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epistemology and cognition
21. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Elena O. Trufanova Елена Олеговна Труфанова
On Hegemony, Acceptance of the Differences and Social Construction of Knowledge
О гегемонии, признании различий и социальном конструировании знания

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The paper analyzes current situation in epistemology that is characterized by the appearance of the so called alternative epistemologies opposing the classical epistemology. The ties between alternative epistemologies and Karl Marx’ class consciousness concept and its development in the neo- and postmarxist works (by A.Gramsci, E.Laclau, Ch.Mouffe) is demonstrated. The research is focused on the concept of “false consciousness” that serves as a basis of the concepts of ideology and hegemony. The concept of hegemony in neo- and postmarxism is analyzed, it is shown how its application is reflected in the research of scientific knowledge: some authors claim that science is an agent of hegemony and it helps to maintain the illusion of the objectivity of the existence of certain phenomena. The proponents of this position – social constructionists, feminist philosophers et. al. – suggest to accept the equal value of the positions of different social groups each of which holds its own special discourse that helps to express the “knowledge” specific to this certain group. It is shown that such position sees “knowledge” as no longer universal, the knowledge is equaled to local understanding of the world. The conclusion is drawn that the position of K. Marx that gives basis to many claims of postmarxists and social constructionist is more favorable in comparison to them, because Marx whilst speaking of class consciousness assigns an important role to the individual subject. It allows to combine both universalistic understanding of knowledge and account not only for group differences, but for each individuality.
language and mind
22. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Karim Zahidi Карим Захиди
How to Leave Descartes Behind: On the Relevance of Marxism for Post-Cartesian Philosophy of Mind
Преодолевая Декарта

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Both mainstream cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind remain wedded to the Cartesian picture of the mind as an isolated, self-sufficient, and constitutively individual phenomenon. However, recently approaches to the mind (e.g. extended mind thesis, enactivism) that depart from the standard view have emerged. Aunifying thread that runs through these approaches can be summed up in the slogan: “to understand mental phenomena one cannot do away with the environment”. Differences between these related views pertain to the strength of the modal operator “cannot”. On the strongest reading the slogan implies that the mind is constituted by the environment. While this interpretation is akin to Marx view on the constitution of consciousness, this link is overlooked in the literature. In this paper, I will argue that Marxists philosophical thinking about the mind, as exemplified by the activity approach, offers a sound philosophical basis for the further development of post-Cartesian views in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Furthermore, I will argue that the materialistic method proposed by these thinkers is the most promising approach to the problem of naturalizing the mind.
23. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Chris Drain Крис Дрэйн
Cognition, Activity, and Content: A.N. Leontiev and the Enactive Origin of “Ideal Reflective Content”
Познание, деятельность и содержание

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According to Leontiev’s “activity approach,” the external world is not something available to be “worked over” according to a subject’s inner or “ideal” representations; at stake instead is the emergence of an “idealized” objective world that relates to a subject’s activity both internally and externally construed. In keeping with a Marxian account of anthropogenesis, Leontiev links the emergence of “ideality” with social activity itself, incorporating it within the general movement between the poles of ‘inner’ cognition and ‘external’ action. In this manner, Leontiev both parallels and goes beyond Hutto and Myin’s recent “enactivist” account of “content-involving” cognition, where representational thought depends on socio-cultural scaffolding and, as such, is uniquely human. What traditionally comes to be called representational content is for Leontiev the result of the transition from a primitive cognitive apparatus of “image-consciousness” to a one which is mediated by social activity. For the being endowed with “activity-consciousness,” mental content is something apprehended by assimilating “the objective world in its ideal form” [Leontiev, 1977, p. 189]. And the precondition for such assimilation is the apprehension of meanings from their origin in the social-material system of activity. The genesis of content-involving cognition is thus coeval with the development of socializing activity systems, replete with the external representations of values and norms as described in enactivist literature as publicly scaffolded symbol systems. Leontiev thus offers an anti-internalist account of cognition commensurate with Hutto and Myin but with the added dimension of a developmental scale of analysis with which to explain the origin of human-specific cognition.
24. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Juraj Halas Юрай Галас
Marxian “Abstraction” and Contemporary Philosophy of Science
Марксова «абстракция» и современная философия науки

