Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 31-40 of 51 documents


disputed question: are names said of god and creatures univocally?
31. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Brian Davies, O.P. Response to Richard Cross on “Are Names Said of God and Creatures Univocally?”
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
cepos discussion
32. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco, OP Defending Adam After Darwin: On the Origin of Sapiens as a Natural Kind
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
For many contemporary Christian theologians, evolutionary biology rules out any account of an Adam and Eve that would explain the origin of our species. In response, I propose that they have uncritically embraced the anti-essentialist presuppositions of the dominant scientific narrative for the origins of our kind. In fact, there are sound and robust reasons to think that human beings share an intrinsic essence that puts them into a natural kind. I also propose that our natural kind can be defined by our developmental capacity for language, which I suggest is needed for abstract thinking. Thus, it is still reasonable to trace the origins of our natural kind to an original individual. He would have been the first anatomically modern human to have evolved this capacity for hierarchical and non-linear language that allowed him to construct an abstract internal map of the world.
33. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Anne Siebels Peterson Matter in Biology: An Aristotelian Metaphysics for Contemporary Homology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Aristotle insists that the organic matter composing an organism depends for its being and becoming upon the living organism whose organic matter it is. An evolutionary context may at first seem to secure autonomy for an organism’s organic matter: after all, in such a context not only can organisms in divergent taxa have the same trait, but a trait can remain the same through thoroughgoing changes in its form, function, composition, and organismic context over evolutionary time. The biological homology concept attempts to capture this mysterious relationship of trait sameness. However, accounts of biological homology that have dominated the contemporary scene face compelling problems—these problems, I will argue, arise from their exclusion of the organism as an explanatory locus for the being and becoming of biological traits. An evolutionary framework in fact supports an account of homology that retains these two aspects of Aristotle’s views on organic matter.
34. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Paul Allen Lonergan, Science, and God: Realism, Experience, and Emergent Probability
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (d. 1984) advocated a critical realism, in which scientific and theological knowledge are products of self-critical phenomenological analysis. Allying his thought with Thomas Aquinas in elaborating a cognitional theory to serve epistemology and metaphysics, Lonergan challenged reigning idealist and empiricist philosophies by understanding the human knower as ordered both to the known world and to divine providence. This paper will sketch four themes in which Lonergan constructs a methodical link between phenomenology and both contemporary science and theology. Lonergan does not embody the frequently cited idea of a rupture in Catholic thought from pre-Vatican II to post-conciliar thought, notably in his treatment of science and religion.
book reviews
35. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Andrew J. Jaeger Aquinas On the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union. By Michael Gorman
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
36. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Gaston G. LeNotre On Sale, Securities, and Insurance. By Leonardus Lessius. Translated by Wim Decock and Nicholas De Sutter
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
37. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Mark K. Spencer The Rigor of Things: Conversations with Dan Arbib. By Jean-Luc Marion and Dan Arbib. Translated by Christina M. Gschwandtner
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
38. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 2
Christopher Toner Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace. By Gregory Reichberg
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
articles
39. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Ambrose Little, OP Are You What You Eat or Something More?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The question “Are you what you eat?” is ultimately a question about change. When we eat, are the nutrients from the food simply added to the biological complex we call the body or are the nutrients a product of substantial change? The scientific literature on digestion often describes the process in the former manner, which, if it were the only way to describe the data, would prove problematic to an Aristotelian and Thomist philosophy. However, the interpretation of the scientific data is not so simple and can be understood within the framework of a broad range of philosophical perspectives. This paper is an attempt to show how it is possible to reconcile the scientific data of digestion with an Aristotelian-Thomistic natural philosophy.
40. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 92 > Issue: 1
Melissa Moschella Gestation Does Not Necessarily Imply Parenthood: Implications for the Morality of Embryo Adoption and Embryo Rescue
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article defends the morality of heterologous embryo transfer (HET) against those who claim that HET is wrong because it makes a woman a mother through someone other than her spouse. I contrast genetic parenthood with gestation to show that gestation alone does not make someone a mother in the focal sense. Genetic parenthood gives rise to the full obligations of parenthood—i.e., makes someone a parent in the focal sense—because the child’s relationship to his genetic parents is (1) permanent, (2) identity-defining, and (3) initially (at conception) the child’s closest human relationship. While the gestational relationship importantly influences the child’s identity, it lacks the unique closeness, permanence, and identity-defining nature that characterize the genetic parent-child relationship, and therefore gives rise only to temporary obligations akin to those of a foster parent. Recognizing these crucial differences between gestation and procreation helps to show that HET is not inherently immoral.