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21. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Casey Hall The Impossibility of Hypocritical Advice
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22. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Jaeha Woo Moral Guilt without Blameworthiness
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23. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Joshua Anderson Collective Identity and Cultural Pluralism: Alain Locke on Stereotypes in Literature
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24. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Mike Jostedt, Jr. Finding a Place in Space: Jane Addams and the Ethics of Choosing Where to Live
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25. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Deborah K. Heikes Epistemic Involuntarism and Undesirable Beliefs
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Epistemologists debate the nature of epistemic responsibility. Rarely do they consider the implications of this debate on assigning responsibility for undesirable beliefs such as racist and sexist ones. Contrary to our natural tendency to believe and to act as if we are responsible for holding undesirable beliefs, empirical evidence indicates that beliefs such as implicit biases are not only unconsciously held but are intractably held. That is, even when we become consciously aware of our biases, we have enormous difficulty changing them and believing differently than we do. This paper considers five responses to epistemic involuntarism. It considers how each response provides or fails to provide a principled means for holding individuals epistemically responsible for their undesirable beliefs. The involuntaristic nature of at least some beliefs seems obvious, but, in the end, we can choose to cultivate epistemic virtues that can influence these beliefs.
26. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Jerry Green Recalcitrant Beliefs and Epistemic Akrasia
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27. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Brian J. Collins Can Utilitarianism Make Sense of ‘Political Obligation’?
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Despite utilitarianism’s status as one of the major ethical theories, historically it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. The primary goal of this paper is to respond to the structural objections that have been leveled against utilitarian accounts of political obligation. In the process of responding to these objections I fi rst offer a sketch of a general account of “obligations” which the utilitarian can endorse. Secondly, I argue that anti-utilitarian theorists have missed an important ethical distinction between “derivative” and “nonderivative” moral principles. The failure to make this distinction, as it relates to ‘political obligation,’ has not only brought about the categorical dismissal of utilitarian accounts it has also muddied the terms and goals of the debate generally.
28. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Travis Quigley NIMBYism and Nationalism
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29. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 39 > Issue: 1
Josué M. Piñeiro Rilkean Memory, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Violence
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Mark Rowlands develops a novel account of remembering in which episodic memories survive in a mutated form after their content has been long forgotten. He dubs this account “Rilkean memories.” I draw from this account to argue that episodic memories of past epistemic harms resulting from Miranda Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice, can persist as embodied behavioral or bodily dispositions that have negative epistemic and practical consequences long after these episodic memories have been forgotten. The way that others judge us as epistemic agents—as people with the capacity to know or the ability to contribute to the pool of knowledge—and following this judgment, treat or fail to treat us as epistemic agents can cause us to adopt attitudes or behaviors with consequences to our epistemic agency. When embodied as Rilkean memories, these attitudes or behaviors raise new difficulties and become quite difficult to eradicate.