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The method of “abstraction” had been the centerpiece of earlier attempts at founding a Marxist philosophy of science – from Engels to Soviet Marxism. This paper confronts Marx’s writings on abstraction with contemporary views of the method, stemming mostly from the analytic and (post-)empiricist traditions. In Section 2, I reconstruct the roles that abstraction was to play, according to Marx, in the construction of a scientific theory, focusing exclusively on his own writings. The analysis reveals certain rules, left mostly implicit in Marx, for the correct application of the method of abstraction. These are discussed in Section 3. The first rule states that concepts of the historically specific aspects of target systems (e.g., the capitalist economy) cannot be defined simply by means of transhistorical concepts. The second rule prohibits abstraction from the explanatorily relevant aspects which pertain, in Marx’s vocabulary, to the “essence” of the target system. In Section 3, I confront Marx’s notion of “abstraction” with contemporary statements on the method. It is shown that it covers both abstraction and idealization as understood in some modern accounts (notably, that of M. R. Jones). Under this approach, abstraction involves the tacit omission of properties, which are simply left unspecified. In contrast, idealization consists in the explicit counterfactual ascription of properties (and values of magnitudes). Finally, the representational goals pertaining to Marx’s “abstraction” are discussed, using distinctions due to M. Weisberg. It is shown that Marx was a proponent of “minimalist idealization”, focusing on the identification of causally relevant mechanisms that characterize all capitalist societies. I conclude with a suggestion for further research.
25. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Valentin A. Bazhanov Валентин Александрович Бажанов
Post-Soviet Marxism in the Soviet Era: Activity Approach to the Analysis of Science
Постсоветский марксизм в советскую эпоху

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Author discusses the specifics of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist philosophical principles in the context of ideological pressure in 1970–1980 s. He analyzes the concepts and approaches that have given rise to some new Post-Marxist ideas. He shows that the revision of the orthodox Marxism was possible exclusively due do the delicate usage of Marxist-Leninist conceptual background. He claims that it was necessary to in order to avoid accusations in revisionism and popularization of ideologically alien views. The author pays special attention to activity approach, which was represented in the works by I.S. Alexeev and M.A. Rozov. He argues that the development of this approach was one of the most significant achievements of non-orthodox Marxism in the Soviet era.
case-studies – science studies
26. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Gennady E. Gorelik Геннадий Ефимович Горелик
Hessen’s Explanation and the Needham Question, or How Marxism Helped to Put an Important Question but Hindered Answering It
Объяснение Гессена и вопрос Нидэма, или Как марксизм помог задать важный вопрос и помешал ответить на него

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Boris Hessen’s Marxist attempt to explain the origin of modern science helped Joseph Needham to come to his Grand Question. To make this heuristic question historically answerable it is extended in cultural space and time: What hindered Greco-Roman and Medieval science from making the next major step after Archimedes, and hindered Easterners from contributing to modern physics after Galileo up to the 20th century? Tо answer this question the key distinction between modern physics and pre-Galilean science is suggested: the right to invent “illogical” fundamental concepts, verifiable by experiment. The epistemological context of the Needham question and my “biblical” answer to it is discussed.
27. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Constantine D. Skordoulis Константин Скордулис
How Marxist History of Science Can Inform a Pedagogy of Science for Social Justice
Что марксистская философия науки может сказать о социальной справедливости в преподавании науки

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The scope of this paper is to examine the perspectives for a pedagogy of science for social justice situated in the framework of Marxism by proceeding to an analysis and a contemporary evaluation of the work of the scholars who are considered as the initiators of the Marxist history of science. In this paper therefore, I review N. Bukharin’s and B. Hessen’s seminal papers as presented in the 2nd International Congress of History of Science and Technology in 1931 in London. This Congress was marked by the appearance of the Soviet delegation influencing a generation of radical scientists in Britain with the most prominent figure being J. Bernal. I present J. Bernal’s views as developed in his most important work “The Social Function of Science” with an emphasis on his writings on science education and the role of science teachers for the emancipation of society. Finally, I present the work of the Austromarxist and member of the Left Vienna Circle E. Zilsel on “The Social Origin of Modern Science” contemplating on his work as an adult educator in the period that Vienna was governed by the Austrian Social Democratic Workers Party. Emphasis is placed on the role of science and education as a vehicle for raising proletarian self-awareness. The analysis of the legacies and works of these scholars of the Marxist tradition in the history of science shows that it can form the basis for a Marxist pedagogy of science that can change society and its practices in our epoch when education in science and pedagogy of science are considered one of the most important pillars of contemporary science policy.
interdisciplinary studies
28. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Álvaro Martins Siqueira Альваро Мартинc Секьера
Critical Realism and the Ontological Critique of Economics Methodology
Критический реализм и онтологическая критика методологии экономики

