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Displaying: 21-29 of 29 documents

21. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Minxing Huang Aristotle’s Categorical Syllogistic and its Relation to Scientific Knowledge
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Aristotle’s Prior Analytics is probably the earliest existing systematic philosophical writing on a syllogistic system and theory of logic. In this work, Aristotle introduces the categorical syllogistic, consisting of three figures and fourteen valid moods. This paper proposes that Aristotle distinguishes a general notion of syllogisms from a more technical notion of syllogisms. Syllogisms that belong to the categorical syllogistic fall under Aristotle’s technical notion of syllogisms that must satisfy two conditions: (1) a conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and (2) the premises derive a conclusion that necessarily follows from them in regard to attributing the major extreme to the minor.
22. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Samuel A. Taylor, Brett Coppenger Inferential Internalism Defended
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Many of our beliefs are the product of inference and depend on chains of reasoning from other beliefs we hold. Inferential internalism is the view that an inference can only provide justification if one is aware of the support relation that holds between the premises and conclusion. This inferential internalist requirement is controversial even among epistemologists who accept internalist conditions on justification more generally. In this paper, we argue that the intuition underlying a central motivation for internalism more generally is the same intuition that motivates inferential internalism. As such, internalists who reject the more demanding requirements of inferential internalism are prima facie involved in a problematic inconsistency. We finish the paper by considering a dilemma for inferential internalism and presenting two strategies for responding.
23. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Joost Ziff Finding the Agent in Thinking
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24. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Michael Hall The Question of Wittgensteinian Thomism: Grammar and Metaphysics
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Wittgensteinian Thomism (WT) proposes a post-Wittgensteinian reading of Aquinas based on the presence of genuine affinities between them in philosophical anthropology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, action theory, and ethics. While this proposal has been historically fruitful in the works of Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Anthony Kenny, and Herbert McCabe, there is a significant difficulty in the prima facie incompatibility in the respective attitudes towards metaphysics between Wittgenstein and Aquinas. This calls into question the very coherence of the WT proposal. Against this objection, I will argue that WT is a coherent proposal which can harmonize these seemingly incompatible attitudes towards metaphysics by showing that Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical observations do not necessarily exclude metaphysics but provides a guide towards it. I will argue that rather than being opposed, grammar and metaphysics are concomitantly joined in Wittgenstein’s later remarks. If this reading of Wittgenstein surmounts that proposed by Hacker, then the incoherence objection to WT simply fails.
25. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Armand Babakhanian Naive Action Theory and Essentially Intentional Actions
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In their recent paper, “Practical Knowledge without Luminosity,” Bob Beddor and Carlotta Pavese (2022) claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions, or “essentialism,” is false. Essentialism states that some actions are essentially intentional, such that, “whenever they are performed, they are performed intentionally” (2022, p. 926). Beddor and Pavese work to reject essentialism, which figures as a key premise in Juan Piñeros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument against the knowledge condition for intentional action (Piñeros Glasscock, p. 1240). Historically, essentialism has received little attention from philosophers since its inception in Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention (2000, §47). However, I believe that essentially intentional actions can play an important role in an ontology of action. In my paper, I develop and argue for a variety of essentialism in the context of naive action theory, which I call naive essentialism. Naive essentialism is a two-fold thesis, which claims that (1) essentially intentional actions exist, and (2) that essentially intentional actions ground accidentally intentional actions. My paper has four parts. In the first part, I distinguish between essentially and accidentally intentional actions, and unpack the relevant principles of naive action theory. Second, I present the grounding thesis that accidentally intentional actions are grounded in essentially intentional actions. Next, I provide an argument for the existence of essentially intentional actions. Lastly, I briefly respond to a possible objection to my argument. The upshot of my arguments is that essentially intentional actions form the metaphysical and explanatory bedrock in a naive ontology of action, and that there are good reasons for accepting a key premise in Piñeros Glasscock’s anti-luminosity argument.
26. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Sarah Pressman Nullified Non-Consent
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27. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Heather Rabenberg Inquiring While Believing
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28. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Steve Smith The Dramatism of Realism
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Theoretical conceptions of realness can indicate what is fundamental or invariant in our experience of the world but are bound to miss a main point of realism due to the practical detachment of theoretical world modeling. The central sense in recognizing beings we encounter as real is accepting that we are or might be sharing existence with them, partnering with them in some significant way in the development of the world. This stance of engagement belongs to our modeling of how to live. The intentional sharing of existence makes for a dramatic situation, the sharers being viewed as interesting agents or quasi-agents who bear watching because the results of their combining actions might be important (possibly in a fictional world). Dramatizing life realistically is a basic expression of intentional vitality and is presupposed in highly serious forms of moral and aesthetic engagement (such as reverence and enchantment).
29. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1
Walter Barta Biting the Bullet on Toothlessness
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