Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 21-40 of 847 documents


21. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Justin Mc Brayer A Value Argument Against Incompatibilism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can’t require a lack of determinism.
22. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Dionysios A. Anapolitanos The Humean Notion of Sympathy
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
23. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Alexiadou Anastasia-Sofia Locke on Language, Meaning and Communication
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
24. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 3/4
Grigoriou Christos The Concept of Catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
25. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
William Outhwaite Habermas and (the) Enlightenment
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
26. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Kolja Möller Popular Sovereignty, Populism and Deliberative Democracy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article investigates the relationship between popular sovereignty, populism, and deliberative democracy. My main thesis is that populisms resurrect the polemical dimension of popular sovereignty by turning “the people” against the “powerbloc” or the “elite”, and that it is crucial thatthis terrain not be ceded to authoritarian distortions of this basic contestatory grammar. Furthermore, I contend that populist forms of politics are compatible with a procedural and deliberative conception of democracy. Ifirst engage with the assumption that populism and a procedural model of democracy are incompatible, demonstrating that this assumption relies on a conservative bias which tiesthe exercising of communicative power to a “duty of civility” (Rawls). I then engage with radical-democratic reconstructions of the procedural notion of popular sovereignty which emphasize the unleashing and diversification of peoplehood in communication circuits and the mutual permeability of constitutional politics, parliamentary legislation, and the public sphere. Thirdly, I conclude that populisms are an essential part of communicative power in modern democracies and part of its dialectical structure.
27. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Wilhelm Dagmar Responding to the challenges of Globalisation: Habermas on Legitimacy, Transnationalism, and Cosmopolitanism
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
28. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Anastasia Marinopoulou Defining cosmopolitanism: European politics of the twenty-first century
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
29. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Julian Nida-Rümelin A cosmopolitan legitimization of state borders
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
30. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Cristina Lafont Alternative visions of a new global order: what should cosmopolitans hope for?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this essay, I analyze the cosmopolitan project for a new international order that Habermas has articulated in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is a very ambitious model for a future international order geared to fulfill the peace and human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the obligation to protect human rights by the international community is circumscribed to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations due to armed conflicts and those due to regulations of the global economic order. I conclude that the cosmopolitan goals of the Habermasian project can only be achieved if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice.
31. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Darrow Schecter System and Life-world, or Systems and Systemic Environments?: Reflections on the Social and Political Theories of Habermas and Luhmann
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
32. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Stefan Müller-Doohm Are There Limits to Postmetap hysical Thought?: Jürgen Habermas’ Conception of Normativity in a secularised Society
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
33. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Piet Strydom The Problem of Limit Concepts in Habermas: Toward a Cognitive Approach to the Cultural Embodiment of Reason
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay deals with Habermas’ concept of truth in his late theoretical philosophy. Assuming his suggestive yet highly inspiring inauguration of a cognitive turn in Critical Theory, it probes his use of the notion of limit concept against the background of the tradition of thought from which it originally derives with the intention of identifying the notion’s potential for taking this promising departure further. It brings to the fore a number of issues in his late writings that reveal the presence of what may be considered the problem of limit concepts in his thought. For present purposes, these issues are located in two areas: Habermas’ revision of his long-held concept of truth and the related criticism of Peirce; and his account of the role of limit concepts like truth and warranted assertibility or rational acceptability in processes of discursive justification. The analysis finds that there is a structural deficit in his presentation that could be filled by cognitively conceived cultural structures that not only correspond to the major types of limit concepts, but also answer to his undeveloped vision of the ‘cultural embodiment of reason’.
34. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 42 > Issue: 1/2
Hauke Brunkhorst Democratic Self-Determination through Anarchic, Public Will-Formation: Towards a robust theory of deliberative democracy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Aim is a robust theory of deliberative democracy. Therefore, three theses are explained by two historical examples, the revolution of 1848 in France (Chapter I), and the new social movements that emerged in the 1960s (Chapter II). The theses are that (1) democratic will-formation is related internally to truth. The foundation and justification of all legal norms in public will-formation presupposes (2) the sublation of the liberal dualism of democracy and rights and of the idealist dualism of rationality and reality in favor of (3) a continuum of public debates, social struggles, and legislative procedures.
35. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Samuel Kahn Positive Duties, Maxim Realism and the Deliberative Field
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
36. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Luca Forgione Kant on the Reflecting Power of Judgment and Nonconceptual Content
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
37. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Joby Varghese Misguided Explanation by the Application of Screening Off Via the Principle of Common Cause
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The Principle of common cause (PCC) has its significance in providing explanations of phenomena in terms of causal theories. Though the principle has its own epistemological advantages, there can be certain situations where the principle might fail. In the first part of the paper, I offer a preliminary assessment of the PCC and then I turn to make an attempt to illustrate those scenarios where the PCC might misguide us in providing explanation of phenomena in terms of common cause.
38. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Petros Damianos Non Conceptual Content And Observable, In Realism Debate
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this article, I try to present some effects of the acceptance of nonconceptual content of perception in the realism problem. After having enhancement as main the problem of discrimination observable - unobservable into the conflict of realism with the constructive empiricism, I criticize a particular aspect, that nonconceptual content of perception strengthens the realistic position. Arguing that, while the starting point of the realist position is the existence of entities of common sense, there is nothing that assures us that the world of our daily life consists of objective, specific, unambiguous entities, that is made up the deep structure of the world - as realists believes - and entities are not just "relevant" objects, which are meant only for our own biological species. These “subjective for species” entities we are obliged, as a particular species, to percept with particular perceptual organs in order to satisfy specific needs, and manage to survive ourselves in a particular environment.
book review
39. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 4
Nikolaos Garipidis Democracy as Popular Sovereignty
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
40. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 41 > Issue: 2/3
Theodore Scaltsas Sharing a Property
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The Socratic discussion in the Hippias Major, 300-303, is not a passing comment on plural reference; it is a theory of plural subjecthood. It has escaped attention because it is a small part of a larger complex argument on the topic of which pleasures are fine. Socrates’s theory is further concealed by the fact that it is presented as an antithesis between Hippias and himself, whereas in fact, Hippias’s position becomes part of Socrates’s theory. I begin by examining Hippias’s position, and subsequently Socrates’ criticism of it. I then turn to Socrates’s further proposal, and the development of a theory of plural subjects that incorporates elements of Hippias’s position, and Socrates’s own. At the end, I address the question of the ontology of plural subjects. I argue that the key to sharing a property between subjects is not in the way that the plural terms refer to these subjects, or in any decomposition of the commonly owned property instance into parts distributed to these subjects. Rather, I follow Socrates in finding the common ownership of a property instance central to plural subjecthood, and develop an account of how this metaphysical function can be performed by the plural subjects without threatening their distinctness and plurality.