Cover of Res Philosophica
Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 21-40 of 333 documents

book symposium
21. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 4
David McPherson Replies to Ivanhoe and Miller
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
22. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Anders Herlitz, Karim Sadek Social Choice, Nondeterminacy, and Public Reasoning
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g., prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what to do. The article outlines different explanations of why independent criteria sometimes fail to fully determine what to do and illustrates how they can still be used to eliminate ineligible alternatives, but it is argued that the independent criteria cannot ground a reasonable social choice in these situations. To complement independent criteria when they fail to fully determine what to do, it is suggested that society must engage in public deliberation by way of generating new reasons that can determine how to rank the alternatives. It is suggested that the approach to social choice presented here reveals a way of accepting the relevance of independent criteria for social choice without letting go of the idea that the attitudes of affected parties matter.
23. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
David Holiday Moral Incapacities of Vice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article examines the moral-theoretic implications of a species of moral incapacity which is frequently acknowledged, but nowhere fully explored, in the extant literature. This is the species ‘moral incapacity of vice,’ comprised of those strict limits to intentional action that manifest a weakness or corruption of moral character. Such incapacities demand closer attention, because they block a prominent line of skepticism about the moral incapacities (skepticism resulting partly from theorists’ heretofore exclusive concern with moral incapacities of virtue). A literary example of moral incapacity of vice is analyzed by means of a Thomistic concept of capital vice. The case blocks moral incapacity skepticism, illustrates that moral incapacities of vice share all of the major criterial (i.e., significant and collectively distinctive) features of moral incapacities of virtue, and brings out the significance of such incapacities for our understanding of character, practical reasoning, and agency.
24. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Michael Vazquez Hopeless Fools and Impossible Ideals
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I vindicate the longstanding intuition that the Stoics are transitional figures in the history of ethics. I argue that the Stoics are committed to thinking that the ideal of human happiness as a life of virtue is impossible for some people, whom I dub ‘hopeless fools.’ In conjunction with the Stoic view that everyone is subject to the same rational requirements to perform ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘duties’ (kath¯ekonta/officia), and the plausible eudaimonist assumption that happiness is a source of normative reasons only if it is in principle attainable, the existence of hopeless fools demonstrates that the Stoics were pluralists about the ultimate justificatory basis of rational action. Hopeless fools are required to behave just like their non-hopeless counterparts, not because doing so is conducive to their happiness, but because doing so conforms with the dictates of Right Reason.
25. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Michael Granado Scientific Epistemology: Exploring the Primacy of Science in the Writing of Gaston Bachelard
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article will explore the ways in which early twentieth century physics informs and sustains Gaston Bachelard’s writing on epistemology and time. By investigating the scientific underpinnings of Bachelard’s philosophy of time, this article will also establish a connection between his epistemological and temporal works that are underdeveloped in the secondary literature. This discussion will seek to prove an epistemological commitment, scattered throughout Bachelard’s work on science, in which all epistemological claims are beholden to the claims of modern science. It will be demonstrated how this epistemological claim is implemented in Bachelard’s work on time—specifically, the ways in which relativity theory and microphysics influences his philosophy of time. Such an approach will bridge the gap between Bachelard’s epistemological writings and his work on time while simultaneously illustrating the ways in which physics influences his thinking.
26. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Aaron Wells The Priority of Natural Laws in Kant's Early Philosophy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is widely held that, in his pre-Critical works, Kant endorsed a necessitation account of laws of nature, where laws are grounded in essences or causal powers. Against this, I argue that the early Kant endorsed the priority of laws in explaining and unifying the natural world, as well as their irreducible role in grounding natural necessity. Laws are a key constituent of Kant’s explanatory naturalism, rather than undermining it. By laying out neglected distinctions Kant draws among types of natural law, grounding relations, and ontological levels, I show that his early works present a coherent and sophisticated laws-first account of the natural order. Laws are a key constituent of Kant’s explanatory naturalism with respect to the empirical domain, and do not undermine it.
27. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Nathan Robert Howard, N. G. Laskowski Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
There’s a long but relatively neglected tradition of attempting to explain why many researchers working on the nature of phenomenal consciousness think that it’s hard to explain.1 David Chalmers argues that this “meta-problem of consciousness” merits more attention than it has received. He also argues against several existing explanations of why we find consciousness hard to explain. Like Chalmers, we agree that the meta-problem is worthy of more attention. Contra Chalmers, however, we argue that there’s an existing explanation that is more promising than his objections suggest. We argue that researchers find phenomenal consciousness hard to explain because phenomenal concepts are complex demonstratives that encode the impossibility of explaining consciousness as one of their application conditions.
book symposium
28. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Mary Kate McGowan Précis for Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
29. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Luvell Anderson Reflections on McGowan's Just Words
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
30. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Claire Horisk Can McGowan Explain Hepeating?
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
31. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Lori Watson Comments on Mary Kate McGowan's Just Words
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
32. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 3
Mary Kate McGowan New Applications, Hepeating, and Discrimination: Response to Anderson, Horisk, and Watson
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
33. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Billy Dunaway, Jon McGinnis Editors' Note
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
34. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
T. Ryan Byerly Recovering a Role for Moral Character and Ascetic Practice in Religious Epistemology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Moral character and ascetic practice have not been major themes in contemporary analytic religious epistemology, but they have been major themes in the religious epistemologies of several influential historical figures, including the medieval Islamic philosopher al-Ghazalı. This article will be concerned with the place of moral character and ascetic practice in both al-Ghazalı’s religious epistemology and in contemporary analytic religious epistemology. By reading al-Ghazalı alongside contemporary work, I aim to highlight some fruitful ideas about how moral character and ascetic practice could play important roles in religious epistemology. I argue that the exploration of these ideas may be enriched via engagement with recent developments in mainstream epistemology and virtue theory, pointing toward future avenues for such work.
35. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Reza Hadisi Creative Imagining as Practical Knowing: An Akbariyya Account
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue that ‘practical knowledge’ can be understood as constituted by a kind of imagining. In particular, it is the knowledge of what I am doing when that knowledge is represented via extramental imagination. Two interesting results follow. First, on this account, we can do justice both to the cognitive character and the practical character of practical knowledge. And second, we can identify a condition under which imagination becomes factive, and thus a source of objective evidence. I develop this view by extracting an account of self-knowledge via extramental imagination from the writings of Ibn ‘Arabi (1165-1240).
36. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Joshua Lee Harris Ontological Pluralism and Divine Naming: Insights from Avicenna
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I defend a version of ontological pluralism, specifically with an eye toward laying metaphysical groundwork for an account of divine naming inspired by Avicenna. I try to show (1) that Avicenna’s pluralism is well-motivated as a metaphysical thesis and (2) that it offers substantive philosophical support for a correlatively pluralist approach to divine naming. My argument proceeds by identifying two influential objections to ontological pluralism, and then offering replies to these objections with the help of Avicenna. The first objection pertains to pluralism as a position in general metaphysics, whereas the second pertains to pluralism as a position in theological epistemology or divine naming. To the extent that these replies are successful, I argue that Avicennian pluralism is compelling on both counts as a philosophical position.
37. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Laura Hassan In Pursuit of the World's Creator: Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on the Origins of the Universe in al-Matalib al-'Aliya
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı’s (d. 606/1210) final theological treatise, al-Matalib al-‘Aliya min al-‘Ilm al-Ilahiyya, is sufficient justification for the assertion of his towering significance as interpreter of Ibn Sına (d. 428/1037) and in the development of new theological paradigms. Yet such is its richness and subtlety that al-Razı’s views in the Matalib on key doctrinal issues such as the creation of the world require much further study. Previously, scholars have maintained that al-Razı refrains from affirming any one doctrine of creation. I argue to the contrary, that despite al-Razı’s epistemological caution on matters pertaining to the action of God, he ultimately deems creation ex nihilo most probable on the balance of evidence, and therefore the doctrine that is to be believed.
38. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Kirk Lougheed Epistemic Paternalism, Open Group Inquiry, and Religious Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Epistemic paternalism occurs when a decision is made for an agent which helps them arrive at the truth, though they didn’t consent to that decision (and sometimes weren’t even aware of it). Common defenses of epistemic paternalism claim that it can help promote positive veritistic results. In other words, epistemic paternalism is often good for inquiry. I argue that there is often a better alternative available to epistemic paternalism in the form of what I call Open Group Inquiry. I then examine how Open Group Inquiry can be applied to cases of religious inquiry, while noting that epistemic paternalism is impermissible in cases of general religious inquiry. I argue that in the case of religious inquiry, there are serious questions about what constitutes evidence along with how to evaluate it. Rather than posing a particular worry for Open Group Inquiry, I suggest these questions pose a problem for religious inquiry in general. I conclude that while it very much matters how concepts like religious knowledge, religious faith, scepticism, etc., are defined, these considerations may well pave the way for a novel argument for religious scepticism.
39. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Amir Saemi Revelation, Moral Skepticism, and the Mu'tazilites
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Facing morally controversial passages in Scripture, many Muslims find themselves forced to choose between accepting the dictates of Scripture and trusting their modern moral sensibilities. Let’s call the view that our independent moral judgment is not reliable when it is in conflict with the apparent meaning of Scripture, moderate moral skepticism. Assuming the falsity of the divine command theory, I will explore the argument for moderate moral skepticism by discussing the ideas of the Mu‘tazilite theologian, Qadi ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Hamadani (935–1025). My hope is that the discussion of the ideas of ‘Abd al-Jabbar helps us to see why the argument for moderate moral skepticism is appealing and what is the best way to resist the argument.
40. Res Philosophica: Volume > 98 > Issue: 2
Julie Loveland Swanstrom Illumination of the Heart: Doubt, Certainty, and Knowledge Acquisition in al-Ghazali and Augustine
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Though al-Ghazalı is often superficially compared to Descartes, Ghazalı’s epistemological project echoes—in consonance or dissonance—Augustine’s, warranting a clear exploration of the depths of these echoes. For both Augustine and Ghazalı the epistemological and theological quest starts with an interior turn, and divine illumination provides the tools for and content of knowledge. Both recount skeptical leanings resolved by divine illumination; both employ philosophy as a tool in theological disputes; both see knowledge as dynamic and transformative; and both assert that God’s direct illumination is a necessary precursor to and a final capstone upon knowledge. Ghazalı’s use of illumination is more circumscribed and specified than Augustine’s. I argue that Ghazalı and Augustine take similar approaches to the role of divine illumination and the importance of interiority or the subjective grasp on knowledge, but despite these differences, Ghazalı and Augustine deal distinctly with the question of authority and certitude of knowledge.