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21. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Evangelia Sembou Where Does the Significance of Hegel’s Phenomenology Lie?
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This paper advances the view that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is an experiential philosophy. It starts with an examination of what Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology consists in. It is argued that Hegel’s Phenomenology is an experiential philosophy because it constitutes the immanent development of truth as it is experienced (of “phenomenal knowledge”); both because it is about the “experience of consciousness” and because it requires of the philosopher that he surrender to the development of the subject-matter. Put differently, the philosopher’s role is to live the “experience of consciousness” from within. The philosopher (Hegel) does not import any external criteria by means of which to assess the validity of each one of consciousness’s claims and worldviews. He merely observes consciousness’s self-examination and comments on it. In this way he turns consciousness’s phenomenological experience into a science. Simultaneously, Hegel guides the observing consciousness of the reader(s) into comprehending the “experience of consciousness” as its own education (Bildung). So the readers, too immerse themselves into the immanent development of consciousness and, as a result, adopt an inside perspective. It is this engagement of the philosopher (Hegel and the reader(s)) with the account that is the most significant aspect of Hegel’s Phenomenology.
22. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Elvira Simfa Being Moral and Loving Oneself: Kant on Self-Love, Self-Conceit and Morality
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Kant’s moral theory is often perceived through opposition of reason (morality) and inclinations. I argue that this opposition has to be reconsidered by taking in account the complex character of inclinations and differ between self-love and self-conceit. Self-conceit violates prudential rationality and is not compatible with morality. Self-love, due to its particular structure that presupposes ability to overcome oneself, can be interpreted as enabling and preparing humans to obey moral commands and successfully aim at happiness.
23. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Wei Song Mill on Function of Art in the Cultivation of Virtue
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On Mill’s view, aesthetic education or the education of the feelings and the cultivation of the beautiful, like intellectual education or moral education, is an important ingredient of human culture, which is indispensable to the completeness of the human being. By historically analyzing the difference of ideas of virtue, which may have been existing between the British people and those of the European Continent, namely, for the former, virtue is almost exclusively an affair of duty, but for the latter, virtue is an affair of the sentiments, Mill believes that a higher and nobler form of expressing the feelings and the beautiful, i.e. Art, enables both sides to aim at a complete and perfect virtue. His reason is as follows, since the perfection is itself the object of Art, Art enables the human mind to maintain a high tone, consequently, the human mind with a high tone will regard human life as a work of Art and will strive for improving it. Mill’s this view of life as Art fully conforms to his belief on self-development and moral progress, and both of them represent his profound understanding and insights of individual person and individual life.
24. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Martin Thibodeau Tragedy and Ethical Agency in Hegel’s The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate
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In recent years much attention has been devoted to Hegel’s interpretation of Greek tragedy. Admittedly, authors dealing with Hegel’s understanding of tragedy have adopted different perspectives and pursued different goals. Yet they do share a common view: tragedy plays a crucial role in shaping some key features of Hegel’s philosophy. In my paper, I focus on the particular feature of ethical life and I argue that Hegel’s later ‘retrospective’ theory of action finds some of its key insights in his interpretation of Greek tragedy as developed in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate.
25. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Stanley Tweyman Hume on Space, Geometry, and Knowledge
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At the end of Book 1, Part 1, Section IV of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume informs us that the topics in Book 1, Part 1 “may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy”. (T.13) Among the topics discussed in Part 1 of this Book is distinctions of reason, which he covers briefly toward the end of his treatment of abstract ideas. While other topics treated in this Part of Book 1 are clearly utilized in subsequent Sections, Parts, and Books of the Treatise (for example, impressions and ideas, philosophical and natural relations), distinctions of reason are rarely mentioned beyond his discussion of this topic toward the end of Section V11 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise. My paper has several aims: First, I will attempt to show the role that distinctions of reason play in providing our awareness of space; second, I will show how Hume’s empiricist account of Geometry in the Treatise is developed through his account of our awareness space; and third, I will briefly address the altered account of Geometry in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
26. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
B. J. van der Walt Exploring Philosophical Historiographical Problems and Methods
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How to study and portray the long history of Western philosophy is the main aim of this paper. The reconnaissance develops through the following four stages: (1) The introduction surveys the major problems confronting any historiographer of philosophy. (2) The second section provides a critical overview of some earlier and contemporary methodologies of describing philosophical history, identifying their strong and weak points. (3) In the light of what is regarded as deficiencies in these methods, the next section formulates a few essential criteria to be followed by the historiographer. (4) The consistent problem-historical method, first developed by Prof. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven and afterwards also applied by his followers, are then evaluated against these guidelines. From a brief description of this method it becomes evident to be consistent in the following respects. It is consistently developed from the clearly stated presuppositions of the historiographer; consistently philosophical; consistent in its problem-historical approach; consistent in the terminology used, and has also being experimentally tested.
27. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Andrew Ward Has Kant Answered Hume’s Causal Scepticism?
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Do Hume and Kant hold strongly divergent views about the causal principle, viz. the principle that every event or change of state in nature must have a cause? It has traditionally been held that they do, and on the ground that while Hume claims that there is no justification for the principle’s acceptance, Kant claims that the principle can be shown to be necessary for the possibility of experience. However, I argue that, on Hume’s account of how we come to believe in the existence of external objects, it is not possible for us to perceive any external object that is changing its state randomly or acausally. Accordingly, Hume is no position to deny that the causal principle can be justified, given he acknowledges, like Kant, that we do believe ourselves capable of perceiving events, or changes of state, in nature. Equally, Kant is no position to claim to have answered Hume’s scepticism about the causal principle given he acknowledges, like Hume, that the objects of the senses are, in reality, merely appearances and not things in themselves.
28. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Ekaterina Zbrozhek The Topicality of Hegel in Zizek’s Philosophy
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As a rule, any philosopher begins the intellectual activity with criticism of previous tradition or its reconsideration. Nevertheless he always has figures which are reference points of his own reasoning. For Zizek’s philosophy of one of such figures is Hegel. But it is not Hegel of ordinary perception. Zizek addresses to Hegel through Kozhev and Lakan. He is not orthodox Hegelian. Zizek takes some important concepts from Hegel, seeming him an actual for a modern philosophical context. They are concepts of distinction, totality, recoverability and negativity. How Zizek uses these concepts in his own philosophical reflection we tried to show in the article.
articles in french
29. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Kyriakos Katsimanis De la définition de la philosophie à l’énumération de ses fonctions principales
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La méditation rétrospective inhérente à l’attitude philosophique nous mène à la question suivante: qu’est-ce que la philosophie elle-même? La raison principale pour laquelle une définition logiquement rigoureuse de la philosophie est extrêmement difficile sinon complètement impossible est que cette notion s’avère particulièrement générale, vague, fluide et changeante. Il en résulte que toute différence spécifique qui est condition indispensable à toute définition valable se révèle incapable de spécifier, de préciser et d’éclaircir la notion de philosophie. Pour surmonter cette difficulté, il serait préférable de considérer le problème sous un angle visuel différent, à savoir la catégorisation adoptée par le sujet du 23me Congrès Mondial de Philosophie. Ainsi, au lieu de répondre à la question: «Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?», il vaudrait mieux essayer de répondre à la question suivante: «Quelles sont les activités ou plutôt les fonctions principales de la philosophie en tant que “Questionnement” et “Mode de vie” ? L’énumération de ces fonctions nous fait penser que l’initiateur de la philosophie proprement dite serait Socrate. Aussi, tout en réaffirmant la première apparition de la philosophie avec les philosophes dits «présocratiques», serait-il plus exact de soutenir que la philosophie au sens moderne du mot est née à Athènes, avec Socrate.
30. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Marceline Morais La dimension philosophique de l’amour selon Platon et Simmel
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À partir d’écrits très connus de Platon sur l’amour, soit le Phèdre et le Banquet, et d’un ouvrage posthume de Simmel, intitulé Philosophie de l’amour, nous tenterons de révéler les liens étroits qui unissent la recherche philosophique et le sentiment amoureux. Contre le caractère uniquement rationnel et objectif de la philosophie, nous ferons ressortir la part de délire et de folie qui l’habite, son ancrage dans un sentiment et son origine pré-logique. On verra notamment que chez Platon l’amour pour un être humain témoigne de notre aspiration à la beauté et guide notre passage vers l’intelligible où se trouve la vérité et l’être. Parallèlement, chez Simmel, l’amour apparaîtra comme une force intérieure à la vie qui pousse toutefois à la dépasser vers un monde de l’esprit. La philosophie et l’amour auraient ainsi comme objectif de dépasser le monde immanent, empirique, des buts rationnels et pragmatiques, le cercle des besoins vitaux, pour s’élancer au-delà de cette sphère. Enfin, nous verrons également comment, né de la vie et de la nature, l‘amour qui en possède la fécondité, est ce qui pousse à créer, à innover, tant au plan artistique que philosophique.
31. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Adrian Nita Réalité et actualité chez Kan
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L’une de très importants idées sur l’idéalisme transcendantale kantien vise les notions qui sont impliquées dans cette démarche philosophique: l’espace, le temps et la réalité. On a ici le motive pour lequel nous nous proposons de presenter les relations entre l’existence et la réalité, d’une partie, et l’actualité (Wirklichkeit) et la réalité, d’autre partie, dans le conditions que la plupart des traductions de Kant usent dans un mode indistincte les termes “réalité ” et “actualité”.
32. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Gennady Samuylov Aristote et Joseph de Maistre
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Presque 200 ans se sont écoulés depuis la mort de Joseph de Maistre, mais ‘intérêt de son héritage ne s’est pas éteint. Toute l’oeuvre de Maistre est fondée et développée sur la base de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il se trouve au coeur du développement de la civilisation universelle et il exprime toutes ses idées dans le courant européen de l’histoire de la pensée occidentale. Il place ses idées dans le contexte historico-philosophique. De plus, il cherche dans l’histoire des principes communs qui existent depuis toujours et sont partagés au fur et mesure par toutes les cultures. Dans notre étude il s’agira de mettre en évidence la dimension historico-philosophique des idées principales de Maistre et leurs liens avec les systèmes théologico-philosophiques de l’Antiquité, à savoir d’Aristote. Maistre rejette l’interprétation matérialiste de la philosophie d’Aristote. Dans l’intention de défendre la thèse sur ‘existence de la connaissance innée, Maistre interprète et utilise la philosophie d’Aristote. Maistre tente de présenter les formes et les lois du jugement comme les formes transcendantes et immanentes de la raison, c’est-à-dire semblables aux idées innées. Il fixe principalement son attention sur le syllogisme, pour lui, le syllogisme et la raison sont des synonymes. Pour démontrer l’existence d’un principe spirituel de l’existence du monde, qui est immatériel, actif et intelligible, il s’appuie sur les réflexions d’Aristote dans le livre Lambda de la Métaphysique. La nouveauté de cette étude consiste en ce qui suit: ce travail a comme objectif de présenter les liens des idées philosophiques de la théologie “universelle” de Joseph de Maistre avec la philosophie d’Aristote. Jusqu’à aujourd’hui il n’existe pas de recherche systématique et complète sur ce sujet, bien que ces liens soient implicitement et explicitement présents dans tous les livres du penseur savoisien.
articles in german
33. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
José Antonio Giménez Lust, Sprache und das gute Leben in Platons Philebos
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Die Platonforschung hat sich immer wieder mit den interpretatorischen Schwierigkeiten des Philebos befasst. Wahrscheinlich besteht die ernsthafteste Schwierigkeit dieses Dialogs darin, die Vielfalt der Themen, die hier behandelt werden, miteinander zu verbinden. Im Philebos wird die Frage nach dem guten Leben als Hauptthema vorgestellt, aber im Laufe des Dialogs werden sowohl dialektische Überlegungen über das Problem des Einen und Vielen als auch eine Klassifikation der ontologischen Gattungen des Kosmos eingeführt. Angesichts dieser Situation haben sich viele Interpreten ausschließlich auf die theoretischen Fragen konzentriert, ohne den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Fragen und der ethischen Fragestellung zu berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag versucht zu erklären, wie die Frage nach dem guten Leben mithilfe der Begriffsanalyse behandelt werden soll, sodass die dialektische Reflexion über die Bedingungen der Sprache durch die Sachorientierung der ethischen Fragestellung erforderlich wird. Der Philebos kann demnach nur als eine kompositorische Einheit betrachtet werden, sofern man zunächst die hier vorliegende Verbindung von Ethik und Dialektik versteht.
34. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Katsutoshi Kawamura Der Crusius’sche Freiheitsbegriff und seine Voraussetzungen
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Der Leipziger Pietist Chr. A. Crusius (1715-1775) setzt sich mit dem von Leibniz und Wolff festgelegten „Satz vom zureichenden Grund“ auseinander, nach dem nicht nur jedes Naturgeschehnis, sondern auch jede Handlung des Menschen a priori determiniert zu verstehen ist. Zunächst kritisiert Crusius die Vieldeutigkeit des Begriffs „Grund“, wo er zunächst zwischen „Realgrund“ und „Erkenntnisgrund“ unterscheidet, und weiterhin ersteren in „wirkende Ursache“ und „Existentialgrund“, und letzteren in „Erkenntnisgrund a priori“ und „Erkenntnisgrund a posteriori“ einteilt. Nach Crusius hat menschliche freie Handlung keinen eindeutig determinierenden Grund, sondern nur wirkende Ursache, die jeder seinerseits ablehnen kann. Crusius gründet seinen Freiheitsbegriff auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, nach der freie Handlungen wegen der Endlichkeit des Menschen nur a posteriori erkannt werden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich zu zeigen, dass im Freiheitsbegriff von Crusius, der „Grundtätigkeit der Freiheit“, ein Muster der Vereinbarkeit von der empirisch orientierten Freiheit und dem Determinismus einzusehen ist.
35. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Nicolae Rambu Das Leben als ein Geschäft. Überlegungen zu Schopenhauers Eudämonologie
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Mein Beitrag wird versuchen, die inneren Spannungen der Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit Schopenhauers darzustellen. Zuerst geht es um den axiologischen Bankrott des Lebens, dann um ein moralisches Dilemma, in dem sich der Leser Schopenhauers befindet: Idealismus oder Weisheit. Am Ende des Beitrags stellt sich die Frage, ob die Aufgabe der Philosophie darin besteht, gegen „die moralischen und intellektuellen Ungeheuer“ auf unserer Welt kämpfen zu sollen. Kann also die Philosophie eine Therapeutik des Geistes sein? Das bleibt eine offene Frage.
articles in spanish
36. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Miguel Giusti On the Current Relevance of Hegel’s Conception of Freedom
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Despite the bad reputation that Hegel’s thought has always enjoyed regarding the respect for individual rights, his conception of freedom has shown an unexpected and permanent relevance. I think this is due to the level of complexity with which Hegel explains the problem of freedom. In this paper I will try to develop Hegel’s thesis, according to which freedom is conceived simultaneously as a set and a process of determinations of the will. To illustrate the thesis, I will use two concrete examples. First, in order to show the objective structure of the determinations of freedom, I will refer to the debate between communitarians and liberals in recent ethical and political philosophy, trying to show why both positions refer, in some way, to a lower level of complexity than the one presented by Hegel. Then, with the aim of showing the current relevance of the notion of freedom as a progressive experience of the acquisition of its own determinations, I will take as an example the interpretation offered by Axel Honneth in his book Leiden an Unbestimmtheit.
articles in russian
37. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Виталий Юрьевич Бельский Философско-антропологическая концепция К.Д. Ушинского (1824 – 1871)
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The paper examines the socio-philosophical and anthropological views of K. D. Ushinsky. In this paper I try to outline the shaping of his philosophical system of history of philosophy, especially Hegel’s philosophi-cal system. I also focus on the qualitative features of the philosophical-anthropological system of Ushinsky, both in methodology and the understanding of the processes of formation of the ideal.
38. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Adel Ivanova, Valentin Pukhlikov Исторические судьбы диалектики как метода философствования о мире и человеке
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The history of philosophy is, in a certain sense, the history of development of dialectics as a method of building the system of ontology and epistemology. Dialectics appeared in Ancient Greece as a result of the attempts of philosophers to express the changeability and movement of the world in the system of concepts. Socrates’s dialectics becomes a consciously applied method of searching for the truth in philosophy. This method gets developed in Plato’s philosophy, where the dialectics is expressed in a system of contradictory assertions which are both true and both false. This concept of the dialectics was solidified in Kant’s philosophy by fixing the system of antinomies in the sphere of pure reason. Hegel made an attempt to convert the dialectics into a necessary element of the scientific proof. Later this attempt was developed to the logical limit in the philosophy of Marx and Engels. This concept of the dialectics was criticized in the works of Russian philosophers I. Il’yin and S. Frank.
39. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Valerian Ramishvili Обоснование достоинства человеческого бытия в онтологии М. Хайдеггера
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Human dignity, as a form of Human’s being and understanding of the world, lost its ontological ground, which is a direct consequence of the oblivion of the being. Human dignity is possible on the ground of free thinking about Being and it is a free thinking of the being. The person has refused possibility of thinking of the being, because the Being has turned into the tran-scendence, the beyond (for God has died). Heidegger considers that Being is not transcendental, the beyond and thinking about being is possible and essential. The transcendence of Being is rejected by the explanation of possibility of “initial meeting” of Being and human. For this purpose Heidegger carried out the following steps: New understanding of an ontological difference means not only distinction of Being and real things, and distinction between Being and the form of self-giveness of Being in the world. Heidegger defined forms of a self-giveness of Being in the world as a hierarchical order: Sein ist, Sein ereignis, Sein es gibt, which is defined by the degree of openness of the Being in the world. The modern thinking forgot the paradigm of Christ, as the example of “initial meeting”. The transition from conceptualization of the Being to ontologization of the Being creates ontology of the being.