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Displaying: 21-30 of 847 documents


21. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos Discourse as Talk and Discourse as Logos: The Work of Philosophy
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22. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Stephen Leighton Aristotle on Fear’s Expression
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23. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Georgia Mouroutsou Plato in Search of a Language Without Particulars: Timaeus 49a6-50a4 in a New Light
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The paper starts by setting the stage for two perennial pairs of problems about the receptacle: “metaphysics / physics” and “matter / space” (I.). Then it provides a close reading of 49a6-50a4 that reinforces the reconstructionist interpretation, but also deviates from Cherniss in some respect. When applying the proposals Plato makes in 49a6-50a4, it reveals a Plato in search of a feature-placing language or language without particulars (LWOP) (II. and III.): though not formulating it himself, Plato provides all necessary material for doing so. Having argued ex negativo and against the exclusivity-thesis regarding the first debate about the receptacle (in III.), the paper offers a new piece of evidence for the space interpretation of the receptacle—though not breaking new ground—because my LWOP thesis presupposes the interpretation of the receptacle as space and argues against the material-substrate reading (IV). Throughout the paper, I have consciously operated with a less Aristotle-centered framework than those most often applied, a procedure that does justice to Plato’s different ontology and semantics of the sensible phenomena. My Plato does not pave the way to Aristotle in this passage because he does not wish to do so.
24. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 43 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Select Publications—Thematic Grouping
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25. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Gerasimos Santas Economic Inequalities and Justice: Plato and Rawls
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26. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Christian Pfeiffer Aristotle and the Thesis of Mereological Potentialism
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According to Aristotle, the way in which the parts of a whole are is different from the way in which the whole exists. Parts of an object are only potentially, whereas the whole exists actually. Although commentators agree that Aristotle held this doctrine, little effort has been made to spell out precisely what it could mean to say that the parts are only potentially. In this paper, I shall attempt to elucidate that claim and explain the philosophical motivation behind it. I will argue that the motivation of mereological potentialism is to account for the unity of material substance. For a part to be potentially is, I will argue, a form of ontological dependence of the part on the whole. Potential parts have their being as a possible division of the whole. I will further explain this by specifying how the parts are grounded in the capacities of the whole and how the parts are individuated by the whole.
27. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Christos Terezis Prolegomena in Proclus’ Theory on the Divine Henads
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28. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Mika Suojanen The “Philosophy-Ladenness” of Perception: A Philosophical Language and Perception in Husserl and Sartre
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The basic entity in phenomenology is the phenomenon. Knowing the phenomenon is another issue. The phenomenon has been described as the real natural object or the appearance directly perceived in phenomenology and analytic philosophy of perception. Within both traditions, philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Russell and Wittgenstein have considered that perceptual experience demonstrates what a phenomenon is on the line between the mind and the external world. Therefore, conceptualizing the phenomenon is based on the perceptual evidence. However, if the belief that perception is “theory-laden” is true, then perception can also be “philosophy-laden”. These philosophers have not noticed whether perceptual knowledge is independent of philosophies. If perceptual knowledge is not independent of philosophies, a philosopher’s background language can influence what he or she claims to know about the phenomenon. For Husserl, experience is direct evidence of what exists. The textual evidence shows that Sartre’s denial of the distinction between appearance and reality lies behind his claim to know the phenomenon, however. By examining Husserl's Ideas and Sartre's Being and Nothingness I conclude that these philosophers’ philosophical languages influence their experience of the phenomenon and perceptual knowledge. Philosophical traditions affect the thoughts of perception.
29. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
W. Balzer, A. Eleftheriadis, D. Kurzawe Digital Humanities and Hermeneutics
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30. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Mohammad Alwahaib Al-Ghazali and Descartes from Doubt to Certainty: A Phenomenological Approach
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This paper clarifies the philosophical connection between Al-Ghazali and Descartes, with the goal to articulate similarities and differences in their famous journeys from doubt to certainty. As such, its primary focus is on the chain of their reasoning, starting from their conceptions of truth and doubt arguments, until their arrival at truth. Both philosophers agreed on the ambiguous character of ordinary everyday knowledge and decided to set forth in undermining its foundations. As such, most scholars tend to agree that the doubt arguments used by Descartes and Al-Ghazali are similar, but identify their departures from doubt as radically different: while Descartes found his way out of doubt through the cogito and so reason, Al-Ghazali ended his philosophical journey as a Sufi in a sheer state of passivity, waiting for the truth to be revealed to him by God. This paper proves this is not the case. Under close textual scrutiny and through the use of basic Husserlian-phenomenological concepts, I show that Al-Ghazali's position was misunderstood, thus disclosing his true philosophic nature.