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21. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Howard McGary Liberalism and the Problem of Racism
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22. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Donna-Dale L. Marcano White Racial Obligation and the False Neutrality of Political and Moral Liberalism
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23. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Paul C. Taylor After Race, After Justice, After History
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24. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
David E. McClean Some Remarks on Paul Taylor’s “After Race, After Justice, After History”
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25. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Kathryn T. Gines Hannah Arendt, Liberalism, and Racism: Controversies Concerning Violence, Segregation, and Education
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26. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Clarence Sholé Johnson Reading between the Lines: Kathryn Gines on Hannah Arendt and Antiblack Racism
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27. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Naomi Zack Race, Class, and Money in Disaster
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28. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Anna Stubblefield Race, Disability, and the Social Contract
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29. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Linda Martín Alcoff Latinos beyond the Binary
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30. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Tommie Shelby Racism, Identity, and Latinos: A Comment on Alcoff
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31. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Bernard R. Boxill The Right to Independence
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32. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
William H. Hardy Before Domination and Dependence
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33. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Charles W. Mills Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls
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34. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 47 > Issue: Supplement
Yolonda Wilson When is an Omission a Fault?: Or, Maybe Rawls Just Isn’t That Into You
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35. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Jason Baehr Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology
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The terrain of character-based or “responsibilist” virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade -- so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character-based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessmentof each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning subfield.
36. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Tim Dare, Justine Kingsbury Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?
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It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth-directed and non-truth-directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non-truth-directed, and suggest that in truth-directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.
37. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Matthew Groe Merleau-Ponty’s Pragmatist Ethics
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Utilizing a characterization of pragmatism drawn from Joseph Margolis, and with reference to the thought of C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, this paper first exposes a pragmatist conception of rationalitywithin the French philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It then explores how this praxical, biologically rooted understanding of rationality leads Merleau-Ponty to espouse the same broadly pragmatistconception of ethical life that we find in arecent work from Joseph Margolis: one that repudiates fixed principles and absolute ends in order to prompt us, under the pressing exigencies of life, to learn from radically different ways of thinking, thus committing us to negotiating peaceful solutions to our moral and political conflicts across diverse rational perspectives in a manner that, although taking us far from any form of objectivism, nevertheless refuses to renounce all claims to objectivity.
38. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Emily S. Lee A Phenomenology for Homi Bhabha’s Postcolonial Metropolitan Subject
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Homi Bhabha attends to the figure of the postcolonial metropolitan subject-a racialized subject who is not representative of the first world, yet a symbol of the metropolitan sphere. Bhabha describes theirdaily lives as inextricably split or doubled. His analysis cannot account for the agonistic moments when one is caught in not knowing, in focusing attention, and in developing understanding. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with the openness in the horizon of the gestaltian framework better accounts for such splits as moments on the horizon for becoming and grasping something new.
39. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
Anders Odenstedt Hegel and Gadamer on Bildung
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Hegel argues that Bildung (cultivation or education) involves an ability to reflect on one’s habitual beliefs in a detached, uncommitted way. According to Hegel, the educated (gebildete) individual is able toconsider a manifold of standpoints on a given issue through awareness of the historical and cultural variability of beliefs. Hans-Georg Gadamer invokes Hegel’s account of Bildung in arguing that historicalstudy permits current presuppositions (Vorurteile) to become reflected through the awareness of cognitive plurality and change that such study brings about. The paper mainly tries to show three things: (i) that Hegel is a source of inspiration for Gadamer in this regard but that there are also important differences between their accounts of Bildung; (ii) that these accounts are not unambiguous; and (iii) that Gadamer, in particular, makes somewhat elusive claims on the power of Bildung.
40. The Southern Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 46 > Issue: 4
David Scott Malebranche and Descartes on Method: Psychologism, Free Will, and Doubt
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The subject of this paper is Malebranche’s relation to Descartes on the question of method. Using recent commentary as a springboard, it examines whether Malebranche advances a nonpsychologistic account of method, in contrast to the psychologism typically thought to characterize the Cartesian view. I explore this question with respect to two issues of central importance to method generally: doubt and free will. My argument is that, despite superficial differences of emphasis, Descartes and Malebranche adopt positions on doubt and free will that effectively ensure that their respective accounts of method aresubstantially the same.