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21. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Colin Johnston Conflicting Rules and Paradox
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22. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Dylan Murray, Eddy Nahmias Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions
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The debate between compadbilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses are performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios, and that their abstract scenarios reveal the folk theory of free will for what it actually is—incompatibihst. Here, we argue that the results of two new studies suggest just the opposite. Most participants only give apparent incompatibilist judgments when they mistakenly interpret determinism to imply that agents' mental states are bypassed in the causal chains that lead to their behavior. Determinism does not entail bypassing, so these responses do not reflect genuine incompatibilist intuitions. When participants understand what determinism does mean, the vast majority take it to be compatible with free will. Further results indicate that most people's concepts of choice and the abihty to do otherwise do not commit them to incompatibiHsm, either, putting pressure on incompatibilist arguments that rely on transfer principles, such as the Consequence Argument. We discuss the implications of these findings for philosophical debates about free will, and suggest that incompatibiHsm appears to be either false, or else a thesis about something other than what most people mean by 'free will'.
23. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Michael Rescorla Perceptual Constancies and Perceptual Modes of Presentation
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24. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Christopher Peacocke Perception, Biology, Action, and Knowledge
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25. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Tyler Burge Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints
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26. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 2
Recent Publications
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27. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Conor McHugh Exercising Doxastic Freedom
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This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention.Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, I argue, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntarycontrol. I develop and defend an account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot requirevoluntary control. Then I show that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. I argue that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxasticstates, this would actually undermine our freedom.
28. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Mohan Matthen How to Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty
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29. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Derek Ball, Bryan Pickel One Dogma of Millianism
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30. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Bradley Armour-Garb, James A. Woodbridge From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism
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31. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Stephen A. Butterfill, Corrado Sinigaglia Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action
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Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of actions? Standard accounts of achon assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.
32. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sam Shpall Moral and Rational Commitment
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33. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Michael Rescorla The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation
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Many philosophers worry that the classical computational theory of mind (CTM) engenders epiphenomenalism. Building on Block's (1990) discussion, I formulate a particularly troubling version of this worry. I then present a novel solution to CTM's epiphenomenalist conundrum. I develop my solution within an interventionist theory of causal relevance. My solution departs substantially from orthodox versions of CTM. In particular, I reject the widespread picture of digital computation as formal syntactic manipulation.'
book symposium
34. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore Précis: Commonsense Consequentialism
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35. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Joshua Gert Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism
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36. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Paul Hurley Comments on Douglas Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism
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37. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Sergio Tenenbaum The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
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38. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Douglas W. Portmore Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum
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39. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 88 > Issue: 1
Recent Publications
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40. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume > 87 > Issue: 3
Robert Audi Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge
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Testimony is the mainstay of human communication and essential for the spread of knowledge. But testimony may also spread error. Under what conditions does it yield knowledge in the person addressed? Must the recipient trust the attester? And does the attester have to know what is affirmed? A related question is what is required for the recipient to be justified in believing testimony. Is testimony-based justification acquired in the same way as testimony-based knowledge? This paper addresses these and other questions. It offers a theory of the role of testimony in producing knowledge and justification, a sketch of a conception of knowledge that supports this theory, a brief account of how trust of others can be squared with critical habits of mind, and an outline of some important standards for intellectual responsibility in giving and receiving testimony.