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Displaying: 21-40 of 1471 documents


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21. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Tanner Hammond Objective Purport, Relational Confirmation, and the Presumption of Moral Objectivism: A Probabilistic Argument from Moral Experience
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All else being equal, can an objective-seeming character of moral experience support a presumption in favor of some form of moral objectivism? Don Loeb (2007) has argued that even if we grant that moral experience appears to present us with a realm of objective moral facts—something he denies we have reason to do in the first place—the objective purport of moral experience cannot by itself provide even prima facie support for moral objectivism. In what follows, I contend against Loeb that granting the objective purport of ordinary moral experience is sufficient to shift a presumptive case in favor of moral objectivism, and this by constituting non-explanatory, relational confirmation that incrementally raises the prima facie probability that moral facts exist. More specifically, I appeal to a modest confirmational principle shared by Likelihoodists and Bayesians—namely, the Weak Law of Likelihood—in an effort to show that (i) at a minimum, granting the objective purport of moral experience establishes a middling scrutable probability for a sufficient but not necessary condition of moral objectivism being true, and that (ii) this moderate probability in turn constitutes evidence that makes it prima facie more probable than not that at least some form of moral objectivism is true.
22. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
Jack Warman Reflections on Intellectual Grandstanding
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In this short paper, I present a philosophical account of intellectual grandstanding. In section 2, I identify a putative case of intellectual grandstanding. In section 3, I introduce Tosi and Warmke’s account of moral grandstanding (Tosi and Warmke, 2016, 2020). In section 4, I highlight some of the similarities and differences between intellectual and moral grandstanding. In section 5, I conclude by proposing some further lines of inquiry.
23. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 1
G. M. Trujillo, Jr. The Benefits of Being a Suicidal Curmudgeon: Emil Cioran on Killing Yourself
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Emil Cioran offers novel arguments against suicide. He assumes a meaningless world. But in such a world, he argues, suicide and death would be equally as meaningless as life or anything else. Suicide and death are as cumbersome and useless as meaning and life. Yet Cioran also argues that we should contemplate suicide to live better lives. By contemplating suicide, we confront the deep suffering inherent in existence. This humbles us enough to allow us to change even the deepest aspects of ourselves. Yet it also reminds us that our peculiar human ability—being able to contemplate suicide—sets us above anything else in nature or in the heavens. This paper assembles and defends a view of suicide written about in Cioran’s aphorisms and essays.
commentaries
24. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Mark Silcox Comments on “A Separability Principle, Contrast Cases, and Contributory Dispositions” by Zak Kopeikin
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25. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew Russo Comments on “Six Arguments against ‘Ought Implies Can’”
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26. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
John Harris Hypothetical Consent’s Unnecessary Shuffle
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27. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robyn Gaier Comments on Bryan Smyth’s “De-Moralizing Heroism: Ethical Expertise and the Object of Heroic Approbation”
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28. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Paul Carron Emotion Regulation and the Cultivation of Virtue: Comments on “The Broader Threat of Situationism to Virtue Ethics”
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29. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Daniel Carr Comments on Tim Lord’s “Eliminative Materialism, Historical Consciousness, and R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Mind”
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30. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
C.E. Abbate Commentary on Deborah Heikes’s “Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility”
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31. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Richard Galvin Maxims, Contraries, Contradictions and Kant’s Universal Law Formula
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32. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Nathan Jackson Ameliorative Potential in the Relational Autonomy Debate
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33. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez On the Category of Nonconsensual Sex: A Reply to Shannon Fyfe and Elizabeth Lanphier
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34. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Bob Fischer Comments on J. P. Andrew’s “The Insignificance of Taste”
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35. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andy Piker Comments on Alastair Norcross’s “The Impotence of the Causal Impotence Objection”
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36. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Julie Kuhlken The Virtuous Artist: A Commentary on “Is Art a Virtue”
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37. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Stefan Sencerz “Epistemic Goods”: A Reply to Jerry Green
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38. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Dave Beisecker The Consequences of Falsehood: Comments on Nikolaus Breiner’s “Charles Peirce on Assertion: Assuming Liabilities as Offering Evidence”
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open submission articles
39. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Heidi Savage The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Non-Literalism and The Habits of Sherlock Holmes
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Many, if not most philosophers, deny that a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is true. However, this attitude confl icts with speakers’ assignment of the value true to this sentence. Furthermore, making these assignments seem in no way distinct from the process that leads speakers to assign true to other sentences, sentences like ‘Bertrand Russell smokes.’ I will explore the idea that when speakers assign the value true to the first sentence, they are not making any kind of confused mistake — that we ought to take these assignments at face value. I show how the alternative view is inadequate for explaining various examples of fi ctional discourse. In addition, evidence that these truth value assignments to sentences are tracking semantic content, rather than pragmatic effects, is offered.
40. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Fischer Why are You Proud of That?: Cognitivism About “Possessive” Emotions
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Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).