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Displaying: 31-40 of 847 documents


31. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Justin Mc Brayer A Value Argument Against Incompatibilism
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Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can’t require a lack of determinism.
32. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Dionysios A. Anapolitanos The Humean Notion of Sympathy
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33. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Alexiadou Anastasia-Sofia Locke on Language, Meaning and Communication
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34. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Grigoriou Christos The Concept of Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics
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35. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
William Outhwaite Habermas and (the) Enlightenment
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36. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Kolja Möller Popular Sovereignty, Populism and Deliberative Democracy
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This article investigates the relationship between popular sovereignty, populism, and deliberative democracy. My main thesis is that populisms resurrect the polemical dimension of popular sovereignty by turning “the people” against the “powerbloc” or the “elite”, and that it is crucial thatthis terrain not be ceded to authoritarian distortions of this basic contestatory grammar. Furthermore, I contend that populist forms of politics are compatible with a procedural and deliberative conception of democracy. Ifirst engage with the assumption that populism and a procedural model of democracy are incompatible, demonstrating that this assumption relies on a conservative bias which tiesthe exercising of communicative power to a “duty of civility” (Rawls). I then engage with radical-democratic reconstructions of the procedural notion of popular sovereignty which emphasize the unleashing and diversification of peoplehood in communication circuits and the mutual permeability of constitutional politics, parliamentary legislation, and the public sphere. Thirdly, I conclude that populisms are an essential part of communicative power in modern democracies and part of its dialectical structure.
37. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Wilhelm Dagmar Responding to the challenges of Globalisation: Habermas on Legitimacy, Transnationalism, and Cosmopolitanism
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38. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Anastasia Marinopoulou Defining cosmopolitanism: European politics of the twenty-first century
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39. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Julian Nida-Rümelin A cosmopolitan legitimization of state borders
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40. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Cristina Lafont Alternative visions of a new global order: what should cosmopolitans hope for?
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In this essay, I analyze the cosmopolitan project for a new international order that Habermas has articulated in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is a very ambitious model for a future international order geared to fulfill the peace and human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the obligation to protect human rights by the international community is circumscribed to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts and those due to regulations of the global economic order. I conclude that the cosmopolitan goals of the Habermasian project can only be achieved if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice.