economic order. I conclude that the cosmopolitan goals of the Habermasian project can only be achieved if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice.