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Displaying: 31-40 of 51 documents


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31. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Michael Tkacz Albertus Magnus and the Error of Ptolemy: Metaphysics and the Origins of Empirical Research Programs
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Is our science of the physical world a matter of theoretical description with predictive value, or is it instead a search for the productive causes of observed phenomena? Ancient astronomers such as Ptolemy maintained the former; ancient cosmologists such as Aristotle the latter. This debate is a central theme in Albert Magnus’s thirteenth-century Aristotelian commentaries. This paper shows how Albert defended the possibility of empirical science aimed at demonstrating the causes of observed phenomena. In the course of his defense, Albert identifies a specific error committed by Ptolemy concerning the subject of physical theory. The identification and correction of this error provides the basis upon which a proper metaphysical foundation for the empirical sciences can be laid. This foundation is nothing other than the recovery of the Aristotelian notion of form as the immanent intelligibility of physical natures.
32. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Kai Hauser Cantor’s Absolute in Metaphysics and Mathematics
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This paper explores the metaphysical roots of Cantor’s conception of absolute infinity in order to shed some light on two basic issues that also affect the mathematical theory of sets: the viability of Cantor’s distinction between sets and inconsistent multiplicities, and the intrinsic justification of strong axioms of infinity that are studied in contemporary set theory.
33. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
James G. Murphy, S.J. The Principle of Double Effect: Act-Types and Intentions
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Objections to the principle of double effect usually concern its first and second conditions (that the act not be evil in itself, and that the evil effect may not be intended). The difficulties often arise from a rejection of the idea that acts have a moral nature independent of context, and a tendency to interpret intention as purely psychological. This article argues that the “act itself” should be understood as the act-type and suggests that examples of evil act-types are not hard to find. It argues that the notion of intention is involved in both conditions, but in different ways. It proposes that these different ways can be interestingly illuminated by Anscombe’s distinction between acting intentionally and acting with an intention.
book reviews
34. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Peter Seipel Reason, Tradition and the Good: MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Reason and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. By Jeffery L. Nicholas
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35. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
C. Jeffery Kinlaw Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity. By Sally Sedgwick
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36. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Peter A. Redpath The Nature of Scientific Explanation. By Jude P. Dougherty
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37. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis. By Richard A. Richards
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38. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 2
Books Received
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39. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
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40. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 53 > Issue: 1
Jean-Louis Hudry Aristotle on Modality and Predicative Necessity
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Many logicians have tried to formalize a modal logic from the Prior Analytics, but the general view is that Aristotle has failed to offer a consistent modal logic there. This paper explains that Aristotle is not interested in modal logic as such. Modalities for him pertain to the relations of predication, without challenging the assertoric system of deductions simpliciter. Thus, demonstrations or dialectical deductions have modal predicates and yet are still deductions simpliciter. It is a matter of distinguishing inferential necessity that applies to every deduction from the modal predicates in the two premises and conclusion. The modality of demonstrations can be either necessary or possible. The necessity is predicative, i.e., independent of inferential necessity. While the possible demonstration challenges the predicative necessity of the necessary demonstration, it preserves the inferential necessity of the deduction simpliciter.