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The objective of this paper is to defend the importance of ontological critique of the mainstream economics. To do so, we examine the methodological arguments of Tony Lawson who, inspired by the critical realism philosophy, advocates in favor of realistic, non-deductive and ontology-aware economics to solve problems of contemporary economic theory. This article proposes that, although correct in the logic of its argument, Lawson’s critique of the mainstream is not able to explain the social reasons for its existence and reproduction. And if so, Lawson’s critique is not ontological. It can be stated that a project of generally reorienting economics methodology is impossible in case the social reason for its orthodox existence is maintained. Some substantial insights can be found in the Marx’s ontological critique of capitalism and also in the Critical Realism philosophy. Therefore, we propose an explanation for the enduring deductivism and empirical realism in economics from a Marxist perspective.
29. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Sergei N. Korsakov Сергей Николаевич Корсаков
The Floor is Given to Mr. Hessen
Слово товарищу Гессену

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The author presents the previously unknown text of the outstanding Soviet philosopher and historian of science Boris Mikhailovich Hessen. The author analyzes the report of Boris M. Hessen at the Second international Congress on the history of science and technology in London (1931). He considers as well some published works of B.M. Hessen, mainly his book on the philosophical interpretation of the theory of relativity. He argues that it is time to start introducing unpublished texts by B.M. Hessen into scientific circulation. This will make the study of his work more thorough and increase the reliability of conclusions made by specialists in Hessen’s legacy. This publication offers the reader the text of B.M. Hessen, extracted from the archive: the report of B.M. Hessen at a meeting of the Presidium of the Communist Academy about the trip to the London Congress.
30. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Boris M. Hessen Борис Михайлович Гессен
Speech at the Presidium Session of the Communist Academies. August 1, 1931
Выступление на заседании Президиума Коммунистической академии. 1 августа 1931 г

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B.M. Hessen’s speech at the meeting of the Presidium of the Communist Academy on August 1, 1931 is a report of his trip to London for the Second International Congress on the history of science and technology. During this meeting several presentations were made by the members of the Soviet delegation. In this report Boris M. Hessen tells in detail about his contacts with the socialist intelligentsia of Great Britain, about the situation in which the Congress was held, about his visit to scientific institutions in Great Britain and about the meeting with Petr L. Kapitsa.
book reviews
31. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 3
Valentin A. Bazhanov, Elena V. Kudryashova Валентин Александрович Бажанов
Marxism and Philosophy of Science
Марксизм и философия науки

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This is a review of the book: Sheehan H. Marxism and the Philosophy of Science. A Critical History. The First Hundred Years. (L.: Verso, 2017. XII. 450 p.). The keynote of the book serves the conviction that Marxism is a sort of “super-theory” that can explain not only any social and political life, but also profound philosophy of science, including natural science. Science is presented in the book as a form of social practice. The main idea of the Marxist philosophy of science is the status of the theory of dialectical materialism. The author shows that Marxist ideas could be considered as the origins of many disciplines: the sociology of science, the history of science, the history of technology; they had a noticeable effect on non-Marxist thought as well. However, Stalinism and Lysenkoism significantly decelerated the development of the Marxist philosophy of science.
32. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Irina A. Gerasimova Ирина Алексеевна Герасимова
Engineering knowledge in the technogenic civilization
Инженерное знание в техногенной цивилизации

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The author argues that the radical technological transformations contribute to the raise of new epistemological questions. The XXI century technologies could be described as a large-scale socio-technical system. The author claims that the engineering knowledge in the technogenic civilization combines science and technology, technology and industry, techno-science and art, economics, society and culture. At the same time engineers and technologists while doing their experimental research face with risks and uncertainty. The author argues that the rise of new global risks as well as the changes in the societal system make especially relevant the problems of resource saving, efficiency, ecological and technological safety. The author insists that the humanities could contribute to the settlement of these problems. She explains why the transdisciplinary approaches which aim at the cooperation of scientists and philosophers should be considered as the most prospective form of scientific research. This mode of research make it possible to combine fundamental issues with practical actions.
panel discussion
33. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Raisa E. Barash, Alexander Yu. Antonovski Раиса Эдуардовна Бараш
Radical Science: Are the scientists capable of social protest?
Радикальная наука

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The authors identify several types of the new forms of protestmovement that are discusses within the problems of autonomy ofscientific system and the protection of the interests of scientists. They argue that the this type of communication shows how it is possible to combine both cognitive and normative attitude of science. The authors show the mechanisms of the reproduction of this communication and argue that it gradually turns into communicative macro system. The authors conclude that the protest movement in science could be considered as a practical resolution of the Merton – Popper paradox, which presumes the incompatibility of both cognitive attitude (impartial observation) and normative dimension (value production) of science.
34. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Alexandra A. Argamakova Александра Александровна Аргамакова
Paradoxes of scientific ethos
Парадоксы научного этоса

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R.K. Merton’s idea of scientific ethos describes the norms and values, which regulate the cognitive practices of scientists. According to it, science has the special status and plays the role of referee in society and culture. Nevertheless, such view of science provokes the paradoxes and contradictions, connected with the basic principles of the conception and the application of science to practice. In the article, this theme will be analyzed at some extent, and the possible decisions of paradoxes around the scientific ethos will be outlined briefly.
35. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Alina O. Kostina Алина Олеговна Костина
Civil activism, mediation and expertise in scientific environment
Гражданский активизм, институт посредничества и экспертизы в научной среде

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Civil activism in the field of science is one of the most crucial issues and the key factor of autonomy of science. Herewith, the position of universities and other scientific institutions is vulnerable and hinges upon state and private financing. Science finds itself between two unattractive and doubtful prospects of developing in either bureaucratic or corporate (in the business sense) way, which leads to the abridgement of basic academic freedoms. Setting the problem of professional expertise and mediation is highly important for the definition of borders and consolidation of the position of science.
36. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Olga E. Stoliarova Ольга Евгеньевна Столярова
Scientific activism and the idea of performativity
Научный активизм и идея перформативности

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The author analyzes the paradoxes of scientific activism from the standpoint of the concept of performativity. The author shows that the contradiction between the disinterested knowledge of the world and the interested action in society is generated by the traditional understanding of knowledge as a justified belief. The author discusses the so called performative conception of science, which gains many adherents in STS and replaces the standard concept of science. It is shown that when studying science as practice, the paradoxes of scientific activism are revised, because the rigid boundary between knowledge and action, science and values is removed.
37. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Liana A. Tukhvatulina Лиана Анваровна Тухватулина
Merton-Popper’s paradox and the substantive rationality of science
Парадокс Мертона-Поппера в свете «материализации» рациональности в науке

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The author discusses the meaning of the paradox, which rises as a result of the controversy between the principles of scientific ethos (R. Merton) and fallibilism (K. Popper). She argues that the justification of the moral authority of science should not depend on this paradox. The author uses Max Weber’s concept of substantive rationality to consider the idea of social legitimation of science. She argues for understanding expertise as a special mode of scientific knowledge which aims at justifying the authority of science in the society.
38. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Alexander Yu. Antonovski Александр Юрьевич Антоновский
On the Critique of Protest. Reply to critics
О критике протеста. Ответ оппонентам

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epistemology and cognition
39. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Steve Fuller Стив Фуллер
The dialectic of politics and science from a post-truth standpoint
Диалектика политики и науки с точки зрения пост-правды

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This chapter takes off from Max Weber’s famous lectures on poli­tics and science as ‘vocations’ to explore the concept of ‘modal power’, that is, the power to determine what is possible. Politics and science are complementarily concerned with modal power, in ways that go to the heart of Michael Dummett’s influential metaphysical characterisation of the antirealism/realism distinc­tion, which the chapter pursues across several philosophical fields, including logic, epistemology, jurisprudence and finally historiog­raphy. The chapter adopts a ‘post-truth’ perspective in the sense that modal power is treated from an ‘antirealist’ standpoint, in which ‘the name of the game’ is to expand one’s own sphere of possible action while constraining that of the opponent. That world of constrained possibilities is the ‘actual’ world, whose rela­tionship to other possible worlds fluctuates over time in ways that resemble quantum effects but are most clearly captured by ‘revi­sionist’ historiography. The chapter ends with a discussion of the contrasting attitudes to such historiography in politics and science.
40. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 55 > Issue: 2
Vladimir N. Porus Владимир Натанович Порус
Contextualism in philosophy of science
Контекстуализм в философии науки

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The author discusses the possibility of spreading of the contextualism principles into the field of philosophy of science. He argues that, while discovering science in all of its aspects (viz. cultural, institutional, economic, communicative, etc.), philosophy of science identifies the relevant contexts for justifying the genesis, development, and reproduction of knowledge. Meanwhile, there is a complex interaction between philosophical and scientific analysis of these contexts. The author claims this process gives raise for a conflict which comes from the contextualization of science and the philosophical analysis of these contexts. The author shows that the resolution of these conflict could open new prospects for the modern philosophy of science.